University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
12-2011

Three essays on the influence of formal institutions on
entrepreneurship.
Michael David Crum
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Crum, Michael David, "Three essays on the influence of formal institutions on entrepreneurship." (2011).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 294.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/294

This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the
author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

THREE ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS ON
ENTREPRENEURSHIP

By
Michael David Crum

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Business of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

College of Business
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

December 2011

THREE ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS ON
ENTREPRENEURSHIP

By
Michael David Crum
A Dissertation Approved on

September 30, 2011

By the following Dissertation Committee:

Dissertation Chair

Bruce H. Kemelgor

James O. Fiet

Jill L. Adelson

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my dissertation committee as well as the other faculty at the
University of Louisville who advised and mentored me over the course of my Ph.D.
program. I would also like to thank the Kauffman Foundation for use of the Kauffman
Firm Survey data in this dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, family
members, and friends who put up with me over the long process of obtaining my Ph.D.

111

ABSTRACT
THREE ESSA YS ON THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS ON
ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Michael David Crum
September 30,2011

This dissertation is composed of three essays in which I examine the influence of
formal institutions on entrepreneurs and new firms. In the first essay, "The Influence of
Institutions on the Likelihood of Self-Employment: A Multilevel Analysis," I examine
how institutions at the country-level are related to the likelihood that individuals in those
country are self-employed. Country-level measures of formal institutions are paired with
individual-level data on self-employment from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(Reynolds et aI., 2005). Using the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World
index and the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom separately as measures
of institutions, I find that sound money in a country is positively associated with
individual self-employment with both indices. Property rights and trade freedom are
positively related to self-employed using the Economic Freedom of the World index.

In the second essay, "Labor Market Institutions and New Firm Employment
Growth,'" I examine how state-level labor market characteristics such as minimum wages,
union densities, and unemployment insurance premiums influence employment growth in
new firms. I use firm-level data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (DesRoches, Robb, &
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Mulcahy, 2009), which contains data from several thousand new firms for years 20042008. Minimum wages, union densities, and unemployment insurance structure do not
predict the level of employment in new firms in the manner hypothesized.
In the third essay, "The Impact of Taxes and Regulations on New Firm Births and
Deaths in State Border Counties," I examine how state-level measures of government
size, taxation burdens, unionization levels, and minimum wages influence the birth and
death rates of firms in counties located on state borders. Tabulations containing data on
establishment births and deaths by U.S. County (Plummer & Headd, 2008) were merged
with measures of government size, taxation burdens, union densities, and minimum
wages. I find a negative relationship between the overall tax burden and the birth rate of
new firms. However, unionization, minimum wages and government size are not related
to the bilih and death rates of firms in the manner hypothesized.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The decision to become an entrepreneur, as well as one's ultimate success at it, is
the result of both individual characteristics as well as the environment in which
entrepreneurs find themselves (Shane, 2003). In addition to individual differences,
environmental factors are likely to influence the behavior of entrepreneurs as well. As
noted by Baumol (1990), the reward structure in an economy may not only influence the
level of entrepreneurship, but it is likely to influence the types of entrepreneurship that
manifests itself. When the "rules ofthe game" incentivize certain activities and
discourages others, the behavior of economic actors is bound to be influenced by them
(North, 1987). In this dissertation, I examine how formal institutions - the rules of the
game developed through constitutions, statutory law, and legal precedent (Williamson,
2000) - influence entry into entrepreneurship as well as the behavior of existing
entrepreneurs.
In this dissertation I develop three essays that discuss and test the influence of
formal institutions on the behavior of entrepreneurs. The first essay, "The Influence of
Institutions on the Likelihood of Self-Employment: A Multilevel Analysis," examines the
relationship between institutions and self-employment. Country-level institution
measures include taxation levels, the strength of property rights, soundness of money,
trade freedom, and the level of business regulation. I also examine how individual
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characteristics interact with country-level variables to detennine the likelihood that
individuals will be self-employed. In the second essay, "Labor Market Institutions and
New Finn Employment Growth," I examine how state-level labor market factors such as
minimum wages, union density, and unemployment insurance premiums influence
employment growth in new finns. Finally, in the third essay, "The Impact of Taxes and
Regulations on New Firm Births and Deaths in State Border Counties," I examine how
state-level measures of government size, tax burdens, unionization levels, and minimum
wages influence the birth and death rates of new finns in counties located on state
borders. Differences in birth rates between manufacturing and service finns are
examined as well.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, entrepreneurship is briefly
discussed. Secondly, the literature on institutions and their impact on growth and
entrepreneurship are examined. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief summary of
the three essays of this dissertation.
1.1. ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The tenn entrepreneurship is associated with multiple definitions, including the
creation of a new finn (Gartner, 1988), the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of
opportunities to create future goods and services (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000),
innovation (Schumpeter, 1942), self-employment and small business management
(Davidsson,2004). Not only has entrepreneurship been defined in various ways, it also
has been measured in many ways, such as self-employment rates, nascent
entrepreneurship rates, and new finn births (Davidsson, 2004). In this dissertation,
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several measures of entrepreneurship will be used, such as self-employment and new firm
entry (creation of a new firm).
The level of entrepreneurship varies substantially among various legal
jurisdictions, whether measured by self-employment, new firm startups, or innovation.
Countries tend to have varying levels of self-employment (Blanchflower, 2000;
Noorderhaven, Thurik, Wennekers, & Van Stel, 2004), nascent entrepreneurship (Arenius
& Minniti, 2005; Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik, & Reynolds, 2005) and innovation

(Shane, 1993). Furthermore, states and provinces within a country vary in the level of
entrepreneurship that they have (Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Sobel, 2008). A number of
possible explanations may exist for these differences, including varying institutions
(formal and informal), wealth, unemployment levels, and human capital differences
among regIOns.
Determining what factors influence the level and type of entrepreneurship is
important for several reasons. Entrepreneurship may be personally fulfilling because it is
challenging and allows a high degree of personal freedom. Engaging in entrepreneurship
is something that individuals often prefer to do in comparison to working for a wage
(Blanchflower, Oswald, & Stutzer, 2001; Gohmann, in press; Kolvereid, 1996).
However, certain environmental factors may limit an individual's ability to become an
entrepreneur, even when they have the desire to become an entrepreneur and profitable
opportunities exist. Entrepreneurship is also important for the wider economy due to the
positive externalities that it generates. Entrepreneurship leads to the commercialization
of new goods and services (Kirchhoff, 1994; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) and
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entrepreneurs have brought many innovations to market (Kenney, 1986). Furthermore,
evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is associated with economic growth (Thurik &
Wennekers, 2004) as well as job creation (FoIster, 2000; Kirchhoff, 1994).

1.2. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS
The term "institution" is a broad term that has been defined in various ways in the
social sciences. For this dissertation, I use the concept of "institutions" that has been
found in the new institutional economics literature. Thus, institutions set the "rules of the
game" in an economy; determining incentives, reducing uncertainty, and influencing
transaction costs in an economy (North, 1987). Pejovich (1998) similarly states that
institutions are "the legal, administrative and customary arrangements for repeated
human interactions" (p. 23). Institutions constrain human action and influence how
humans interact with one another (North, 1990).
Institutions can be both informal and formal (North, 1990). Informal institutions
include norms, social conventions, codes of behavior, and customs. These originate from
the experience, routines, culture, and religious beliefs of a society (Klein, 2000; Pejovich,
1998; Williamson, 2000). Thus, informal institutions may last a very long time, perhaps
centuries (Williamson, 2000) and may influence a number of economic outcomes (North,
1990). For example, in many societies, dishonesty is considered an inappropriate form of
behavior (Knowles & Weatherston, 2006; North, 1990). Individuals who are dishonest
will face social sanction which is likely to discourage dishonest behavior, decreasing
transaction cost in the society (Knowles & Weatherston, 2006). Conversely, formal
institutions are the rules that originate from constitutions, statutory law and legal
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precedent (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Formal institutions typically change with
more regularity, although some may last substantial periods oftime as well (Williamson,
2000). Informal and formal institutions are closely and causally related to one another.
Norms, customs, and traditions have an impact on formal institutions, by such
mechanisms as the laws and constitutions that a country adopts. Furthermore, the laws of
a country may influence the norms, customs and codes of behavior in a society. For
example, in addition to affecting changes in social norms leading to increased tobacco
taxes and regulations in the United States, it is likely that increasing regulations (changes
in formal institutions) have also affected the norms regarding smoking (Hamilton, Biener,
& Brennan, 2008; Nyborg & Rege, 2003).

North (1990) uses the example of a sporting event to further clarify what is meant
by institutions and to differentiate institutions from organizations. Take the example of a
basketball game that occurs between two opposing teams. The teams are an organization;
they do not set the rules of the game, but they are obligated (or at least have a strong
incentive) to abide by them, just like individuals and organizations within an economy.
Formal institutions are the rules of the game actually written down in the rulebook that
are enforced by the referees. These would include rules against excessive physical
contact with other players (fouling), rules that prevent players from blocking shots that
are on a downward trajectory (goaltending), and rules determining how many points a
basket is worth. The rules against goaltending clearly give players a substantial incentive
not to engage in goaltending because the punishment for doing so is to count the basket
as if it were actually made. Furthermore, in basketball, there are many informal
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institutions that influence player behavior as well. For example, sportsmanship is a social
convention among basketball players. It is generally considered unsportsmanlike for
basketball players not to shake the hands of other players at the end of a game. Although
a player breaking this "rule" is not breaking any official basketball rules and will face no
punishment from referees, they likely will face disgust by fans and other players. Both
the formal and informal institutions in this example reduce the uncertainty that players
and teams face because they are aware of what behaviors are acceptable as well as the
sanction they will face for behaving in an unacceptable manner. They also know what
punishment players of the opposing team will face if they violate these rules, and thus
have some expectations about what the opposing team is likely to do (the other team is
likely not to engage in goaltending very often, for example). The institutions also
determine the incentives in the basketball game. Because basketball rules (formal
institution) state that a shot taken behind the three-point line is worth three points instead
of two, players have more of an incentive to take these shots than they would if they were
simply worth two points.
Institutions, both formal and informal, have been used to explain economic
outcomes, such as economic growth. However, many theories developed to explain
economic growth do not explicitly consider the institutions (Gwartney, Holcombe, &
Lawson, 2004). Solow's (1957) neoclassical growth model predicted that economic
output was a function of capital, labor, and the effectiveness of labor. Therefore, in
Solow's model, economic growth was mainly due to the effectiveness oflabor! (Romer,

1 Although variation in capital could increase economic growth according to the Solow model, long-term
growth would be due to changes in the effectiveness of labor.
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1996). Although economic thinking regarding economic growth has since evolved, the
convergence prediction of Solow's (1957) model has received some empirical support
(Barro & Xavier, 1992). That is, economies with low level of per capita income tend to
grow more quickly over time and tend to catch up with those with higher initial levels of
per capita income. Later, theories of endogenous growth began to emerge that focused
on the effectiveness oflabor factor that explained much of the variance in economic
growth in Solow's (1957) model (Romer, 1994). Additionally, researchers (Gallup,
Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999) have argued for many other predictors of economic growth,
including climate and geography. Climate and geography have an effect on
transportation cost, the productively of agriculture, and the level of disease. Natural
resources are thought to have an influence on economic growth, with substantial natural
resource wealth, oddly enough, being associated with low economic growth (Sachs &
Warner, 2001). This is thought to be due to "Dutch Disease" which occurs when an
extreme increase in a nation's wealth due to an increase in the value of natural resources
causes the currency to strengthen relative to other currencies. This makes products
manufactured in the country more expensive on the world market, leading to fewer
exports and less investment in manufacturing (Corey, 2009; Stevens, 2003).
Institutional economics does not view economic growth as an inevitable outcome.
Instead, institutions first must be adopted in an economy that reduces the cost of
transacting, encourages capital and labor to be put towards productive uses, and allows
the sharing and transfer of risk (Klein, 2000). Like with the basketball example, the rules
in a society are likely to determine how the game is played, as well as the outcome. In
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the 1986-1987 basketball season, the NCAA adopted the three-point line (Bradley, 2009).
This rule change allowed more total points to be scored in a game, gave an advantage to
teams that had effective long-range shooters, and gave teams a greater chance to come
back and win the game after being substantially behind. Likewise, differences in the
"rules of the game" between countries will lead to different behavior by individuals and
organizations within those countries, which will ultimately lead to differences in
economic outcomes- such as growth, unemployment levels, and the distribution of
income. While some institutions may lead to stagnation and high unemployment, those
that encourage specialization of labor and efficient use of capital are likely to lead to high
levels of employment and substantial economic growth (North, 1990). Subsequent
research has produced a plethora of findings supporting the idea that different types of
institutions are associated with different levels of wealth and growth in economies
(Barro, 1996; Dawson, 2003).
One challenge in using institutions to predict economic growth is determining
which institutions are likely to influence economic growth, as well as how to measure
them. While the "quality" of institutions has been conceptualized and measured in many
different ways, one common measure of institutions has been the level of economic
freedom in an economy (Gwartney & Lawson, 2003). Economic freedom refers to the
"freedom to choose which goods or services to buy, where to invest, and with whom to
trade, and to set a mutually acceptable exchange price" (Johnson & Lenartowicz, 1998: p.
337). Economic freedom is said to exist when property rights are protected; governments
are small, and taxes are low; currency is sound; and few government restrictions are
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placed on an individual's ability to contract with other parties (Gwartney et aI., 2004).
Empirical research has generally supported the hypothesis that countries with high levels
of economic freedom have higher growth rates than those with low levels of economic
freedom (De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Dollar, 1992; Easton & Walker, 1997; Farr, Lord, &
Wolfenbarger, 1998; Gwartney, Lawson, & Holcombe, 1999; Heckelman, 2000). The
specific effect of property rights on economic growth have been discussed and examined
as well (Gwartney et aI., 2004; Leblang, 1996; Torstensson, 1994). Property rights refer
to "the individual's ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the
asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange" (Barzel, 1997: p. 3). When
property rights are protected by governments through legal protections, individual actors
in the economy can make long-term, capital investments without worrying about whether
their property will be expropriated by the government or other parties. Because contracts
will be enforced by the courts, transaction costs are low (Pejovich, 1998). Thus, strong
property rights reduce uncertainty, and thus give economic actors more incentive to make
long-term investments (Besley, 1995).
While institutions have been associated with economic growth, institutions merely
set the "rules of the game" in an economy; economic players must act in order for
economic growth to occur. Thus, institutions are likely to influence other drivers of
economic growth, such as entrepreneurship. Certain institutions may influence the
number of individuals who become entrepreneurs (McMullen, Bagby, & Palich, 2008;
Ovaska & Sobel, 2005), the type of entrepreneurship in which individuals engage
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(Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008), as well as the ultimate success of their business ventures
(Sobel, Clark, & Lee, 2007).
In this dissertation, I build on this research by examining how institutions
influence the behavior of entrepreneurs in three different contexts.
1.3. SUMMARY OF THE THREE ESSAYS

Essay #1: The Influence of Institutions on the Likelihood of Self-Employment: A
Multilevel Analysis
Past research has examined the relationship between institutions and
entrepreneurship (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2009; McMullen et ai., 2008; Sobel,
2008). Although some relationships have been found between measures of institutions
and entrepreneurship, there has been little attempt to examine how institutions interact
with individual characteristics to influence the likelihood that an individual will be selfemployed. Small government size, property rights protection, sound money, freedom to
trade, and business freedom are hypothesized to increase the probability that an
individual in that country is engaged in self-employment. Also, an individual's education
level and regulatory focus are hypothesized to interact with institutional factors to
determine the likelihood that an individual will be engaged in self-employment.
In this essay, the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship is tested
using two sets of measures of institutions: (1) The Economic Freedom of the World index
(Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel, & Leeson, 2007) and (2) the Index of Economic Freedom
(Heritage Foundation, 2005). The 10 components from the Index of Economic Freedom
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are modified so that they are conceptually equivalent to the five components from the
Economic Freedom of the World index. Therefore, five different measures of institutions
are used from the two different indices: size of government, property rights, sound
money, trade freedom, and business freedom. This allows the robustness of these
relationships to be examined. Individual-level data on self-employment comes from the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Reynolds et aI., 2005). Multi-level modeling is
performed using the lmer and glmmPQL packages in R to estimate how these
institutional variables influence the probability that an individual is engaged in selfemployment. Some support is found for a positive relationship between trade freedom,
property rights, and sound money in the country in which an individual resides and the
likelihood that they are engaged in self-employment. Government size/taxation levels
and the level of business regulations do not predict engagement in self-employment in the
hypothesized manner. This essay is presented in Chapter 2.

Essay #2: Labor Market Institutions and New Firm Employment Growth
Labor market institutions include the taxes on labor, minimum wages,
employment regulations, social security taxes and benefits, and laws governing
unionization in an economy (Nickell 1998). Labor market institutions develop over time,
often as a result of various social movements and economic shocks (Thelen, 2004) and
vary widely across countries and sometimes even among regions or states within a
country. Because these institutions set the rules for both employees and employers, they
ultimately influence the cost of labor and affect hiring, firing, and other employment
decisions within the firm. In this essay, I examine how minimum wages, unemployment
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insurance premiums, and unionization levels impact employment growth in new firms. I
hypothesized that low minimum wages and low unemployment insurance premiums will
increase hiring and lead to higher levels of employment among new firms. Conversely,
high levels of unionization are predicted to lead to increased firm employment levels.
For this essay, I obtain firm-level data from Kauffman Firm Survey (DesRoches,
Robb, & Mulcahy, 2009), which contains data on several thousand new firms followed
longitudinally across five waves which were collected for years 2004-2008. I match
these data with state-level data minimum wage, unemployment tax, and unionization
data. Multilevel modeling using the SAS Glimmix procedure is then used to see how the
labor market factors in the state in which the firm operates predicts the firm employment
level over time. State union density is found to have a marginal negative effect on firm
employee growth. I found no relationship between both minimum wages and the
unemployment insurance structure and employee growth in new firms. This essay is
presented in Chapter 3.
Essay #3: The Impact of Taxes and Regulations on New Firm Births and Deaths in
State Border Counties.

This essay answers the following question: How do state-level taxes and
regulations influence the birth and death rates of firms? I hypothesize that small
government size, low tax burden, and low minimum wages will be associated with high
levels of firm births, especially among manufacturing firms. In addition, I hypothesize
that small government size, low tax burden, and low minimum wages will be associated
with a high level of firm deaths as well.
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Data on finn births and deaths by industry are obtained from a custom tabulation
from the U.S. Census Bureau's Company Division. Known as the EBD (establishment
births and deaths), these tabulations contains data on establishment births and deaths for
each county in the United States from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). More
specifically, for each county in the United States, these tabulations contain the total
single-unit, multi-unit, and total establishment births and deaths and the finn's five-digit
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. These data are merged
with measures of government size, tax burdens, union densities, and minimum wages
from the Economic Freedom of North America index (Karabegovic, McMahon, &
Mitchell, 2005). Furthermore, the overall county tax burden data are obtained from the
U.S. Census of Governments. In the analysis, only counties on state borders are
examined, and these counties are matched with other counties that are located on the
other side of the state border. This allows for the control for a number of unobservable
factors (Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a). I found support for a negative relationship
between overall tax burden and the birth rate of new finns. However, unionization,
minimum wages and government size did not influence the birth and death rates of finns
in the manner hypothesized.

13

CHAPTER 2: THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS ON THE LIKELIHOOD
OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

2.1. INTRODUCTION
Formal institutions are significant predictors of economic growth in an economy
(Barro, 1996; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). In
addition, scholars have argued that a relationship exists between institutions and the level
and type of entrepreneurship that manifests itself (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008). Recently,
empirical work has started to examine the influence institutions have on entrepreneurship.
For example, small government size is positively related to sole proprietor growth rates
(Kreft & Sobel, 2005) and self-employment rates (Nystrom, 2008). Furthermore, a
heavily regulated business environment is associated with a decrease in new firm entry
(Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; van Stel, Storey, & Thurik, 2007). The level of
economic freedom, or the extent to which governments allow free exchange and protect
property rights (Gwartney et aI., 2007), is associated with increased levels of
entrepreneurship, indicated by increases in variables such as venture capital availability,
innovation (Sobel, 2008), and net new business formation (Campbell & Rogers, 2007).
Likewise, economic freedom is negatively related to unproductive entrepreneurial
activities such as lobbying (Sobel, 2008).
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Although empirical work has begun to examine the relationship between
institutions and entrepreneurship, many unanswered questions remain. Most research
examining the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship uses aggregated
measures of entrepreneurship, such as the rate of self-employment or innovation in a
country or state (Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008; Sobel, 2008; Sobel et
aI.,2007). The disadvantage to using an aggregated analysis is that it does not allow for
the control of individual characteristics and for the testing of cross-level interactions
(Luke, 2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Thus, we do not know to what degree
individual characteristics interact with the institutional environment to influence the
likelihood that an individual is engaged in entrepreneurship. Another concern is that
many studies use different samples and different yet overlapping measures of institutions.
For example, whereas small government size relates positively to entrepreneurial activity
in several studies (Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; Nystrom, 2008), a recent study using a
different measure of government size found it to be non-significant (McMullen et aI.,
2008). Although many measures of institutions are available, economic freedom indices
are perhaps the most commonly used. Two major economic freedom indices exist for
countries (1) the Economic Freedom of the World index, published by the Fraser institute
(Gwartney et aI., 2007), and (2) the Index of Economic Freedom, published by the
Heritage Foundation (2005). These indices contain some similar measures; however,
they are constructed differently. This difference in construction may lead to conflicting
results when comparing studies that use different indices. Therefore, we do not know if
the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship is robust across the different
indices or if it is just an artifact of the measure being used.
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In this essay, I examine the following research question: Does a country's formal
institutional environment influence the likelihood that individuals are engaged in selfemployment? Baumol (1990) argues that the institutional environment has a profound
impact on entrepreneurship. This essay adds to previous research by examining how
individual-level moderators of this relationship, such as regulatory focus and human
capital, influence self-employment. This essay has implications for public policy as well.
Some empirical evidence indicates that job creation (FoIster, 2000) and economic growth
(Carree, van Stel, Thurik, & Wennekers, 2002) might become impaired when selfemployment levels become too low. Thus, it is important for policy makers to assure that
the institutions in their country do not hamper the ability of individuals to become selfemployed.
This essay starts by reviewing the literature concerning institutions and
entrepreneurship and by developing hypotheses concerning how the formal institutional
environment influences the likelihood that individuals engage in self-employment.
Furthermore, I develop several hypotheses predicting cross-level interaction effects,
focusing on how institutions interact with an individual's regulatory focus and human
capital to determine the likelihood of self-employment. Finally, I use data from the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset to test the hypotheses.

2.2. INSTITUTIONS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The institutional environment influences many outcomes in an economy,
including economic growth (Barro, 1996; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Rodrik et aI., 2004)
and the level of entrepreneurship (McMullen et aI., 2008; Ovaska & Sobel, 2005). The
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institutional environment may also affect the amount of productive and unproductive
entrepreneurship that exists (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008). As North (1990) states:
"Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
human devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic"
(p.3).

Therefore, institutions set the "rules of the game" in an economy; determine incentives,
reduce uncertainly, and influence transaction costs (North, 1987).
Institutions can be both formal and informal (North, 1990). Informal institutions
(or informal constraints) include norms, social conventions, codes of behavior, and
customs, which originate from the experience, routines, culture, and religious beliefs of a
society (Klein, 2000; Pejovich, 1998; Williamson, 2000). Formal institutions are the
rules developed by human beings, such as constitutions and statutory law (North, 1990;
Williamson, 2000). Informal and formal institutions are closely and causally related to
one another. Norms, customs, and traditions (informal institutions) influence the laws
and the constitution a country adopts (formal institutions). Furthermore, the laws of a
country may influence its norms, customs, and traditions. For example, changes in social
norms lead to increased tobacco taxes and regulations in the United States, and yet it is
likely that increased regulations have influenced the norms regarding smoking, making
smoking less socially acceptable (Hamilton et aI., 2008; Nyborg & Rege, 2003).
Informal and formal institutions typically differ in how quickly they change. While
informal institutions can last centuries, formal institutions typically change more often
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(Williamson, 2000), although they vary greatly with respect to how quickly they change.
While the U.S. Constitution was created over a short period of time, other institutions,
such as British common law, evolved over a much longer period (North, 1990).
Although there is a close relationship between informal and formal institutions
and both may have an impact on entrepreneurship, this essay will focus exclusively on
how formal institutions in a country affect entrepreneurship. Hereafter, the term
"institutions" will refer exclusively to formal institutions.
2.3. MODEL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY
To predict how institutions affect the self-employment decision, it is necessary to
understand why people flow in and out of self-employment. I use a model similar to
Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997) to predict exit from self-employment to wage
employment. I also modify this model to explain entry into self-employment from wage
employment.
Switching from Self-Employment to Wage Employment
In their model, Gimeno et aI., (1997) assume an individual compares the
threshold level of performance to the actual economic performance of her business to
determine whether to continue the venture. The threshold level of performance is the
minimum performance that he or she requires from the venture to keep operating it. The
threshold performance is a function of the opportunity cost associated with other forms of
employment, the cost of switching occupations (from self-employment to the new
occupation), and the difference in psychic income between continuing self-employment
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and other possible sources of employment. Figure 2.1 displays a simplified version of the
model.

Figure 2.1: Model of Entrepreneurial Exit

Adopted/rom Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo (1997)

Economic
Performanc~

of the Firm
Exit SelfEmployment
Income Available in
Other Employment

Psychic Income in
Threshold

Self-Employment Psychic Income in
Alternative

Cost of Switching
Occupations

When the expected economic performance of a venture is higher than the
threshold level of performance, an individual will continue to be self-employed. When
the expected economic level of performance falls below the threshold level of
performance, the firm is abandoned, and the individual leaves self-employment for wage
employment. Threshold performance is determined by three factors. The first is income
available from other sources of employment, or the opportunity cost of being selfemployed. If the individual can earn a substantial return in wage employment, then the
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threshold level of their business will be high. The second factor is the difference between
the psychic income from self-employment and the psychic income from alternative
employment. If the individual enjoys self-employment more than wage employment then
this difference will be large, and will further increase the threshold level of performance.
Psychic income can be substantial for the self-employed (Hamilton, 2000). The third
factor is the switching cost associated with moving from self-employment to wage
employment. High switching cost will increase the threshold level of performance
(Gimeno et aI., 1997).
An individual will discontinue the business and become a wage earner when the
expected utility of operating the entrepreneurial venture (UE) is less than the utility of
alternative employment (U A) minus the associated cost of switching from selfemployment to alternative employment (SC EA ):
(1)

UE is determined by the expected economic performance of the venture (EP E) plus
the psychic income that the individual obtains from operating the venture (PIE). EP E is a
function of the entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human capital
specific to the current firm (X2). PIE is a function of a number of individual
characteristics (x.).
(2)
The expected utility of alternative employment (U A) is determined by the
expected economic performance of alternative employment (EPA) plus the psychic
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income that the individual obtains from alternative employment (PIA). EPA is a function
of the entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human capital specific to
alternative employment (X3). The PIA is a function of a number of individual
characteristics (Xs).

(3)

Subsituting (2) and (3) into (1) yields the combined model:

Thus, an entrepreneur will close a firm when the expected utility gained from
operating the venture becomes less than the expected utility of alternative employment
minus the cost of switching from entreprneuership to alternative employment. The
expected utility the entrepreneur recieves from the venture is derived from both the
economic performance of the venture as well as the psyhic income of operaing the
venture. Likewise, the expected utility of alternative employment is due to both the
economic performance and psychic income of alternative employment.

Switching from Wage Employment to Self-Employment
Although the model developed by Gimeno et al. (1997) is used to predict whether
a self-employed individual will switch to an alternative form of employment, the same
factors can be used to predict if an individual who is currently engaged in wage
(alternative) employment will switch into self-employment. An individual will
discontinue wage employment and start a venture when the utility of alternative
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employment (V A) is less than the utility of self-employment (V E) minus the cost of
switching from alternative employment to self-employment (SC AE ):
(5)

V A is determined by the expected economic performance of alternative
employment (EPA) plus the psychic income that the individual obtains from alternative
employment (PIA)' EPA is a function of the individual's general human capital (Xl) and
his or her human capital specific to alternative employment (X3). PIA is a function of a
number of individual characteristics (Xs).

Equation 6 displays the combined equation. The expected performance of the
venture (EP E), the expected performance of alternative employment (EP A), and switching
costs (both SC EA and SCAE) are likely to be influenced by the institutional environment.

2.4. INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF SELF -EMPLOYMENT
The institutions in a country influence the likelihood that an individual will switch
into or out of self-employment. I examine the institutional factors associated with
economic freedom, which have been found to affect the level and type of
entrepreneurship in an economy (Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Nystrom, 2008; Sobel,
2008). Economic freedom refers to the extent to which property rights are protected and
voluntary transactions and competition are allowed in an economy (Gwartney et aI.,
2007). An economy is economically free when governments protect private property and
do not burden economic actors with high levels of taxation or business regulation.
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Institutional factors associated with economic freedom include government size/taxation,
the level of business regulation, the level of restrictions on international trade, the
protection of property rights, and the soundness of money.

Government Size and Taxation
Government size may affect the costs and benefits associated with selfemployment in several ways. Small governments require less tax revenue to operate.
Large governments require more revenue and often tax businesses in a number of ways to
generate the needed funds. For self-employed people, business profits are often taxed at
personal income rates (Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider, & Rosen, 2001). In countries with
progressive income taxes, self-employed individuals with high incomes face high
marginal tax rates (Wolff, 1998). These high tax rates may reduce the incentive for
individuals engaging in entrepreneurship. In addition, governments may choose to tax
the self-employed in ways other than income taxes. These include capital gains tax, user
fees, business license fees, etc. (Bruce & Mohsin, 2006; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes, & Shleifer, 2002). As governments grow larger, they wi11likely increase many
of these different taxes in order to fund themselves.
In addition to high taxes limiting the potential return of self-employment, they
may also reduce people's ability to become self-employed because high taxes may
exacerbate liquidity constraints (FoIster, 2002). Liquidity constraints occur when
individuals or firms have profitable opportunities that they would like to exploit but
cannot due to a lack of the capital necessary for opportunity exploitation. Although the
idea of liquidity constraints deterring entry into self-employment and firm growth is a
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controversial one, some support has been found in industrialized countries (Dunn &
Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Johansson, 2000; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996), and any effect is likely
even more pronounced in countries with less developed capital markets. Because high
taxes reduce the amount of cash retained by an individual or firm, prospective
entrepreneurs may choose not to start new firms and may limit the extent to which
existing ones expand (FoIster, 2002). If high levels of taxation increase the liquidity
constraint, then higher taxes in an economy are likely to be associated with lower levels
of self-employment.
Small governments are less involved in the economy compared to larger ones.
When governments are large, their presence in the economy may crowd out private firms
and deter new firms from entering the market. A large government may playa role in
industries that are typically not entered by smaller governments. Larger governments
often enter and compete in certain industries, such as education, air travel, and healthcare
(Poterba, 1995; Salvatore, 2003). For example, in the United States as well as many
other countries, the government operates substantially in the education industry, with a
strong presence in primary, secondary, and post-secondary education (Heller & Rogers,
2006). Although post-secondary education in the United States is provided by a number
of private colleges and universities as well as public colleges and universities, public
colleges and universities enroll a substantially larger number of students (Eckel & King,
2004). Government subsidization of education makes it difficult for private firms to
compete because they must charge students substantial tuition; whereas, students may
attend government schools for free, or in the case of post-secondary schools, at a
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subsidized rate. The more industries in which the government is involved, the fewer
opportunities there will be for entrepreneurs to exploit (Gohmann, Hobbs, & McCrickard,
2008).
Empirical research on the relationship between government size/taxation levels
and levels of entrepreneurship finds mixed results. Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik, and
Reynolds (2005) found that the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is positively related to the
nascent entrepreneurship rate across countries. However, several other studies found a
negative relationship between government size/taxation levels and entrepreneurship.
Using data from 23 OECD countries from 1972 to 2002 Nystrom (2008) found that
government size, using the measure from the Economic Freedom of the World index
(EFW), is negatively related to self-employment. Bjomskov and Foss found that
government size (EFW measure) is negatively associated with the total entrepreneurial
activity rate (a country's self-employment rate plus the nascent entrepreneurship rate)
using data from 29 countries. Furthermore, they found that government size is negatively
associated with entrepreneurship that is undertaken to exploit a lucrative opportunity
(opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship) as well as entrepreneurship that is undertaken
due to personal necessity (necessity-motivated entrepreneurship), thus finding that large
governments deter both types of entrepreneurship. Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2009)
found that a limited state sector is positively associated with nascent entrepreneurial
entry. Likewise, Kreft and Sobel found a negative relationship between tax burden
measure from the Economic Freedom of North American (EFNA) index and the sole
proprietor growth rate in U.S. states.
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In summary, small government demands less tax revenue from their citizens,
giving them the ability and more incentive to start and operate their own firms.
Furthermore, small governments are less likely to compete directly with private firms in
certain industries, leading to more areas in which entrepreneurs can pursue opportunities.
Much of the existing research shows a negative relationship between government
size/taxation levels and measures of entrepreneurship.

Hl: There is a negative relationship between the size of governmentllevel of
taxation in the country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that
he or she will be self-employed.
Level of Business Regulation
Governments can regulate businesses in a number of ways: by making it difficult
to obtain a business license, by setting price controls, or by restricting firm entry
(Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1997; Gwartney et aI., 2007). These sorts of regulations
can vary widely across countries. For example, meeting the government requirements for
starting a business in Italy requires that the prospective entrepreneur perform 16
procedures, wait 62 days, and pay the equivalent of$3,946 in fees. Alternatively, in
Canada this task can be performed in 2 days with an equivalent of $280 in fees (Djankov
et aI., 2002). Clearly, such regulations have direct and indirect costs and may playa large
role in deterring individuals from starting new firms.
If entry regulations are burdensome, new firms may find it difficult to enter the
formal sector of the economy. The formal sector of the economy refers to the part of the
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economy subject to regulation, in which taxes are levied, wages are regularly paid, and
the relationship between workers and employers is governed by explicit contracts
(Pradhan & Van Soest, 1995). The informal sector does not feature these attributes, and
many firms in the informal sector engage in ethically questionable or illegal activities.
This may lead to a number of outcomes, including a formal sector made up mostly of
larger already existing firms. Large amounts of regulation regarding starting a new
business tend to increase the size of an economy's informal economy and decrease the
size of its formal economy (De Soto, 1989). The size of the informal sector has been
shown to vary greatly by country; making up only around 9.4% ofthe economy in
Denmark while constituting around 76% of the economy in Nigeria (Antunes &
Cavalcanti, 2007; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobation, 2000). Although
entrepreneurship may still exist in the informal sector, starting a new firm in this sector
may be much less feasible because firms in the informal sector often lack securable
collateral and, therefore, access to capital that firms in the formal sector can obtain
(Antunes & Cavalcanti, 2007). Furthermore, entrepreneurship in the informal sector is
unlikely to have the social benefits that formal sector firms have in terms of leading to
greater economic growth, greater human capital investment and greater employment.
Thus, a large informal sector in an economy is likely to retard the creation of new firms
and self-employment.
Another way in which governments often regulate firms is by regulating the
relationship between firms and employees. This is done through legislating minimum
wages, forcing firms to pay overtime, making firms pay severance packages to dismissed
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employees, and protecting labor unions (Emerson, 1988; Freeman, 2007; Gwartney et al.,
2007). These rules increase the cost of hiring. These rules may influence the decision of
individuals whether to become self-employed by increasing the cost of switching to selfemployment. According to results from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics,
the median firm plans to have two employees in addition to the owner within the first
year of business operations (Human & Matthews, 2004). Because most new firms plan
on hiring paid employees and doing so relatively quickly, the costs of hiring employees
will likely influence individuals when deciding whether to start a new firm.
Several empirical studies examine the relationship between business regulation
and entrepreneurship. McMullen, Bagby, and Palich (2008) use both the level of
business regulation and labor market freedom measures from the Index of Economic
Freedom (lEF) index to predict the level of entrepreneurship in 37 countries included in
the 2002 GEM survey. Measures of entrepreneurship used included entrepreneurship
undertaken in order to exploit a lucrative opportunity (opportunity-motivated) as well as
entrepreneurship undertaken due to personal necessity (necessity-motivated). They found
that business regulation is not associated with entrepreneurship. Likewise, Bjomskow
and Foss (2008) found no relationship between the level of business regulations and
measures of entrepreneurship. However, other researchers have found a negative
relationship between business regulations and entrepreneurship. Klapper, Laeven and
Rajan (2006) examine the relationship between entry barriers and entrepreneurship using
the Amadeus database, which contains firm-level data from more than five million firms
in 34 European countries. They found that costly regulations are negatively related to the
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creation of new firms, and this is even truer in industries that have naturally high entry
barriers. Van Stel, Storey, and Thurik (2007) examine how business regulations impact
nascent and young businesses, with regulatory variables taken from the World Bank
Doing Business (WBDB) database. They found that hours rigidity (restrictions on
expanding or contracting the number of working hours) and employment rigidity
(difficulty of hiring and firing) negatively relate to the measures of entrepreneurship.
Sobel, Clark, and Lee (2007) used the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) measure
of total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) index to examine the relationship between
institutions and entrepreneurship. Domestic entry restrictions were measured using a
variable "administrative burden for startups" from The Global Competitiveness Report.
Internal barriers to entry are negatively related to TEA, and this relationship is robust
when other measures of governmental barriers are included in the analysis. Finally,
Nystrom (2008) also found that low levels of business regulation are associated with high
rates of self-employment in OECD countries.
Direct regulations regarding starting and operating a business, as well as those
involving the employment relationship, increase the cost of starting and operating a
business. Thus, business regulations are likely to increase the cost of switching from
wage employment to self-employment and may also lower the expected returns to selfemployment.
H2: There is a negative relationship between the level of business regulation
in the country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that he or she
will be self-employed.
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Freedom to Trade
A country that lacks trade freedom will typically have high tariffs as well as nontariff barriers, such as quotas, subsidies, and bans on trade (Gwartney et aI., 2007).
Although free trade has expanded greatly in recent history (Bergsten, 2001), many trade
restrictions still exist (Gibson, Wainio, Whitley, & Bohman, 2001; Schnepf & Womach,
2008).
The impact that trade freedom has on self-employment is not obvious. In one
sense, substantial trade restrictions may actually increase the opportunity for firms to
produce goods and services for domestic consumption because protectionist measures
may make it difficult for foreign firms to enter and operate in the market. This would
allow domestic firms to charge higher prices or offer lower quality products (Dardis,
Spivak, & Shih, 1985; Nguyen-Hong, 2000). Furthermore, firms that are new and/or
small may not have adequate resources to take advantage of the opportunities that appear
when trade barriers are minimized. Julien, Joyal and Deshaies (1994) found that
globalization hurt small and medium sized firms because lower productivity makes it
more difficult to compete in the global marketplace. Their limited resources make it
difficult for them to exploit opportunities that arise in foreign markets due to the
relaxation of tariffs. Campbell (1996) found that many small exporting firms are not
positioned correctly to benefit from the increasing numbers of opportunities that come
about as a result of increased trade freedom. Therefore, trade restrictions may actually
encourage self-employment for some individuals.

30

However, substantial trade restrictions may also create fewer opportunities for
domestic firms to have their product or service sold in another country. Trade
agreements are often reciprocal in nature; when a country has extensive trade barriers that
keep foreign firms from entering the domestic market, foreign countries will often place
trade restrictions against products from the protectionist country (Anderson, 2002;
Gawande & Hansen, 2003). Likewise, countries often agree to lower trade barriers
simultaneously through free trade agreements, as can be seen with the North American
Free Trade Agreement and various World Trade Organization agreements (What is the
World Trade Organization?, 2009; Brown, Deardorff, & Stem, 1992). Therefore,
substantial trade restrictions in a country will likely lead to other countries having
substantial restrictions against that country.
Trade allows markets for goods and services to expand, allowing firms to
specialize (Smith, 1776). Free trade between countries allows firms to specialize in
producing a product or service and export their product or service around the world.
Firms that do businesses globally often start exporting early in their life (Moen &
Servais, 2002), indicating that globalization may often be a part of the earliest plan for a
new firm. The term "born global" has gained notoriety with researchers because
empirical evidence suggests that many new firms are engaging in business beyond their
home country as soon as they are open (Andersson & Evangelista, 2006; Moen, 2002). If
these new ventures face substantial trade barriers when attempting to conduct business
abroad, they will be at a cost disadvantage to domestic firms in those markets and may
find doing business there unattractive. As doing business in foreign markets becomes
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less attractive for domestic firms, the economic performance of these firms or the
expected economic performance of prospective new firms is likely to fall. Additionally,
extensive trade restrictions could make engaging in self-employment less economically
beneficial in other ways. When trade restrictions are substantial, they increase the cost of
products to consumers (Cox & Harris, 1985; Dardis et aI., 1985; Irwin, 2003; Langerfeld
& Nieberding, 2005). Firms are consumers of many products, such as capital

investments and inventory/raw materials that are likely to be more expensive when trade
restrictions

ar~

significant.

Empirical research on the relationship between trade freedom and
entrepreneurship has been mixed. Sobel, Clark, and Lee (2007) found that the average
tariff rate is negatively related to total entrepreneurial activity and is robust when other
measures of governmental barriers were included in the analysis. However, other
research shows a non-significant relationship between trade freedom and measures of
entrepreneurship (McMullen et aI., 2008; Nystrom, 2008). Although trade restrictions
may increase the level of self-employment in a country by creating opportunities for
producing items that are restricted, in other ways, such restrictions also may lead to the
destruction of business opportunities and may make some business opportunities less
profitable. Overall, freer trade gives the entrepreneur more opportunities to sell their
products or services. Therefore, it is likely that trade freedom will increase the likelihood
that individuals will be engaged in self-employment.
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H3: There is a positive relationship between the level of trade freedom in the
country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that he or she will
be self-employed.
Property Rights
According to Demsetz (1967), "an owner of property rights possesses the consent
of fellowmen to allow him to act in a particular way" (p. 347). Property rights are
important because they structure the incentives in a manner that helps internalize
externalities (Demsetz, 1967). Property rights is a rather broad term, but generally
property rights are considered strong when the government protects private property, the
court system enforces contracts, and there is little expropriation of property (Index of
economic freedom, 2005).
From an individual's perspective, well-defined property rights reduce the
uncertainty regarding the use of property (Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1967). For example, a
government seizing private property and failing to compensate the owner for it will
impact the level of risk that property owner's face and will influence their behavior. As a
result, property owners will tend to underinvest in improving their property. Besley
(1995) found empirical support for the relationship between land rights and investment
(measured by land improvements such as planting trees, irrigating, and mulching the
land) in Ghana. Examining a sample of manufacturing firms in Eastern Europe, Johnson,
McMillian & Woodruff (2002) found that investment is retarded by weak property rights.
Claessens & Laeven (2003) found that stronger property rights leads to higher firm
growth due to the fact that firms do a better job of allocating assets.
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In many ways, the decision to become self-employed is a decision of how an
individual should invest his or her time and resources. This investment decision will
likely be influenced by the strength of the property rights in the location where the
individual resides. When people become self-employed and start a new venture, they
must invest capital in their business. When property rights are weak, business investment
is deterred because those who are self-employed or thinking of becoming self-employed
do not know whether they will be able to keep any profits they may obtain (Johnson et
al., 2002). Therefore, it is expected that strong property rights protection in a country
will increase the probability that people in that country will engage in self-employment.
Bjomskov and Foss (2008) failed to find a significant relationship between the
quality of the legal system and entrepreneurial activity. However, other researchers have
found a positive relationship between measures of the strength of property rights and
entrepreneurship. Nystrom (2008) found that secure property rights are positively related
to the rate of self-employment. McMullen, Bagby, and Palich (2008) found that strong
property rights are associated with higher levels of opportunity-motivated
entrepreneurship but are not significantly related to rates of necessity-motivated
entrepreneurship.

H4: There is a positive relationship between property rights protection in the
country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that he or she will
be self-employed.
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Sound Money
An economy is said to have sound money when the inflation rate is low and has

little volatility (Gwartney & Lawson, 2003). Although there is often thought to be a
positive relationship between the inflation rate and inflation volatility2, these two issues
will be examined separately.
It is important for future inflation rates to be known with some degree of

certainty because, like property rights, inflation rates allow individual actors to have
consistent expectations about what prices to expect in the future. High volatility in the
inflation rate makes planning for the future and making investment decisions difficult
because the actual net present value of future projects will be difficult to determine
(Huizinga, 1993). Typically, when a contract is written, any inflation expectation is
inferred in the terms of the contract (Holland, 1984). The most obvious example of this
is the mortgage contract between a borrower and a bank. While the interest rate may be
7%, the lending bank may only require a real 4% return but includes a 3% premium for
expected inflation. Once a contract is agreed to, if actual inflation is higher than expected
inflation, then those making payments (the borrowers) receive a gain while those
receiving payments (the lending banks) receive a loss (Holland, 1984). Ifinflation
uncertainty is high, writing contracts to account for this variable inflation will be more

2 There has been some debate to what degree high inflation and inflation volatility are related. Although
some research indicates a strong relationship between inflation rate and inflation uncertainty, Holland
(1984) found somewhat more mixed results. However, the two concepts can be made conceptually distinct,
even if they often occur together.
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difficult. Firms and individuals will likely be hesitant to enter into contracts, and those
entered into will likely be shorter term (Rich & Tracy, 2004).
Although uncertain inflation rates can lead to problems in making investment
decisions, consistent inflation rates also are problematic if they are excessively high.
High levels of inflation have been found to lead to a number of negative economic
outcomes, such as reduced common stock returns (Fama, 1981), low economic growth
(Bruno & Easterly, 1998), and even high levels of unemployment (Friedman, 1977).
High levels of inflation raise the rate of return required for business investments (Nelson,
1976), therefore making starting or operating a business less attractive.
Both a high rate of inflation and inflation volatility lead to an undesirable
economic environment that becomes risky for those engaging in long-term transactions
(Huizinga, 1993; Nelson, 1976). Being self-employed often requires that individuals
agree to long-term contracts, and many business investments that are made by the selfemployed are long-term. It may seem that the self-employed would benefit from high
inflation rates because they are often borrowing money and signing long-term lease
agreements in which they would actually gain from high levels of inflation. However, if
a country traditionally has a high level of inflation, it is likely to be priced into any loan
or lease contract, which would make the agreement expensive (Holland, 1984). When a
country suffers from high or uncertain levels of inflation, the inflation risk will raise the
threshold level of performance required by those currently self-employed to remain selfemployed and will lower the attractiveness of pursuing opportunities in self-employment
by those who are not currently self-employed.
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Nystrom (2008), however, found no relationship between sound money and selfemployment, while McMullen et al. (2008) found mixed results. Conversely, Bjomskov
and Foss (2008) found a positive relationship between sound money and (1) the
opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship rate, (2) the necessity-motivated
entrepreneurship rate, and (3) the total entrepreneurial activity rate.

H5: There is a positive relationship between the soundness of money in the
country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that he or she will
be self-employed.
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Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Relationships between Institutions and Likelihood of
Engaging in Self-Employment
Country-Level
Predictors:
HI: Government
SizelTax Level

H2: Level of
Business Regulation

H3: Trade Freedom

Engagement in SelfEmployment

H4: Property Rights

H5: Sound Money

2.5. INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF SELF -EMPLOYMENT:
MODERATING EFFECTS
The institutional environment of a country may interact with characteristics of
individuals to influence the likelihood that they are self-employed. I examine two
individual-level factors that are likely to interact with institutional factors to influence the
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individual's choice between self-employment and wage employment: an individual's
regulatory focus and their human capital leveL
Regulatory Focus
Regulatory focus theory argues that an individual can adopt two possible
strategies when working to achieve a goal: a promotion focus or a prevention focus
(Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 2004; Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998). When individuals
have a promotion focus, they focus on pursuing possible gains and concern themselves
little with possible losses. Individuals with a prevention focus emphasize minimizing
possible losses even if doing so minimizes possible gains. If an individual is preventionfocused concerning engagement in entrepreneurship, he or she will worry about the
possibility of failure and will act in a way that minimizes this possibility, even at the cost
of possible gains. Individuals use a promotion focus when they have a desire for
accomplishment and progress and adopt a prevention focus when they desire security and
safety (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). In the literature, there has been some debate to what
degree an individual's regulatory focus is chronic (a long-lasting trait) or determined by
context (McMullen & Zahra, 2006).
The higher the psychic income an individual receives from being self-employed,
the more likely that he or she is to enter self-employment (or remain self-employed if
already self-employed; (Gimeno et aI., 1997). Because operating an independent
business is risky and a substantial number of new firms do fail (Evans & Leighton, 1989;
Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989), those who approach owning a business with a prevention
focus will derive less psychic income from self-employment than those who have a
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promotion focus. Thus, prevention-focused individuals will be less likely to become or
to continue to be self-employed.
Sound Money and Regulatory Focus
A country has sound money when the inflation rate is low and has little volatility
(Gwartney & Lawson, 2003). A sound currency allows those who are self-employed to
make more certain investment decisions (Huizinga, 1993) such as whether to hire an
employee or whether to purchase equipment. However, when the currency in a country is
not stable, the long-term decisions that self-employed individuals must make are very
risky because volatile inflation rates make it difficult to determine the financial returns to
self-employment ex ante.
When an individual is deeply concerned about the possibility of failure in selfemployment, he or she is less likely to be self-employed, and this is likely to be true
regardless of the environment that he or she finds themselves in. If a person is
prevention-focused with regard to a certain activity, he or she may be willing to take
small, calculable risks but not willing to take large risks that are difficult to control for
(Brockner et aI., 2004). Therefore, if an individual has a strong prevention focus when it
comes to engaging in self-employment, he or she may still be willing to engage in selfemployment if environmental conditions make the risk associated with self-employment
predictable and manageable. However, if environmental conditions are such that the risk
of owning a business is magnified, then a prevention-focused individual may be even
more likely to avoid or leave self-employment. The increased risk of operating a
business that is present when a country's currency is not sound is likely to
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disproportionally deter an individual who is prevention-focused from being selfemployment. Thus, if a prevention-focused individual resides in a country in which the
money is not sound, he or she will be less likely to engage in self-employment than a
prevention-focused individual that resides in a country that has a sound and stable
currency.
H6: The negative relationship between prevention focus and the likelihood
of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries without
sound money than individuals in countries with sound money.
Property Rights and Regulatory Focus
Strong property rights exist when courts are fair and efficient and when property
is not expropriated without just cause and appropriate compensation (Index of economic
freedom, 2005). Strong property rights protections are important because they shape
incentives and reduce uncertainty (Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1967). Thus, strong property
rights are essential to encourage investments (Besley, 1995). If individuals become selfemployed and start a new business, they will make substantial investments that may be
lost if their country does not provide strong protection of their property rights (Johnson et
aI., 2002). Weak property rights protection is likely to deter people from entering selfemployment and encourage those currently self-employed to exit. However, this effect
will likely vary for differing individuals, depending on their personal characteristics.
Like with sound money, the presence of strong property rights reduces the amount
of risk in transactions and in conducting business (Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1967).
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Individuals who are prevention-focused will be particularly sensitive to the level of
property rights in their country when determining whether to become or continue to be
self-employed. This is because weak property rights are likely to reduce the psychic
income that prevention-focused individuals derive from self-employment because these
individuals will be worried about the possible losses that they may incur and thus will
seek less enjoyment from self-employment. As the psychic income derived from selfemployment decreases, individuals are more likely to leave self-employment for wage
employment (Gimeno et aI., 1997). Thus, those who are prevention-focused will be less
likely to engage in self-employment when property rights protections are weak than those
who are not prevention-focused.
H7: The negative relationship between prevention focus and the likelihood
of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries with weak
property rights than individuals in countries with strong property rights.
Human Capital
An individual's level of human capital influences the likelihood that he or she will

engage in entrepreneurship (Bates, 1995; Davidsson & Honig, 2003). One component of
an individual's general human capital is formal education (Becker, 1975). The
relationship between education and self-employment is complex. Those with high levels
of education are generally more likely than others to be self-employed (Caputo &
Dolinsky, 1998; Fairlie, 1999; Rees & Shah, 1986; Reynolds, 2004). Many people with
professional degrees work in areas where self-employment is common, such as in
medicine or law. Also, a high level of education gives an individual certain skills that
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may be helpful in starting and operating a business, such as writing, critical thinking, and
management skills. Some empirical research suggests that those with higher levels of
human capital are more successful as entrepreneurs than those with lower levels of
human capital (Bates, 1990; Cooper, Gimeno-Gasc6n, & Woo, 1997).
However, Blanchflower (2000) found that the relationship between education and
self-employment is non-linear, that those with the lowest and highest levels of education
were more likely to be self-employed than those with an average level of education.
Those with a low level of education may be likely to be self-employed because they may
have difficulty in finding ajob and are "pushed" into self-employment out of necessity.
Although the opportunities that individuals with low human capital may pursue may be
limited, their opportunity costs are limited as well.

Government Sizeffaxation Levels and Human Capital
Large governments tax their citizens more to pay for the services that they
provide (Anderson, Wallace, & Warner, 1986; Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1987). High
taxation also reduces the incentive to engage in certain activities that have the possibility
of high returns, such as self-employment (FoIster, 2002). Although this generally
reduces the incentives of individuals in a country to engage in entrepreneurship, it is
likely to affect those with high levels of human capital the most adversely. For selfemployed people, business profits are often taxed at personal income rates (Carroll et al.,
2001), and individuals with higher levels of human capital are likely to have high
earnings from their business (Evans & Leighton, 1989; Hundley, 2000). Therefore, these
individuals will likely be taxed at a higher tax rate than those with less human capital,
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who are likely earning less from self-employment. Typically, governments with high
levels of taxation have tax rates that are quite progressive, taxing wealthy individuals at
higher rates than less wealthy individuals. Thus, large governments with high tax levels
can be particularly damaging to the incentives to be self-employed for those with high
levels of human capital.
Because of the disproportionate negative impact that high levels of taxation have
on the expected return of self-employment for individuals with high levels of human
capital, it is likely that high taxes and large governments will also disproportionately
affect the likelihood that individuals with high levels of human capital will be selfemployed. Thus, there will be a larger difference in the likelihood of self-employment
between those with high levels of education and those with moderate levels of education
when the government is large verses when it is small.

H8: The positive relationship between having a college education and the
likelihood of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries
with small governments/low taxation levels than individuals in countries with
large governments/high taxation levels.
Regulation of Business and Human Capital
Government regulations can make the process of starting and/or operating a
business more time-consuming and costly. Such regulations vary greatly among
countries (Brunetti et aI., 1997; Djankov et aI., 2002; Gwartney et aI., 2007). Although
the regulations placed on businesses by governments can negatively affect all those who
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are engaged in or considering self-employment, their impact is likely to differ depending
on an individual's level of human capital. When individuals have low levels of human
capital, they are likely to have difficulty dealing with complex problems (Ucbasaran,
Westhead, & Wright, 2008). Starting or operating a business is likely to be more difficult
if business regulations are substantial (van Stel et aI., 2007). Thus, individuals with low
levels of human capital may not possess the necessary knowledge to start and effectively
operate a business in such an environment. Furthermore, they will likely not have
sufficient resources to hire accountants and lawyers and, in some cases, pay the necessary
bribes to help them through the process of starting a business.
For those with higher levels of human capital, business regulations are likely to be
less of a deterrent to starting and operating a business. This is because these individuals
are likely to have the knowledge and resources necessary to start and operate business
even when business regulations make doing so difficult. Thus, when government
regulation of business is substantial, those with lower levels of human capital will
disproportionately be less likely to start a new firm and more likely to leave an existing
independent business than individuals with high levels of human capital.

H9: The positive relationship between having a college education and the
likelihood of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries
with high levels of business regulation than individuals in countries with low
levels of business regulation.
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2.6. METHODS AND RESULTS
Sample

I obtained a sample of individuals from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM) survey for the years 2001 to 2006. The GEM survey is a cross-country data
collection project that surveys individuals about their engagement (or lack of
engagement) in entrepreneurship (Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, Cox, & Hay, 2004). The
GEM data contains surveys of individuals from a number of countries (Minniti, Bygrave,
& Autio, 2005). Each year, individuals were selected at random. Hence, the GEM

survey is not longitudinal in the strict sense because the same respondents are not
followed over time. Instead, it contains cross-sectional data for each year that are pooled
together.
The GEM data were collected using both phone and face-to-face interviews.
Respondents were selected using either random digit dialing or random selection of
geographical clusters (Reynolds et al., 2005). Random digit dialing was used in countries
in which a large proportion of adults had a landline phone, and the interview was
conducted over the phone. Geographic stratified sampling was used in areas in which
landline phones were not owned by a large number of people in the population, and
actual interviews were conducted face-to-face. Data were collected from individuals
from a number of high-income countries, such as the United States, Sweden, and Ireland,
as well as a number of middle-income countries, such as Romania, Brazil, and Turkey
(Minniti et al., 2005). Generally, the sample included a minimum of2,000 individual
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observations for each country for each year it was included in the sample, although there
are many more observations for some countries (Reynolds et aI., 2005).
The GEM data were collected from a random sample of individuals; the data was
not collected from a random sample of known entrepreneurs. Surveyed individuals were
asked a number of questions concerning how they perceive entrepreneurship, as well as if
they were self-employed or were planning to become self-employed. If they were selfemployed, they were asked some basic question about their business, such as how long
they had been in business and the number of people their business employed at the time.
Therefore, from this data several measures of entrepreneurship, and several categories of
entrepreneurs can be derived: (1) nascent entrepreneurs (those who were trying to start a
business at the time of the survey), (2) owner-managers of new firms up to 3.5 years old,
and (3) owner-managers of established firms that were more than 3.5 years old.
Furthermore, the GEM questionnaire asked respondents whether their entrepreneurship
motivated by economic necessity or if it arose to exploit a profitable opportunity; thus
measures of necessity- and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship are available
(McMullen et aI., 2008). For a more detailed description of the data collection process
used in the GEM surveys, see Reynolds et aI. (2005).
For the years 2001 through 2006, there are 713,737 individual-level observations.
However, only 472,243 observations are used in the analysis, due to missing data. For
example, the following question, "Fear of failure would prevent you from starting a
business?" was only answered by 540,539 respondents (173,198 cases had missing data).
Likewise the question "Have the knowledge, skill, and experience required to start a new
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business?" was only answered by 546,514 respondents (167,223 cases had missing data).
Individuals were surveyed from 55 unique countries. Some countries were surveyed
every year, while others were surveyed for only select years during the 2001-2006
timespan.
Dependent Variable
Although several measures of entrepreneurship are available in the GEM dataset,
I wish to examine the relationship that institutions have with an individual's choice to
engage in self-employment. The dependent variable used in this analysis is whether the
individual is self-employed, regardless of the age of the business. The GEM survey
measured this by asking individuals if they were owner-manager of a firm. The response
is coded as a 1 if the individual was an owner-manager at the time and 0 if the individual
was not.
Independent Variables
Recently, there have been several empirical papers examining the relationship
between institutions and the level of entrepreneurship in an economy (McMullen et aI.,
2008; Nystrom, 2008; Sobel, 2008). Measuring institutions is a difficult proposition
because it often involves developing numerical measures for concepts such as the
strength of property rights and the level of business regulation, which are not naturally
represented by numerical values. Therefore, counts, such as the average number of days
it takes to get a business license, are sometimes used, as well as indices which use some
sort of scoring mechanism, such as in the economic freedom indices (Ayal & Karras,
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1998; Dawson, 1998). Several indices are commonly used to measure economic
freedom, including the Economic Freedom of the World index and the Index of
Economic Freedom. I use both of these indices in the analysis. Both indices have an
aggregate score that measures economic freedom, as well as individual components that
measure different aspects of economic freedom. Each component in both indices is
typically derived from multiple measures.

Economic Freedom o/the World
The Economic Freedom of the World index is published by the Fraser Institute
(Gwartney et aI., 2007). Instead of scoring states/provinces on their level of economic
freedom, this index scores individual countries. This index is made up of 23 measures
aggregated into five components: (1) size of government, (2) legal structure and property
rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation
of credit, labor and business. Table 2.1 displays the measures making up the five
components.
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Table 2.1: Economic Freedom of the World Index Components
Components
1. Size of Government:
Expenditures, Taxes and
Enterprise

2. Legal Structure and
Security of Property Rights

3. Access to Sound Money

4. Freedom to Trade
Internationally

5. Regulations of Credit,
Labor and Business

Measures
lA: General Government Spending as a Percentage of Total Consumption
IB: Transfers and Subsidies as a Percentage of GDP
lC: Government Enterprises and Investment
ID: Top Marginal Tax Rate
i: Top Marginal Income Tax Rate
ii: Top Marginal Income and Pa~roll Tax Rate
2A: Judicial Independence (GCR)
2B: Impartial Courts (GCR)
2C: Protection of Property Rights (GCR)
2D: Military Interference in Rule of Law and Political Process (ICRG)
2E: Integrity of the Legal System (ICRG)
2F: Legal Enforcement of Contracts (DB)
2G: Regulatory Restrictions on the Sale of Real Property (DB)
3A: Money Growth
3B: Standard Deviation of Inflation
3C: Inflation Most Recent Year
3D: Freedom to Own Foreign Currency Bank Accounts
4A: Taxes on International Trade
i: Revenue from Trade Taxes
ii: Mean Tariff Rate
iii: Standard Deviation of Tariff Rates
4B: Regulatory Trade Barriers
i: Non-tariff Trade Barriers (GCR)
ii: Compliance Cost ofimporting and Exporting (DB)
4C: Size of Trade Sector Relative to Expected
4D: Black-Market Exchange Rates
4E: International Capital Market Controls
i: Foreign Ownership/Investment Restrictions (GCR)
ii: Capital Controls
5A. Credit Market Regulations
i: Ownership of Banks
ii: Foreign Bank Competition
iii: Private Sector Credit
iv: Interest Rate Controls/Negative Real Interest Rates
5B: Labor Market Regulations
i: Minimum Wage (DB)
ii: Hiring and Firing Regulations (GCR)
iii: Centralized Collective Bargaining (GCR)
iv: Mandated Cost of Hiring (DB)
v: Mandated Cost of Worker Dismissal (DB)
vi: Conscription
5C: Business Regulations
i: Price Controls
ii: Administrative Requirements (GCR)
iii: Bureaucracy Costs (GCR)
iv: Starting a Business (DB)
v: Extra Payments/Bribes (GCR)
vi: Licensing Restrictions (DB)
vii: Cost of Tax Compliance (DB)
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Index 0/ Economic Freedom
The Index of Economic Freedom was developed by the Heritage Foundation
(2005). This index measures economic freedom at the country level of analysis, and
higher values indicate more freedom. This index is made up of a number of measures
making up 10 components: (1) business freedom, (2) trade freedom, (3) fiscal freedom,
(4) government size, (5) monetary freedom, (6) investment freedom, (7) financial
freedom, (8) property rights, (9) freedom from corruption, and (10) labor freedom. Table
2.2 displays the measures making up these 10 components.
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Table 2.2: Index of Economic Freedom Components
Components
1. Business Freedom

2. Trade Freedom
3. Fiscal Freedom

4. Government Size
5. Monetary Freedom
6. Investment Freedom
7. Financial Freedom
8. Property Rights
9. Freedom From
Corruption
10. Labor Freedom

Measures
Starting a Business- procedures (number)- from the Doing Business survey (DB)
Startin~a Business- time (days) (DB)
Starting a Business- cost (% of per capita income) (DB)
Starting a Business- minimum capital (% of income per capita) (DB)
Obtaining a License- procedures (number) (DB)
Obtaining a License- time (days) (DB)
Obtaining a License- cost (% of income per clll'ita) (DB)
Closing a Business- time (years) (DB)
Closing a Business- cost (% of estate) (DB)
Closing a Business- recovery rate (cents on the dollar) (DB)
Trade-Weighted Average Tariff Rate
Non-Tariff Barriers (qualitative penalty)
Top Tax Rate on Individual Income
Top Tax Rate on Corporate Income
Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
Government Expenditures: (100-.03 *(Expenditures/GDp)L)
Weighted Average Inflation for Past Three Years
Price Controls (qualitative penalty)
Restrictions on Foreign Investment (qualitative)
Banking Security and Independence From Government (qualitative)
Certainty of the Legal Protection of Property (qualitative)
Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI)*( 10)
Ratio of Minimum Wage to Average Value Added Per Worker (DB)
Hindrance to Hiring Additional Workers (DB)
Rigidity of Hours (DB)
Difficulty of Firing Redundant Employees (DB)
Legally Mandated Notice Period (DB)
Mandatory Severance Pay (DB)

The components from the IEF and EFW index are measures of very similar
concepts. Most studies using economic freedom indices make use of components from
one of these indices. However, in this essay, I will perform separate analyses, one using
measures from the IEF and another using measures from the EFW. Therefore, the
robustness of the relationship between the institutional measures and self-employment
can be tested. If the relationship is robust between one of the institutional measures and
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self-employment, then it should not be significant whether the component is taken from
the IEF or EFW index.
One issue in using these two indices in separate analyses is that they need to be
modified so that the individual index components used in the analysis are approximately
the same between the two indices and so that they both measure the hypothesized
constructs. Although the various components of these indices measure similar concepts,
these components do not match up perfectly and thus limit the degree to which they are
comparable. For example, in the Economic Freedom ofthe World (EFW) index, one
component is Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises. In the Index of
Economic Freedom (IEF), there is, one component called Government Size and another
called Fiscal Freedom (representing the overall tax burden). Therefore, to compare the
measures from the different indices, some of the components need to be modified in
order for them to be measuring approximately the same construct. Due to this, the 10
components of the IEF are combined to make them directly comparable to those in the
EFW index. The combined IEF components will be referred to as the modified Index of
Economic Freedom components. Table 2.3 displays how the IEF components are
combined to create the modified IEF components and how these new components match
with the components of the EFW index (as well as the hypothesized constructs). The
modified IEF components are constructed by simply averaging the scores of the
components from which they are made. The correlations between the components of the
EFW index and the modified IEF can be seen in Table 2.4. The high correlation between
the EFW index components and the modified IEF components provides evidence of
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convergent validity between these measures, indicating that they are measuring the same
underlying construct. All of the correlations were significantly different from zero (p <
.01).

Table 2.3: Institution Measures Modified
Components of EFW index

Corresponding Components
in the IEF

1. Size of Government:
Expenditures, Taxes and
Enterprise
2. Legal Structure and
Security of Property Rights
3. Access to Sound Money
4. Freedom to Trade
Internationally
5. Regulations of Credit,
Labor and Business

Government Size
Fiscal Freedom
Property Rights
Freedom From Corruption
Monetary Freedom
Trade Freedom
Investment Freedom
Business Freedom
Labor Freedom
Financial Freedom

Table 2.4: Correlation between EFW Components and Modified IEF Components
Corresponding Modified IEF Components
2.
3.
4.
1.
5.
EFW Components
1. Size of Government:
.758
Expenditures, Taxes
and Enterprise
.910
2. Legal Structure and
Security of Property
Rights
.692
3. Access to Sound
Money
4. Freedom to Trade
.673
Internationally
5. Regulations of
.734
Credit, Labor and
Business
Correlations are from the countries included III the GEM survey for years 2001-2006. All
correlations are significant atp < .01. n = 208.
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Control Variables

Country Level
An economy's wealth influences the level of self-employment. Generally, in

poorer countries, people enter self-employment out of lack of other options (McMullen et
aI., 2008). More opportunities for self-employment may exist because there is a lack of
capital-intensive firms that rely on economies of scale. Conversely, in wealthier, more
developed countries, people do not need to enter self-employment to survive because
there are other employment options. Many studies have found a negative relationship
between gross domestic product and the level of entrepreneurship in a country
(Noorderhaven et aI., 2004; Torrini, 2005; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005). In this analysis, I
use a measure of country-level gross domestic product per capita corrected for purchasing
power parity (PPP) from the World Bank World Development Indicators for each year
(The World Bank, 2010).
Similarly, unemployment rates may influence self-employment (Blanchflower,
2000; Tervo, 2006). High unemployment may be a proxy for a poorly performing
economy, thus making self-employment a less attractive option for individuals. On the
other hand, high unemployment may lead to individuals entering self-employment due to
a lack of other employment options. Country unemployment rates are included for all
years (International Labour Organization, 2010).

55

Individual Level
Several individual-level control variables are likely to have an impact on the
likelihood that an individual is self-employed. One variable that has been predictive of
this is gender. Research has documented that males are more likely to be self-employed
than females (Carter & Brush, 2004; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996; Reynolds, 2004).
Explanations for gender differences in the likelihood that an individual is self-employed
include differences in human and financial capital between males and females,
differences in intentions, as well as differences in risk propensity (Carter & Brush, 2004).
Gender is a dichotomous variable coded for the analysis with 1=male and O=female.
Past research also finds a relationship between an individual's age and his or her
propensity to engage in entrepreneurship, with the probability of being self-employed
usually increasing as a person ages (Blanchflower, 2000; Evans & Leighton, 1989; Lindh
& Ohlsson, 1996). There are several possible explanations for this. As people age, their

level of human capital often increases, possibly making them more likely to discover
opportunities as they get older. Furthermore, many people's preferences change as they
get older, and older people may get more psychic income from self-employment than
those that are younger. Age is included as a control variable. Likewise, I created an age
squared control variable in order to capture a possible nonlinear relationship between age
and self-employment, since both the very young and very old may be less likely to be
self-employed.
An individual's level of human capital influences the likelihood that they will

engage in entrepreneurship as well (Bates, 1995; Davidsson & Honig, 2003). One
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common measure of human capital is the level of education that an individual has
obtained. Some evidence has shown that the relationship between education and selfemployment is non-linear, with the lowest and highest educated more likely to be selfemployed than those with an average level of education (Blanchflower, 2000). Education
is measured as an ordinal measure in the GEM with the following categories: (1) no
secondary schooling, (2) some secondary schooling, (3) secondary school degree, (4)
post-secondary degree, and (5) graduate experience. In order to control for this and
examine the moderation hypotheses, I recode these into two categories: no college
education and college education. Those with no secondary schooling, some secondary
schooling, or a secondary school degree are considered to have no college education,
while those with a post-secondary degree or graduate experience are considered to have a
college degree.
Although an individual's level of education may certainly influence the
probability that he or she is self-employed, this is a general measure of human capital. In
addition to formal schooling, human capital is developed by an individual through work
experience and non-formal sources of training (Davids son & Honig, 2003), and some of
the human capital developed through these avenues may be particularly useful in selfemployment. As an indicator of human capital specific to self-employment, I included
the response from an item asking the respondent if he or she "has the knowledge, skill,
and experience required to start a new business?" Yes responses were coded as 1, no
responses as O.
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One possible determinant to an individual being self-employed is whether he or
she approaches self-employment with a prevention focus. If an individual is preventionfocused about entrepreneurship, he or she will worry about the possibility of failure and
will act in a way that minimizes this possibility, even ifhe or she risks possible gains. A
substantial number of new firms fail (Mata & Portugal, 1994; Phillips & Kirchhoff,
1989); therefore, given their desire for safety and security, individuals who approach
entrepreneurship with a prevention focus are likely to find becoming self-employed too
risky. I control for individual's prevention focus by including the following item: "Fear
of failure would prevent you from starting a business?" Yes responses, indicating a
prevention focus, were coded as 1; no responses, indicating a promotion focus, were
coded as O.
Dummy variables are entered for each year (except 2001). This allows the
intercept to vary across years (Wooldridge, 2003).

Analysis
The GEM survey data used in this analysis are individual-level responses, which I
combine with country-level measures of institutions, unemployment, and economic
development. Thus, the GEM data contains a number of individual responses nested
within various countries. To perform this analysis, random coefficient multilevel
modeling is performed. Much of the past research concerning the relationship between
institutions and entrepreneurship has involved performing regressions using country-level
measures of institutions to predict country-level rates of self-employment or nascent
activity (Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008; Sobel et aI., 2007). In contrast,
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a random coefficient multilevel modeling approach can be used to predict the probability
that any individual will engage in self-employment, using individual-level as well as
country-level characteristics. This allows for individual-level control variables, such as
individuals' beliefs and perceptions about themselves, educational level, and gender to be
added to the model (Luke, 2004). Furthermore, multilevel modeling allows for the
testing of cross-level interactions. Although in a purely country-level analysis individuallevel variables can be aggregated to the country-level, such aggregation may lead to
inflated relationships and misinterpretation if interpreted at the individual level (Luke,
2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).
The analysis is performed using the lmer and glmmPQL packages in R.
Specifically, I used the commercial 64-bit version ofR known as Revolution R Enterprise
developed by Revolution Analytics. While a number of packages, such as HLM 6 and
will perform this type of analysis, the 64-bit version of Revolution R allows a multi-level
analysis to be performed even with a substantial number of independent variables and an
extremely large sample size. Using multi-level modeling software, the researcher can
model randomly-varying intercepts and slopes, and with the appropriate link function,
can model various types of outcome variables. In all of the hypotheses, the dependent
variable is dichotomous; therefore, a logit link function is used for all the regressions. To
test the developed hypothesis, I followed a model-building process recommended by
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). When the random coefficient model is estimated, it is
tested to see what random effects are significant and should be kept random in the final
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model. Finally, a model containing the variables of interest is estimated so that the
developed hypotheses can be tested.
Individual-level dichotomous variables are left uncentered, while continuous
variables (such as age) are grand-mean centered. The use of grand-mean centering is
recommended when the influence of level-2 variables on the dependent variables are of
primary interest (Enders & Tofighi, 2007).
The estimation equations for the hypothesized model are presented in the
following paragraphs, beginning with the level-l equation and then a series of level-2
equations.
(1) Yij = logistic
+

(~Oj

+

~lGenderi

+

~2Agei

+

~3AgeSquaredi

+

~4EntSkillsi

+

~sjCollegei

~6jPreF OCUSi)

Equation 1 is known as the level-l equation in a multilevel model (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2006). In equation (1), Yij is the probability that individual i from country j is
self-employed.

~Oj

represents the intercept term for country j, and the intercept term is

allowed to vary by country. In the hypothesized mode several control variables are
individual-level variables, including gender, age, college education, entrepreneurial
skills, and prevention focus. The terms

~l

through

~4

represent the slopes for individual-

level variables with coefficients that do not vary by country. Only the slopes for college
(~Sj)

(2)

and prevention focus
~Oj = Yoo

(~6j) are

allowed to vary by country.

+yOl GovSizej + Y02BusinessReguiationsj + Y03 TradeFreedomj +

Y04PropertyRightsj + YosSoundMoneYj + Y06GDPPerCapitaj + Y07UnemploymentRatej+ UOj
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In equation 1, BOj represents the intercept term which is allowed to vary across
countries. Equation 2, the level-2 equation for the intercept, shows how BOj is determined.
Country characteristics for country j are used to predict BOj. The terms YOI through Y07
represent the slope coefficients for these variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).

UOj

represents the error term for the intercept, or the variation of BOj from its mean that is not
explained by the variables in the equation.
(3)

B5j=Y50 + Y51GovSizej + Y52BusinessReguiationsj

+U5j

Equation 3 is the level-2 equation that shows how the random slope coefficient
~5j,

is determined.

~5j

is the slope coefficient for the level-l dummy variable for college

education. Government size/taxation levels and the level of business regulations are used
to predict

~5j.

The terms Y51 and Y52 represent the slope coefficients for state j that

displays the relationship between their associated level-2 predictors and
the variance in

~5j

~5j. U5j represents

from its mean that remains unexplained by government size and the

level of business regulations.

Equation 4 is the level-2 equation that shows how the random slope coefficient
~6j,

is determined.

~6j

is the slope coefficient for the level-l dummy variable representing

prevention focus. The level of property rights and soundness of money in state j are used
to predict

~6j.

These include the overall tax burden as well as the level of government

regulations. The terms Y61 and Y62 represent the slope coefficients for these variables.
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U6j

represents the variance in

~6j

from its mean that remains unexplained by property rights

and the soundness of money.
For all other level-1 variables, the slope coefficients will be fixed (will not be
allowed to vary by country).

Results
The means and standard deviations of all the variables can be seen Table 2.5.
The correlation matrix can be seen in Table 2.6. Due to the large sample size, many of
the correlations are significant at .001 (***), .01 (**) or .05(*).
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
OwnerlManager
Gender
Skill
Prevention Focus
Age
Age Sguared
College Education
GDP per Capita PPP
Unemployment Rate
Government Size (EFW)
Business Regulations
(EFW)
Trade Freedom (EFW)
Prope!!y Rights (EFW)
Sound Money (EFW)
Government Size (IEF)
Business Regulations
(IEF)
Trade Freedom (IEF)
Property Rights (IEF)
Sound Money (IEF)
Startup and Operating
Regulations (EFW)
Labor Regulations (EFW)
Credit Regulations (EFW)

Mean
.1462
.4841
.4547
.3469
42.96
2,096
.3342
21,620
7.79
4.21
3.46

Standard Deviation
.3533
.4998
.4979
.4760
15.82
1,490
.4717
9,945
4.97
1.50
.926

N
473,243
473,243
473,243
473,243
473,243
473,243
473,243
194
194
194
194

7.51
7.20
8.86
43.12
30.63

.805
1.69
1.08
19.17
12.93

194
194
194
194
194

70.84
67.97
82.68
3.83

11.39
21.65
7.02
1.25

194
194
194
194

4.55
1.71

1.37
1.10

194
194
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Table 2.6: Correlations

Variable

3

4

5

6

7

S

9

11

10

12

13

14

16

15

17

IS

19

1

.110'"
.302'"
-.090'"
.009'"
-.017'"
71 College
.043'"
S) GOP per Capita PPP
-.062'"
91 Unemplovment Rate
-.022'"
10) Government Sizerraxation -.073'"

EFW)
II) Property Rights (EFW)
12) Sound Money (EFW)
1:3)Trade Freedom (EFWl
(14) Business Regulation
EFW)
15) Government Sizerraxation
IEF)
16) Property Rights (JEF)
17) Sound Money (IEF)
IS) Trade Freedom (IEF)
19) Business Regulation (lEF)

2

I

1) Self Employment
2) Gender
3) Skill
4) Prevention Focus
5) Age
6) Age squared

I
.173'"
-.070'"
-.033'"
-.030'"
.022'"
-.013'"
.016'"
.003'"

1
-.133 , ••
I
-.035'" -.040'"
-.OSS'" -.049'"
.IIS'·' -.041'"
-.052'" -.011'"
.010'" .023'"
-.096'" -.004"

1
.97S···
I
-.04S'·' -.061'"
I
I
.152'" .152'" .149'"
-.074'" -.06S·" -.101'" -.470'"
I
.023'" .02S·" -.014'" .ISS'" -.090'"

-.050'" -.021'" - 061'" -.020'" .139'" .142'"
-.061'" -.009'" -.031 '" .014'" .OSS'" .OS6'·'
-.OS4'" -.016'" -.OSI'"
.004" .077'" .OS3'"
.011'" .016'" -.024'" .036'" -.OS2'" -.079'"
-.OS2'"

.000 -.062'"

.014'"

.OSS··' .057'"

-.066'" -.015'" -.050'" -.005'" .130'" .131'"
-.037'" -.OOS·'· -.041'" .021'" .OS4'" .OS6'·'
-.079'" -.016'" -.040'" .029'" .099'" .103'"
.035'" .019'" -.012'" .036'" -.097'" -.100'"

.IIS·" .S03·" -.432'"
.076'" .702'" -.315'"
.040'" .4IS'" -.293'"
-.154'" -.554'" .376'"
.032'"
.115'"
.091'"
.04S'·'
-.140'"

.504'" -.155'"
.S70···
.545'"
.666'"
-.615'"

-.463'"
-.255'"
-.203'"
.40S·'·

I
I
.234'"
I
.220'" .591'"
ISS'" .544'" .4S3'"
I
.2S4'" -.571'" -.352'" -.274'"
.776'"

.451'"

.521'"

.217'" -.033'"

.177'" .S9S·" .679'" .SSO·'·
.060'" .546'" .604'" .404'"
.146'" .641'" .675'" .647'"
.163'" -.599'" -.492'" -.446'"

"T
'0

I

-.607'"
-.337'"
-.3S6·'·
.S02'"

I
.473'"
I
.251'" .609'"
I
I
.444'" .742'" .4SI···
-.144'" -.6S9··' -.404'" -.544'"

I

The need for using random coefficient modeling (RCM) can be assessed by
calculating interclass correlations (ICCs). Intraclass correlations are calculated to see
how variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the different levels of
analysis in the proposed multilevel model. It represents the correlation between two
randomly chosen level-l units within the same level-2 unit cluster. To obtain the needed
information to calculate an ICC, I first run an unconditional (null) model in which the
variability in the dependent variable is partitioned to the different levels. With a
continuous dependent variable, the ICC is calculated by dividing the variance in the
dependent variable at level-2 by the total variance of the dependent variable (which is the
sum of the level-2 and level-l variances). However, with a binary outcome the total
variance of the dependent variable cannot really be estimated. However, Hox (2010)
recommends calculating a pseudo-ICC by dividing the variance at level-2 by the sum of
the level-2 variance and the variance of the logistic distribution. 3.29 is the variance of a
logistic distribution with a scale factor of 1 (Hox,2010). I calculate the ICC using this
method. The intraclass correlation can be seen in Table 2.7. I obtain these by running
the lmer procedure in Revolution R. The intraclass correlation shows how the variability
in the dependent variable is partitioned into the two levels: countries and individuals.
The ICC of 0.1156 indicates that 11.56% of the variance in the likelihood of being selfemployed is due to country differences. This correlation is substantial enough that failure
to account for this clustering could inflate the standard errors of the parameter estimates
(Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998), indicating that random coefficient multilevel modeling is an
appropriate analysis technique in this circumstance.
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Table 2.7 Intraclass Correlation
Country Variance
Variance of the Logistic Distribution
Intraclass Correlation

.4294
3.2865
.1156

The next step is to run the random coefficients model. In the random coefficients
model, both the intercept and the level-1 slope coefficients that are predicted to vary are
allowed to vary based upon country. This estimation is performed so that these models
can be compared with the random slope model, to see if the additional random slopes
substantially increase model fit. I have hypothesized that the slope coefficient for both
college education (high human capital) and fear prevention focus will vary based upon
country.
To determine which model has the best fit, I examine the AIC and BIC indices.
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is a general fit index that can be used to compare
non-nested models (Hox, 2010). Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is a similar index
used to assess model fit, but the BIC tends to place more of a penalty on complex models
than the AIC. When comparing models, the model with the lower AIC and BIC is
preferred. Both measures become smaller as the deviance of the model goes down, as
well as when the number of parameters in the model goes down. BIC is calculated using
the number of individual observations as the sample size (instead of the number of
countries). In Table 2.8, the AIC and BIC for three models are displayed: the null model
(random country intercept only); a model with a random intercept and prevention focus
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slope; and a model with a random intercept, prevention focus, and college education
slope.

Table 2.8: Random Effects & Model Fit
Model

Deviance

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

490,492

490,515

427,991

428,036

62,501

62,479

406,745

406,823

21,246

21,213

Difference Difference
Null Model (Random 490,488
Intercept)
427,983
Random Intercept &
Prevention Focus
Slope
406,731
Random Intercept,
Prevention Focus &
College Slope

As can be seen in Table 2.8, adding the prevention focus slope to the model
improves fit substantially, according to both AlC and BlC measures of fit. Likewise,
adding a random slope for college education improves fit substantially as well. However,
these substantial differences seem likely due to the extremely large sample size, and thus
should be interpreted with caution.
To examine the hypothesized fixed effects, I run the analysis on the several
models using the glmmPQL procedure from the MASS package in R. This procedure is
similar to the lmer procedure used to examine the null and random effects models but is
capable of better estimating more complex models. The lmer procedure had difficulty
converging with the more complex models. The disadvantage to using the glmmPQL
procedure is that it works somewhat different mathematically, and deviance scores,
which are often used to assess model fit in multi-level models are not provided. Thus, the
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discussion of these models will focus on the significance of the hypothesized variables
instead of model fit.
The first model includes only a random intercept and control variables. I then
estimate a direct effects model containing all of the hypothesized and control variables. I
estimate separate models using the Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et aI.,
2007) index and the modified Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2005)
as the institutional variable measures. The last model contains all control and
hypothesized variables, as well as interaction terms. Again, I estimate separate models
using the EFW index and the modified IEF.
The results for the control model can be seen in Table 2.9. Many ofthe
individual-level control variables are significant predictors ofthe whether an individual is
engaging in self-employment. These include gender (0.4153;p < .0001), entrepreneurial
skills (1.7237; p < .0001), prevention focus (-0.3636;p < .0001), age (O.l462;p <

.0001), age squared (-0.0015;p <.0001). Surprisingly, having a college education

(0.0168; p = .0998) was not a statistically significant predictor of self-employment. It is
important to remember, given the sample size as well as the fact that the control variables
included are ones that have been found to significant predictors of self-employment in the
past, it is to be expected that many of the individual-level variables would be statistically
significant. At the country-level, gross domestic product statistically significantly
predicted self-employment (-0.017;p

=

.0005) while unemployment rates did not (-

0.0064;p = .2429).
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Table 2.9: Control Model

Modell
Variable
Intercept
Gender
Skill
Prevention Focus
Age
Age Squared
College
GDP per Capita
(thousands)
Unemployment
Rate
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006

Coefficient
-0.0918
0.4153
1.7237
-0.3636
0.1462
-0.0015
0.0168
-0.017

SE
0.0890
0.0095
0.0114
0.0475
.0021
0.000023
0.0102
0.005

t-value
-1.03
43.52
150.89
-7.65
70.81
-67.35
1.65
-3.50

p-value
0.3023
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0998
0.0005

-0.0064

0.0055

-1.17

0.2429

0.1328
0.6473
0.5166
0.6820
0.4897

0.0216
0.0231
0.0230
0.0239
0.0243

6.14
28.04
22.50
28.55
20.19

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Table 2.10 displays Model 2 and Table 2.11 displays Model 3. Model 2 is the
direct effects model using institutional measures from the Economic Freedom of World
index (Gwartney et al., 2007) while Model 3, uses institutional measures from the Index
of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2005). Italicized variables are the variables
that were added to these models. However, my discussion will focus on the Models 4 &
5.
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Table 2.10: EFW Direct Effects Model
Model 2
Variable
Intercept
Gender
Skill
Prevention Focus
Age
Age Squared
College
GDP per Capita
(thousands)
Unemployment Rate
TaxationiGovernment
Size
Property Rights
Sound Money
Trade Freedom
Business Regulation
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006

Coefficient
-0.1910
0.4158
1.7229
-0.3612
0.1470
-0.0016
0.0151
-0.0248

SE
0.1019
0.0096
0.0114
0.0470
0.0021
0.000023
0.0102
0.0062

t-value
-1.87
43.52
150.63
-7.68
71.0509
-67.60
1.48
-4.01

p-value
0.0609
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1382
<0.0001

0.0067
0.1119

0.0061
0.0186

1.11
6.00

0.2691
<0.0001

0.0677
0.0707
0.1005
0.1833
0.1552
0.7043
0.6837
0.8725
0.7217

0.0202
0.0198
0.0300
0.0226
0.0224
0.0242
0.0282
0 . 0321
0 . 0337

3.35
3.57
3.35
8.10
6.94
29.15
24.26
27.17
21.39

0.0008
0.0004
0.0008
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
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Table 2.11: IEF Direct Effects Model
Model 3
Variable
Intercept
Gender
Skill
Prevention Focus
Age
Age Squared
College
GDP per Capita
(thousands)
Unemployment Rate
Taxation/Government
Size
Property Rights
Sound Money
Trade Freedom
Business Regulation
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006

Coefficient
-0.1194
0.4155
1.7228
-0.3635
0.1462
-0.0015
0.0167
-0.023

SE
0.0863
0.0095
0.0] 14
0.0474
0.0021
0.000023
0.0102
0.0068

t-value
-1.38
43.52
150.73
-7.67
70.78
-67.32
1.64
-3.29

p-value
0.1664
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1006
0.0010

-0.0121
0.0021

0.0063
0.0019

-1.94
1.07

0.0525
0.2841

0.0041
0.0104
-0.0030
0.0052
0.1691
0.6836
0.5604
0.7171
0.5405

0.0029
0.0022
0.0016
0.0017
0.0230
0.0250
0.0255
0.0270
0.0293

1.42
4.82
-1.89
3.11
7.35
27.34
21.96
26.52
18.43

0.1568
<0.0001
0.0594
0.0019
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Results from the full model, which includes the hypothesized cross-level
interaction effects, can be seen in Table 2.12 and Table 2.13. Italicized variables are the
variables that were added to these models (not in previous models). In Model 4, I use the
EFW institution measures, for Model 5, I use the measures from the IEF. Adding the
interaction terms not only adds additional significance tests, but this also slightly changes
the parameter estimates for the direct effects. However, the results for the full models are
very similar to the direct effects models. Thus, my discussion of the hypotheses tests will
be based upon the results from both of the full models. When I ran the full model, the
software would not converge on a solution when the college slope was allowed to vary by
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country. Hence, this random slope was removed, and hypotheses 8 and 9 were not tested.
Because that the model would not converge with a random college slope, it is likely that
there is very little variation in this relationship by country and thus unlikely that any sort
of significance would have been found for hypotheses 8 and 9.

Table 2.12: EFW Full Model
Model 4
Variable
Intercept
Gender
Skill
Prevention Focus
Age
Age Squared
College
GDP per Capita
(thousands)
Unemployment Rate
Taxation/Government
Size
Property Rights
Sound Money
Trade Freedom
Business Regulation
Pre Focus*Property
Rights
Pre Focus*Sound
Money
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006

Coefficient
-0.2238
0.4158
1.7230
-0.4158
0.1469
-0.0016
0.0152
-0.0297

SE
0.1021
0.0096
0.0114
0.0448
0.0021
0.000023
0.0102
0.0064

I-value
-2.19
43.51
150.63
-9.21
71.03
-67.58
1.49
-4.65

p-value
0.0283
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1350
<0.0001

0.0070
0.1111

0.0060
0.0185

1.17
6.01

0.2431
<0.0001

0.0819
0.0527
0.0943
0.1852
-0.0982

0.0203
0.0209
0.0299
0.0226
0.0208

4.03
2.51
3.15
8.20
-4.72

<0.0001
0.0119
0.0016
<0.0001
<0.0001

0.0516

0.0270

1.91

0.0564

0.1545
0.7061
0.6860
0.8801
0.7304

0.0224
0.0242
0.0281
0.0321
0.0337

6.91
29.23
24.38
27.40
21.64

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

In the EFW (using Economic Freedom ofthe World) full model,
taxation/government size is a statistically significant predictor of entrepreneurship
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(0.1111; P < .0001) although in a different direction than hypothesized in hypothesis 1.

Likewise, the business regulation coefficient is statistically significant (0.1852; p <
.0001), but in a different direction than hypothesized in hypothesis 2. The coefficient for

trade freedom is positive and statistically significant (0.0943;p

=

.0016), which is

consistent with hypothesis 3. Property rights is positively related to self-employment
(0.0819;p < .0001) which supports hypothesis 4. Finally, sound money is positively

related to self-employment (0.0527;p = :0119), which is consistent with hypothesis 5.
The interaction between prevention focus and sound money is statistically non-significant
(0.0516;p = .0564). No support is found for hypothesis 6. The interaction between

prevention focus and property rights is statistically significant, but in the direction
opposite of what is hypothesized (-0.0982;p < .0001). Thus, there is no support for
hypothesis 7.
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Table 2.13: IEF Full Model
ModelS
Variable
Intercept
Gender
Skill
Prevention Focus
Age
Age Squared
College
GDP per Capita
(thousands)
Unemployment Rate
Taxation/Government
Size
Property Rights
Sound Money
Trade Freedom
Business Regulation
Pre Focus*Property

Coefficient
-0.1739
0.4156
1.7225
-0.4471
0.1462
-0.0015
0.0164
-0.029

SE
0.0882
0.0095
0.0114
0.0473
0.0021
0.000023
0.0102
0.007

t-value
-1.97
45.52
150.69
-9.45
70.78
-67.33
1.61
-4.09

p-value
0.0486
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1082
<0.0001

-0.0100
0.0019

0.0063
0.0019

-1.60
0.97

0.1104
0.3297

0.0029
0.0108
-0.0027
0.0053
-0.0077

0.0029
0.0023
0.0016
0.0017
0.0019

1.01
4.65
-1.68
3.16
-4.11

0.3145
<0.0001
0.0938
0.0016
<0.0001

0.00036
0.1680
0.6811
0.5642
0.7240
0.5519

0.00365
0.0230
0.0250
0.0255
0.0271
0.0294

0.10
7.30
27.25
22.09
26.73
18.74

0.9225
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Ri~hts

Pre Focus*Sound Money
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006

In the full model using the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) institution
measures, the coefficient for taxation/government size is not statistically significant
(0.0019;p = .3297). Thus, there is no support for hypothesis 1. The level of business

regulation has a statistically significant effect of the likelihood of being self-employed
(0.0053;p = .0016); however, the relationship is positive, and the opposite of what was

hypothesized in hypothesis 2. Trade freedom is not statistically significantly related to
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self-employment (-0.0027; P = .0938), which is not consistent with hypothesis 3.
Property rights are not statistically significantly related to self-employment (0.0029; p
=.3145), thus this is not consistent with hypothesis 4. Sound money is positive and
statistically significant (0.0108; p < .0001), supporting hypothesis 5. The interaction
between prevention focus and sound money was statistically nonsignificant (0.0004;p =
.9225). Thus, no support is found for hypothesis 6. The interaction between prevention
focus and property rights was statistically significant but in the direction opposite of what
was hypothesized (-0.0077; p < .0001). Hypothesis 7 is therefore not supported. A
summary of the hypothesized variables and their significance in models 4 and 5 can be
seen in Table 2.14.

Table 2.14: Results Summary
Results- EFW
Measures
Not supported

Not supported

H2 Business Regulation

Not supp0l1ed

Not supported

H3

Trade Freedom

Supported

Not supported

H4 Property Rights

Supported

Not supported

H5

Supported

Supported

Not supported

Not supported

Not supported

Not supported

Not supporteda

Not supporteda

Not supporteda

Not supporteda

HI

Hypothesized Relationship
With Self-Employment
Taxation/Government Size

Sound Money

H6 Prevention Focus* Sound
Money
H7 Prevention Focus *Property
Rights
H8 College*T axation/Government
Size
H9 College*Business Regulation
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Results- IEF Measures

aThese effects were not tested in the full model because the model would not converge
with both a random college and prevention focus slopes. However, the college variable
itself was not statistically significant, and a separat~: analysis (without a random
prevention focus slope) failed to find statistically significant moderation effects.

Post Hoc Analysis
In some ofthe analyses, both taxation/government size as well as business
regulation were positively related to self-employment, even though a negative
relationship was predicted. For taxation/government size, there is good theoretical
rational for why this relationship might be positive. As discussed earlier, there are tax
benefits to self-employment, which will tend to increase as tax rates go up (Bruce &
Schuetze,2004). Also, large governments can provide certain services (education, police
protection) infrastructure (roads and bridges) and basic research that may be beneficial to
entrepreneurs (Audretsch et aI., 2005; Kirchhoff et aI., 2007; Kreft & Sobel, 2005).
However, the positive relationship found between the level of business regulation is more
difficult to explain. Why would individuals in countries with more business regulation be
more likely to be self-employed? Business regulations would seem to impede small
entrepreneurs while being less of an impediment to large and established firms. The
measure of business regulation used in both the EFW and IEF included not only direct
regulations to businesses regarding startup and price controls, but also regulations of
labor and credit markets. In order to examine this in a little more detail, I break down the
business regulation measure into the three sub-components: business startup and
operating regulations, labor regulations, and creditlbank regulations. I use only the EFW
index, since the IEF does not have labor regulations for all years. I then run an analysis
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using these three subcomponents in place of the aggregated business regulations measure.
The results can be seen in Table 2.15.
Not surprisingly, business and operating regulations is now a non-significant
predictor of self-employment (-0.0087;p = .6464). However, labor regulations (0.0881;
p < .0001) and credit regulations (0.1115; p < . 0001) are positively related to self-

employment. In countries with greater labor regulations, firms may be reluctant to hire
workers since the labor costs are high. Since workers cannot be hired, they may be more
likely to become self-employed as they are pushed into this type of work because of the
regulations. It may be the case that credit regulations have a larger impact on bigger
businesses and thus make small business more the norm. As a consequence, these
countries may have more self-employment. It makes sense that business and operating
regulations would not be positively related to self-employment. This helps explain the
counterintuitive findings found in the main analysis.
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Table 2.15: Post Hoc Test- Multiple Regulation Measures
Model 6
Variable
Intercept
Gender
Skill
Prevention Focus
Age
Age Squared
College
GDP per Capita
(thousands)
Unemployment Rate
Taxation/Government
Size
Startup and Operating
Regulations
Labor Regulations
Credit Regulations
Property Rights
Sound Money
Trade Freedom
Prevention
Focus *Property
Rights
Prevention
Focus*Sound Money
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006

Coefficient
-0.2350
0.4171
1.7227
-0.4145
0.1468
-0.0016
0.0140
-0.0279

SE
0.1016
0.0096
0.0114
0.0445
0.0021
0.000023
0.0102
0.0065

I-value
-2.31
43.58
150.48
-9.30
70.84
-67.40
1.37
-4.30

p-value
0.0207
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1710
<0.0001

0.00211
0.1068

0.00614
0.0186

0.34
5.75

0.7314
<0.0001

-0.0087

0.0190

-0.46

0.6464

0.0881
0.1115
0.0356
0.0856
0.0642
-0.1071

0.0124
0.0179
0.0219
0.0222
0.0293
0.0213

7.11
6.21
1.62
3.86
2.19
-5.02

<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1048
<0.0001
0.0284
<0.0001

0.0505

0.0277

1.82

0.0682

0.1390
0.6893
0.6549
0.8952
0.7315

0.0227
0.0247
0.0277
0.0353
0.0381

6.13
27.85
23.57
25.33
19.22

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

2.7. DISCUSSION
The results are informative in how formal institutions predict the likelihood that
an individual is self-employed. Several previous studies have examined how institutions
influence entrepreneurship, with many of them using economic freedom indices to
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measure institutions (Bjomskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008; Sobel, 2008;).
One large difference in this essay is that I do not try to predict country-level
entrepreneurship rates, but instead examine individual decisions to engage in
entrepreneurship (measured by whether they are self-employed). Although results
similar to previous research would not be surprising, such agreement is not necessarily
expected either. There does appear to be some similarities in results I found and previous
analyses performed solely at the country-level.
I found a positive relationship between government size/taxation levels and the
likelihood of self-employment with the EFW measure, and a non-significant relationship
with the IEF measure. Past empirical research on the relationship between government
size/taxation levels and levels of entrepreneurship has found mixed results, with some
finding negative (Nystrom, 2008) and other studies finding positive relationships (Aidis,
Estrin, and Mickiewicz, 2009; Bjomskow & Foss, 2008; Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik,
and Reynolds, 2005). This may explained to different measures of entrepreneurship, for
example, Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz predict entrepreneurial entry instead of selfemployment. Also, many of the studies do not predict the likelihood that an individual
will be an entrepreneur through the use of multi-level modeling, but instead look at
aggregate self-employment rates at the country or state level.
While some studies have found a non-significant relationship between measures
of business regulation and measures of entrepreneurship (Bjomskow and Foss 2008;
McMullen, Bagby, and Palich 2008) others have found a negative relationship (Klapper,
Laeven and Rajan, 2006; Sobel, Clark, and Lee, 2007; Nystrom, 2008, Van Stel, Storey,
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and Thurik, 2007). However, I found a positive relationship between the level of
business regulations and the likelihood of self-employment. This is somewhat explained
by the post hoc analysis which reveals that it is labor and credit regualtions that tend to be
driving this relationship, while startup and operating regullations are not significantly
related. Again, these differences may be due to the use of different methodoligies and
measures.
Trade freedom is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of selfemployment with the EFW measure, while non-significant for the IEF measure. Past
research has been mixed as well. Sobel, Clark, and Lee (2007) found that the average
tariff rate is negatively related to total entrepreneurial activity, however, other research
has shown a non-significant relationship between trade freedom and measures of
entrepreneurship (McMullen et aI., 2008; Nystrom, 2008).
I found a positive relationship between property rights and the likelihood of selfemployment with the EFW measure, but a non-significant relationship with the IEF
measure of property rights. The positive relationship seems fairly consistent with the past
literature, generally strong property rights have been found to encourage investment
(Besley, 1995; Johnson, McMillian & Woodruff, 2002) and certain types of
entrepreneurship (McMullen, Bagby, and Palich, 2008; Nystrom 2008). The relationship
between sound money and the likelihood of being self-employed was the most robust
relationship of any of the hypothesized variables- it significantly predicted selfemployment in all model specifications in which it was included as a variable. This is
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consistent with findings of Bjomskov and Foss (2008) but not with the findings of
Nystrom (2008)
Besides the ability to control for a number of individual level factors, another
advantage to using a multi-level analysis is the ability to test cross-level interactions.
There were four cross-level interactions hypothesized. However, the results from the
interaction test did not generally support the hypothesized interactions.

2.8. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several limitations to this research. Although the GEM survey allows
access to a large number of cross-country respondents, this survey does not include many
countries, and seems to contain a disproportionate number of European countries. Africa
in particular is underrepresented, containing only observations from Uganda and South
Africa. This is a problem because the determinants of entrepreneurship in Europe are
likely to be much different than those in Africa. Thus, my results may have limited
generalizability. Another limitation with the GEM survey is the crudeness of some of the
measures. Entrepreneurial skills and prevention focus (fear of failure) are measured by
dichotomous variables. These sorts of measures may make sense in a large cross-country
survey such as this, since questions with responses on a Likert-type scale may be difficult
to translate accurately for all of the countries in which individuals are surveyed.
Nevertheless, the crude nature of the measures means that they are subject to a substantial
amount of measurement error. Measurement error lowers the bivariate correlation
between two variables, weakening the bivariate relationship (Chen & Popovich, 2002)
and making it less likely that a significant relationship will be found. However, with a
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statistical analysis containing multiple independent variables, it is impossible to know
how the measurement error will impact the relationship between two variables. Also,
when examining how country-level differences influence entrepreneurship, there is
always the possibility of omitted variable bias. Countries vary on an almost infinite
number of variables, many of which are unobservable and immeasurable.
Examining measures of entrepreneurship- such of self-employment, new startups,
etc. give us an idea about the prevalence and predictors of entrepreneurship. Allowing
individuals the choice to become entrepreneurs is not only a basic liberty, but it is also
important to economic outcomes like job creation and economic growth (Carree, van
Stel, Thurik, & Wennekers, 2002; F61ster, 2000). However, saying that all
entrepreneurship is desirable, and that more entrepreneurship is always good, is simply
wishful thinking. This study does not fully capture how institutions influence the type of
entrepreneurship that people engage in. Baumol (1990) argues that even if institutional
forces do not change the level of entrepreneurship in an economy, they certainly do
change the type of entrepreneurship that occurs. Thus, institutions may influence the
relative ratio of productive entrepreneurship to unproductive and destructive
entrepreneurship. In the early middle ages, institutions encouraged "entrepreneurship"
that involved developing innovative weapons to aid in making warfare - likely due at
least partially to the economic gains that could be eaptured through warfare (and perhaps
the lack of other ways to gain wealth). Thus, although entrepreneurship existed, it was
not focused on developing new consumer products or efficient production systems.
Likewise in modem society, high levels of taxation may in fact encourage people to
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become self-employed (Bruce & Schuetze, 2004), so they can take advantage of certain
tax benefits (both legal and illegal) that self-employed individuals can take advantage of.
These individuals may not particularly desire to be self-employed, and they may be less
productive as self-employed than if they were working for some other firm. Likewise,
with larger governments, individuals may become self-employed to perform consulting
work for government. They may have incentives to lobby for special rules or regulations
that might increase the demand for their services. However, in this study, due to the
nature of the data, I am not able to separate productive entrepreneurship from
unproductive and destructive versions.
Attempting to measure productive entrepreneurship and using institutional
variables to predict productive entrepreneurship may be the logical next step in this
research stream. One notable paper already attempts to make a distinction between
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship and examines what institutional factors
predict each (Sobel, 2008). In this paper, the distinction is made by using firm births,
patenting activity, etc. as measures of productive entrepreneurship, and using the number
oflobbying firms and the quality of the state's liability system. However, some new
firms that come about are unproductive if not downright destructive. Attempts should be
made to examine new firms on a number of criteria to determine whether they are to be
considered productive, unproductive, or destructive.
Another fruitful area of future research may be examining the interactions
between country-level institution measure and individual-level characteristics. Many
factors that commonly predict engagement in entre:preneurial activities, such as risk
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perception, risk tolerance, and overconfidence and may have their effects moderated by
institutional factors. While none of the hypothesized moderators in this study were
supported, that does not mean that other moderating relationships do not exist.

2.9. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I examined the relationship between the formal institutions of a
country and the likelihood of individuals being

self~employed.

Two sets of institutional

measures, the Economic Freedom of the World index and the Index of Economic
Freedom are used in the analysis to measure govemment size, the level of business
regulation, trade freedom, the strength of property rights, and soundness of money. Some
support is found for a positive relationship between trade freedom, property rights, and
sound money in the country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that they
are engaged in self-employment. Govemment size/taxation levels and the level of
business regulations do not predict engagement in self-employment in the hypothesized
manner.
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CHAPTER 3: LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND NEW FIRM
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH

3.1. INTRODUCTION
Labor market institutions include the taxes on labor, minimum wages,
employment regulations, social security taxes and benefits, and laws governing
unionization in an economy (Nickell 1998). Labor market institutions develop over time,
often as a result of various social movements and economic shocks (Thelen, 2004) and
vary widely across countries and sometimes even among regions or states within a
country. Because these institutions set the rules for both employees and employers, they
ultimately influence the cost of labor and affect hiring, firing, and other employment
decisions within the firm. For example, labor market institutions have been shown to
influence a number of economic outcomes, such as the variance in pay levels (Freeman,
1998), unemployment rates (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998; Nickell, 1997) and job creation
(Cahuc & Postel-Vinay, 2002).
Existing research has focused on using labor market institutions to predict
economy-level outcomes, such as the level of unemployment (Belot & Van Ours, 2001)
and variation in wages (Siebert, 1997). For these economy-level outcomes to arise,
institutions need to change the behavior of firms and individuals. However, how labor
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market institutions specifically influence the behavior of new firms is not well
understood. New firms often are resource-constrained and have less access to capital
than more established firms (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, &
Rosen, 1994), yet they require substantial increases in employment in order to grow.
Often they operate in "hypercompetitive" industrit:s with small profit margins (Jones,
Ram, & Edwards, 2004; Ram, Edwards, & Jones, 2007). New firms may be more
sensitive to labor market institutions that increase the cost of labor, since they may lack
access to capital and compete in very competitive industries. Alternatively, new firms
may be less sensitive to some labor market institutions such as those that encourage
unionization because their initial small size may reduce their chances of being unionized.
In addition, new firms may be able to effectively avoid the impact of high minimum
wages by informally hiring people "off the books" or by renegotiating other details of the
employment contract to compensate for having to pay high wages (Arrowsmith, Gilman,
Edwards, & Ram, 2003). However, current research has not rigorously examined how
labor market institutions such as minimum wages, unionization protections, and labor
taxes influences new firms.
In this essay, I examine the following research question: Do labor market
institutions influence employment growth in new firms? New firms are often small, and
small firms are said to suffer from the liability of smallness3 (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990)
because they often lack the necessary resources needed to survive (Holtz-Eakin et aI.,

New fIrms are said to suffer from the liability of newness because they lack legitimacy and must learn
new routines, which raises their mortality rate (Stinchcombe, 1965). However, new fIrms are most often
small and, therefore, suffer from the resource constraints associated with the liability of smallness as well.
Although conceptually different, many new fIrms arguably have both types of liabilities.
3

86

1994). Labor market institutions may exacerbate this liability by increasing the labor cost
of new firms. Thus, answering this question will build on previous findings suggesting
that the institutional environment may have a profound impact on emerging firms
(Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Sobel et aI., 2007). Furthermore, this paper examines how
firm attributes, such as whether a firm has a

comp~:titive

advantage, moderate the

relationship between labor market institutions and firm employment. Because new firms
are often considered significant creators of new jobs (Birch, 1987; Birley, 1986;
Davidsson, Lindmark, & Olofsson, 1998; Van Praag & Versloot, 2007; Van Stel &
Suddle, 2008), an understanding of to what extent their labor market policies influence
employment growth in these firms can aid decision making by policymakers.
This essay is organized as follows. First, I develop several hypotheses concerning
the relationship between various labor market institutions and employment growth in new
firms. I examine several aspects of labor market institutions: minimum wages, union
densities, and the structure of unemployment insurance. I then test these relationships by
combining state-level measures of labor market institutions with firm-level measures
from the Kauffman Firm Survey.
3.2. LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
Siebert (1997) notes, "any labor market is surrounded by an array of institutional
arrangements that form a complex web of incentives and disincentives on both sides of
the market" (p. 39). Labor market institutions include the taxes on labor, minimum
wages, employment regulations, social security taxes and benefits, and laws governing
unionization in an economy (Nickell 1998). The rules that regulate the labor market
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influence the supply and demand for labor (Freemlll, 1998; Siebert, 1997). These rules
and regulations differ greatly among countries, with different countries developing
several distinct models with varying results. As noted by Freeman (1998), the U.S.
model entails relatively low union protection, low minimum wages compared to the
average wage, and a weak social safety net. The U.S. has experienced rather low
unemployment and high growth but has experienced low inflation-adjusted wage
increases relative to many European countries. Conversely, many European countries are
characterized by relatively high levels of unionization, high minimum wages, and
extensive social safety nets, although differences do manifest themselves among
European countries. During the 1980s and 1990s, many European countries had
substantially higher unemployment rates than the U.S., although there was generally less
variance in pay levels (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Freeman, 1998; Ljungqvist &
Sargent,1998). The differences between European countries and the U.S. in
unemployment rates persisted into the 2000s, until the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009
when the rates converged (Schmitt, Rho, & Fremstad, 2009). The differences in
economic outcomes among these countries are to some degree a result of differences in
labor market institutions (Belot & Van Ours, 2001; Freeman & Nickell, 1988; Siebert,
1997).
In addition to labor market institutions varying widely by country, substantial
variation in these institutions also occurs between the various states or provinces inside
some countries. This can clearly be seen in countries with a federalist system, which
grants substantial governing power to individual states or provinces, such as in the U.S.
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and Canada (Karabegovic et aI., 2005). For example, in the U.S., states can enact their
own minimum wage laws4 , set right-to-work laws, determine acceptable firing practices,
and determine on what basis firms may discriminate in employment (Colvin, 2000;
Karabegovic et aI., 2005).

3.3. LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND NEW FIRMS
As discussed, labor market institutions have a broad impact on labor market
outcomes, affecting working conditions, employee wages (Freeman, 1998), firm
profitability (Voos & Mishel, 1986), unemployment levels (Siebert, 1997), and worker
productivity (Addison & Barnett, 1982). Labor market institutions have a substantial
impact on firms, and new firms are no exception. However, labor market institutions
may playa greater role in influencing hiring and firing in new firms for several reasons.
New firms also are generally small, lack resources., and do not have as easy access to
capital as more established firms (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994).
Furthermore, new firms have a substantial need for additional resources in order to grow.
New firms are often not yet profitable and cannot use their profits to fund expansion;
therefore, they often must rely on external resources to operate and grow. Due to these
resource constraints, increased labor cost of any sort may lead to new firms be less
willing to hire workers and more willing to layoff workers than older firms.

Although states do enact minimum wage laws, they are not able to enact a minimum wage lower than the
federal minimum wage in the United States. Thus, fIrms in states that have no minimum wage laws or
minimum wages below the federal minimum wage must pay the federal minimum wage.
4
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To examine how labor market institutions impact new firms, I examine how
minimum wages, as well as unionization levels and unemployment tax policies, influence
the employment levels of new firms.
Minimum Wages

The first national minimum wage in the u.s. of25 cents per hour was enacted by
the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938 (Grossman, 1978). Some individual states adopted a
minimum wage prior to the Fair Labor Standard Aet, but often these rules only applied to
children and/or female workers (Leonard, 2000). Even though a national minimum wage
is in effect in the u.S. today, many states have their own minimum wage rates as well
(Karabegovic et ai., 2005). In 2009, all but five states had their own minimum wages,
although some had rates below the federal minimum wage. Washington state had the
highest minimum wage at $8.55 per hour, while the federal minimum wage was
increased to $7.25 that year (United States Department of Labor, 2009).
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that all else being equal, a higher
minimum wage will lead to lower levels of employment and higher levels of
unemployment (Stigler, 1946). Increases in the minimum wage raise the marginal cost of
each additional employee; as a result, firms reduce the number of employees. Most
empirical studies have found a negative relationship between increases in the minimum
wage and employment (Baker, Benjamin, & Stanger, 1999; Neumark & Wascher, 2000).
Generally, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment
between zero to three percent (Brown, Gilroy, & Kohen, 1982).
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A few studies have found insignificant or positive relationships between
minimum wages and employment levels (Card & Krueger, 1994; Card & Krueger, 1995;
Dickens, Machin, & Manning, 1999). Explanations include monopsony labor markets, or
countervailing forces that could minimize or eliminate a negative relationship between
minimum wages and employment. These include possible "shock effects" in which
employers react to increases in the minimum wage by raising their workers' productivity
to compensate for the increased minimum wage (Brown et aI., 1982) as well as the
possibility that firms reduce employee compensation in other ways (Brown & Crossman,
2000). Finally, the "hungry teenager" hypothesis notes that increases in the minimum
wage will lead to increased earnings among teenagers (Kennan, 1995; Zavodny, 1998).
Because teenagers often spend their money at places such as fast food restaurants that
employ workers at the minimum wage, the demand curve for low skilled labor is shifted
right (Antonova & Tudoreanu, 2009). Thus, employment levels do not change or change
very little because of minimum wage increases.
Several researchers have questioned the findings of the studies by Card and
Krueger (1994, 1995) and have reexamined these studies empirically. Card and Krueger's
(1995) study of the 1990-1991 minimum wage increase found no relationship between
minimum wages and teenage employment. However, Wessels' (2007) replication of the
analysis applying the Card and Krueger (1995) model to the 1996-1997 federal minimum
wage increase found that the higher minimum wage is associated with lower teenage
employment in states that were more affected by the minimum wage increase. Neumark
and Wascher (2000) suggest that econometric and measurement issues may have led to
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an incorrect conclusion in the analysis by Card and Krueger (1994) on the impact of the
New Jersey minimum wage increase on employment levels in the fast food industry.
They replicated the analysis using payroll data instead of telephone surveys and generally
concluded that the minimum wage increase did reduce employment.
In addition to econometric and measurement issues, one possibility for the
differing findings in some of the minimum wage n::search is that increases in the
minimum wage may not affect all firms the same way regarding their hiring and firing
activities. Rama (2001) examined the case of the minimum wage doubling in Indonesia
and found that while small firms decreased their employment substantially, large firms
actually increased employment. Therefore, if minimum wages affect firms with varying
attributes in different ways, then perhaps the differing results that have been found
regarding the relationship between minimum wages and employment may be due to
heterogeneous samples.

Minimum Wages and New Firms
Minimum wages are likely to increase a finn's labor cost for unskilled employees
(Gregg, 2000). If the minimum wage rate rises above the marginal revenue generated by
workers, then they are likely to be laid off (if working for a firm) or not hired (if not
working for a firm) (Leonard, 2000). Thus, high minimum wages in a state are likely to
lead to lower levels of employment relative to firms in low minimum wage states.
Newer firms are likely to behave differently in response to high minimum wages
than older firms. New firms differ from established firms in that they may not currently
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be generating much revenue from their employees and thus may not have access to
needed capital, even if it can be invested productively. When firms are new, employees
may be working on activities that may not necessarily be profitable for the firm in the
short-term, but may be in the long-term. For example, a new restaurant may be paying
employees a wage (marginal cost) that exceeds the additional revenue that employee
actually generates for the firm (marginal revenue). That is because firm may have few
initial customers, but wants to keep a sufficient number of employees on the payroll to
ensure that customers receive prompt service. Doing so may allow the firm to be
successful in the future, as satisfied customers become repeat customers of the business
and tell their acquaintances about the positive expt:rience they had.
Although the marginal revenue generated by an employee may exceed their
marginal cost, the cost is realized immediately while the revenue may not be realized
until far into the future. This would not be particularly problematic if capital markets
worked efficiently; the new firm would simply bOITOW the money they needed to hire
such workers and pay it back later. However, given evidence that small and new firms
face liquidity constraints (Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994:; Johansson, 2000), increased labor cost
may lead to new firms limiting the number of people that they employ, even when
employing a greater number of people would be profitable in the end.
Several other factors may make high minimum wages particularly problematic for
new firms as well. New firms are typically small, and small firms typically pay lower
wages than large firms (Brown & Medoff, 1989; Idson & Feaster, 1990; Morissette,
1993; Winter-Ebmer, 2001). Therefore, these fimls are likely to have a larger percentage
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of their workers earning the minimum wage, making high minimum wages more costly to
these firms. Small, new firms often operate in markets that are known as
"hypercompetitive," and firms in these types of markets have low profit margins, making
their ability to deal with high labor cost difficult (Jones et aI., 2004; Ram et aI., 2007).
Although traditional economic theory prediicts that a number of negative
consequences may result from high minimum wages, others argue that the actions that
firms take in responding to increased minimum wages may be hard to predict
(Arrowsmith et aI., 2003). Despite the fact that high minimum wages may be a major
burden for new firms, sometimes they may be able: to respond to high minimum wages in
creative ways and avoid having to reduce the number of workers that they employ.
Contracts between employers and employees can be renegotiated to avoid or minimize
the impact ofthe minimum wage on the firm (Arrowsmith et aI., 2003). One way this is
done is through circumventing the law. For example, informal arrangements may be
made in which employees work "off the books," that is, are not registered as employees,
and receive wages paid in cash. Employers could pay these workers' wages below the
minimum wage. Employees may agree to such arrangements when they are threatened
with termination, if they receive other benefits (such as tax benefits) from the
arrangement, or have few alternatives for employment (such as in the case of illegal
immigrants). Furthermore, ties between the employer and employees, especially in
groups of ethnic minorities, may serve to enforce these sorts of arrangements (Jones et
aI., 2004; Ram et aI., 2007). Because new firms are typically small and lack formal
human resources practices (Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Wager, 1998), informally
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renegotiating such contracts, even when technically illegal, is likely to be much easier
than in more established firms that have formal human resource procedures. Even if
employers agree to pay a high minimum wage, they may change other parts of the
employment contract to compensate for the extra payment. For example, firms may
require employees to work harder and be subject to more critical employee reviews
(Arrowsmith et aI., 2003). Firms can cut employee pay in other ways, such as offering
fewer vacation days, less paid overtime, and fewer employee discounts and making
breaks unpaid (Brown & Crossman, 2000).
Although new firms certainly may adapt substantially to high minimum wages
using a number of techniques, it seems unlikely that new firms will be able to adapt to
minimum wages so well that their employment levels will not be affected. Thus, high
minimum wages are likely to exert a negative impact on employment levels in new firms.

HI: New firms operating in states with higher minimum wages will have
lower employment growth than new firms operating in states with lower
minimum wages.
Union Protections and Union Density
Union density, the percentage of workers that are represented by unions, varies
dramatically among U.s. states. In 2008, the percentage of employees represented by
unions in the U.s. ranged from a low of 4.6% of workers in Georgia to 26.6% of workers
in New York, with an average of 12.9% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010).
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The level of unionization in a region is likely influenced by statutory laws, such
as legal protections, cultural acceptance of unions, as well as the type of industries in the
region. One way it is thought that state governments can influence the prevalence of
unionization in their states is through enacting (or failing to enact) right-to-work laws.
Right-to-work laws remove the requirement to join a union to get or maintain a job
(Lumsden & Petersen, 1975). The Taft-Hartley act passed in 1947 allowed individual
states in the u.s. to pass right-to-work laws if they chose. As of2009 22 states had rightto-work laws (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010).
Some research has found little or no relationship between right-to-work laws and
unionization levels (Wessels, 1981), while others have found a negative relationship
(Ellwood & Fine, 1987; Moore, 1998). Even when a relationship is observed between
union density and the presence of right-to-work laws, it is difficult to say that the
presence of right-to-work laws causes union density to decrease. The relationship may be
endogenous because many of the states that have enacted right-to-work laws are states in
which unions were not strong to begin with (Farber, 1984; Moore & Newman, 1985) and
therefore have less political power. Conversely, states with traditionally high levels of
union membership and union power, such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, have not
enacted right-to-work laws. Thus, a simultaneity bias problemS seems to exist in which it
is not clear whether right-to-work laws lead to lower levels of unionization or whether
low levels of unionization leads to less opposition to right-to-work laws, making their

5 A simultaneity bias (or reverse causality) is a form of endogeneity in which the dependent variable may
also influence the independent variable. Endogeneity may also occur due to an omitted variable that
influences the dependent variable and also is correlated with one or more of the independent variables
(Verbeek, 2008).
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enactment more likely. However, Davis and Huston (1995) and Moore (1998) both
found that right-to-work laws are associated with lower union densities even when
accounting for the simultaneity bias problem.
Another factor likely to influence the level of unionization is a region's culture.
Culture not only influences how favorably a socie~y views unions but also affects the
enactment of laws that may be beneficial (or not) to unions. Cultural measures of
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and power distance are significant
predictors of union density, with cultures that value masculinity and accept inequity
displaying low union densities (Singh, 2001). Public support for unionization may relate
to union density as well. Lower public support for unions during the 1980s occurred
during a period of substantial decline in private sector union density (Palley &
Lajeunesse, 2007). In addition to formal institutions and culture, the level of
unionization in a region is influenced by the types of industries and industry structure that
are prevalent in the region. Unionization has generally been higher in areas associated
with manufacturing, such as the Northeast and Midwest regions of the U.S.
(Kokkelenberg & Sockell, 1985). Conversely, areas with traditionally low levels of
manufacturing, such as the Southeast and Great Plains regions, have had lower union
densities.
Researchers have examined the effects of unionization on firms as well.
Unionization tends to lead to higher wages (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983;
Stewart, 1990), and higher wages provide incentives for firms to substitute capital in
place oflabor, raising productivity (Addison & Barnett, 1982). However, any
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relationship between unionization and worker productivity is likely confounded by a
selection effect. Because firms that are unionized pay more for workers, they likely will
only select the highest quality workers to hire (Addison & Barnett, 1982).
It is often argued that unionization of a firm's workforce will have a negative

impact on firm profitability. Unionized workers tc:::nd to get paid more than nonunionized workers (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983; Stewart, 1990), which
could lead to firms either raising prices or having lower profits. Voos and Mishel (1986)
find that unions in the supermarket industry substantially reduce profits of supermarkets
and this effect is more pronounced when there is a high level of concentration in local
markets. Likewise, evidence from Britain suggests that unions have a negative impact on
firm profitability (Menezes-Filho, 1997). A study of U.S. firms found that unionized
firms had profitability that was 10%-15% lower than firms that were not unionized
(Hirsch, 1991). High levels of unionization also have a strong negative impact on the
level of new business activity within states (Bartik, 1985).
Union Density and New Firms
Because unionized workers typically are paid more than non-unionized workers
are, a firm's cost are likely to be higher if its workforce is unionized (Bratsberg & Ragan
Jr, 2002; Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Thus, unionization leads to more expensive workers
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1987), and firms that hire unionized
workers tend to hire fewer workers and to substitute capital for labor (Clark, 1984). This
effect may be particularly pronounced in new firms that become unionized because these
firms are often small and weak and yet may have to negotiate with an established labor
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union (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). However, when firms start, typically their workforce
is not unionized, even if the firm operates in an industry or geographical region that is
heavily unionized. This is because it is difficult for workers to unionize in small, new
firms (Acs & Audretsch, 1989; Miller & Mulvey, 1996), which typically have few
employees, a large percentage which are part-time (Belanger & Murray, 1994; Galarneau,
1996). Even if the new firm is located in a state that has labor institutions favorable to
union organizing, it is unlikely that the firm's employees will unionize until the firm has
grown larger.
However, the presence of high union densities in the state in which a firm
operates could affect a new firm in a couple of ways. As a firm grows, there may be
more pressure for the employees to unionize. In comparison to non-unionized workers,
unionized workers typically earn higher salaries for similar jobs (Christie, 2007; Freeman
& Medoff, 1984; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1987; Komfeld, 1993). Therefore, this pressure

may cause the owner(s) to avoid growing too large, keeping the firm small to avoid
unionization. A high level of unionization in the firm's region can hurt new firms in
other ways even if the firm's employees are not unionized and cannot realistically
threaten organizing. Because unionized firms must pay higher wages anyway, they are
likely to hire the highest quality workers (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Mellow, 1981).
Unionized firms are likely to pay these highly qualified workers well, thus new firms
may have more difficulty obtaining high-quality workers at a reasonable cost in states
that have high union densities.
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Alternatively, high union densities in a stat,e could be favorable to new firms
because they are unlikely to be unionized due to their size and youth; whereas, larger
established firms in the state more likely will be (Acs & Audretsch, 1989; Miller &
Mulvey, 1996). Thus, when union densities are high, many existing firms in the state
may have labor costs that are relatively high in comparison to new firms operating in the
state, which are likely not unionized. Also, if unions are successful in negotiating high
wages for their employees, firms that are unionized will tend to hire fewer employees
than they otherwise would (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). However, nonunionized firms
will not have this disincentive to hire.
It has been observed that small firms typically pay lower wages than larger firms

(Brown & Medoff, 1989; Idson & Feaster, 1990; Morissette, 1993; Winter-Ebmer, 2001).
Although there are several reasons for this, the fact that small firms are often not
unionized may contribute to this observed difference. The higher labor cost experienced
by some incumbent firms that are unionized will likely lead to limited hiring of
employees due to the high cost of hiring well-paid unionized workers, while new firms
that are not unionized will not be forced to limit their hiring due to high union wages.
Because new firms that are not unionized will not have to pay a high wage for labor, they
will likely increase employment levels as they are able given their capital, revenue, and
need for labor.
Compared to new firms in regions in which union densities are relatively low,
new firms in areas of high union densities may tend to hire more employees. New firms
will likely have an advantage in labor cost relative to existing firms that are likely to be
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unionized (Clark, 1984). Therefore, new finns will be able to grow and expand their
employment at the cost of existing incumbent finns. New finns in states with low union
densities will have no such advantage.

H2: New firms operating in states with higher union densities will have
higher employment growth than new firms operating in states with lower
union densities.
Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance is insurance that pays workers a portion of their wages
in the event that their job is involuntarily tenninated6 . The "premium" for this insurance
is paid for by the finn for which an individual works. Unemployment insurance
programs are joint federal-state programs, and states set their own unemployment tax
schedules that they collect from employers (Anderson & Meyer, 1993). Unemployment
insurance taxes are often levied on finns based upon the number of employees they have
(Padgitt, 2009). This is essentially a tax on employment, which increases the cost of
labor for finns. In addition to affecting incentives to seek employment, unemployment
insurance is also likely to influence the hiring and firing behavior of finns, especially
because they are forced to pay the insurance premiums. Therefore, high premiums may
work as a disincentive for finns to hire workers because it makes each employee more
expensive. However, the incidence of the tax may be borne by workers. Anderson and
Meyer (1993) found that high unemployment insurance premiums are absorbed by
workers in the fonn of lower wages, minimizing any negative impact on hiring.
6

Generally, the termination cannot be due to a disciplinary action to receive unemployment insurance.
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Unemployment Insurance and New Firms

Because states' policies regarding unemployment insurance vary (Anderson &
Meyer, 1993), the level and structure of unemployment insurance taxes in a state may
influence the employment levels of new firms. Typically, firms must pay unemployment
insurance taxes for every worker that they employ. The structure of how these taxes are
calculated tends to vary from state to state, and their determination can be complicated.
The actual rates charged are a function of the statutory ranges that each state sets, the
amount of money in the state unemployment fund, the industry in which the firm
competes, and the firm's past experience with regards to worker layoffs (Padgitt, 2009).
States make several choices when determining unemployment tax rates and these
rates may have a substantial financial impact on firms. First, policymakers decide the
maximum and minimum rates that firms can be charged (Padgitt, 2009). States also
determine the degree to which employee layoffs will affect the insurance premiums.
When unemployment insurance benefits are successfully collected by a worker, the
benefits that they receive are charged to the worker's former employer(s) using a formula
determined by the state. Thus, the amount that a fiirm pays is somewhat dependent on the
frequency in which its former employees have qualified for unemployment benefits. In
some states, a firm that terminates an employee is charged for the benefits that worker
receive, thus penalizing firms when they downsize: their workforce. Other states charge
all of the worker's former employers over some span of time (such as the past year) or
charge all of the former employers of the worker over a span of time in proportion to the
amount of wages that that the worker earned from each employer (Padgitt, 2009).
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Unemployment tax structures that heavily penalize downsizing films make labor
cost a quasi-fixed cost. Thus, when making employment decisions, firms will not only
consider current marginal revenue and marginal cost but also will consider future
production levels (Oi, 1962). An unemployment tax structure in which charges for all the
unemployment benefits when layoffs occur will be particularly burdensome (Padgitt,
2009) and is likely to reduce the incentive of firms to hire employees if they think that
they will have to layoff these workers in the future:. Likewise, new firms will be
discouraged from hiring workers when the unemployment tax rates are high, due to their
lack of capital and the difficulty they have obtaining it (Blanchard & Tirole, 2008).
H3: New firms operating in states with unemployment taxes that are high
and that penalize firms for worker layoffs will have lower employment
growth than new firms operating in statf:S with unemployment taxes that are
low and that do not penalize firms for worker layoffs.
3.4. METHODS AND RESULTS
Sample

Firm data are obtained from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), which is a
longitudinal survey of new firms. To find firms to participate in the KFS, firms are
randomly selected from Dun and Bradstreet's database of new businesses started in 2004
(Fairlie & Robb, 2009). To be eligible to participate in the KFS, firms had to perform at
least one the following activities in 2004 and could not have performed any of these in
the previous year (2003):
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o

Payment of state unemployment taxes.

o Payment of FICA taxes.
o Presence of a legal status for the business.
o Use of an Employer Identification Number
o Use of Schedule C to report business income on a personal tax return.
These criteria were adopted to assure that firms selected to participate in the KFS were
actually new firms that were beginning operations.
Data for the baseline survey were collected from July 2005 to July 2006 from
principals representing 4,928 new firms that were started in 2004 (DesRoches et aI.,
2009). Respondents were paid $50 to complete th(~ survey to ensure a high response rate.
Approximately 77% of respondents completed the survey using Computer Assisted
Telephone Interviewing (CAT!) while 23% completed the internet survey. Plans were
made to collect multiple waves of data after the baseline survey, and to date, four
subsequent waves have been collected and are used in the analysis. In subsequent waves,
respondents also had a choice whether to use CAT! or the internet to complete the survey
and were paid an additional $50 for each wave of data collection in which they
participated. Thus, firm-level data for years 2004,2005,2006,2007 and 2008. The
numbers of surveys completed each year are as follows: 2004 = 4,928; 2005 = 3,998;
2006 = 3,390; 2007 = 2,915 and 2008 = 2,606 (Ka.uffman Foundation, 2011). This totals
to 17,837 observations. Thus, 18.9 % of initial respondents were lost for wave 2, 15.2%
for wave 3, 14.0% for wave 4, and 10.6% for wave 5. A cumulative loss of 47.12 % of
initial firms was experienced by wave 5.

104

One limitation to the Kauffman Firm Survey data for this research is that it
contains an oversample of high-technology firms. High-technology firms are quite
different from low-technology firms in that that they have a need for workers that have
high levels of human capital and these firms spend significant resources further
developing the human capital of their employees (Baldwin & Gellatly, 1998; Darby, Liu,
& Zucker, 1999). Conversely, many low-technology firms, such as retailers and

restaurants, tend to hire many workers with lower levels of human capital. For lowtechnology firms hiring lower-skilled workers, substantial minimum wages are likely to
have a large impact on the cost of hiring additional employees (Partridge & Partridge,
1999). Conversely, in high-technology firms, high minimum wages are not likely to
substantially increase the cost of labor because the types of employees they typically hire
are earning wages far in excess of the minimum wage. Growth in employees for hightechnology firms will likely be driven by firm needs, with minimum wages having little
impact on decisions to hire additional employees. Thus, the high-technology firms are
removed from the data. Additionally, firms in the medical, insurance and finance
industries are removed as well. Specifically, all firms in industries starting with "5" in
their NAICS codes are removed (51 = information; 52 = finance and insurance; 53 = real
estate and rental leasing; 54 = professional, scientific, and technical services; 55

=

management of companies and enterprises; 56 = administrative and support and waste
management and remediation services. Industries starting with 61 (educational services),
62 (health care and social assistance), and 90 (public administration) were also removed.
For a count of firms remaining in the sample by industry, see Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Observations by '~ave & Industry
Industry
(NAICS)
11
21-23
31-33
42-49
71
81
Total

Baseline

40
391
703
884
200
444
2,662

Follow Up 1 Follow Up 2 Follow Up 3

34
311
590
659
153
360
2,107

31
270
510
550
125
316
1,802

28
234
453
461
110
264
1,550

Follow Up
4
28
210
394
402
106
251
1,391

This leaves 2,662 observations in the baseline wave, 2,107 observations in the
first follow up wave, 1,802 observations in the second follow up wave, 1,550
observations in the third follow up wave, and 1,391 in the fourth follow up wave.
Measures

Dependent Variable
The KFS dataset contains data on the number of employees the firm has in each
of the waves in which data were collected. In the baseline wave, only about 40% of all
firms had employees, although this increases in subsequent waves. In addition to the
baseline wave, data on employment were collected on the four follow-up waves;
therefore, employment data will be available for 21004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008
(DesRoches et aI., 2009). Because the number of lemployees is highly right skewed, a
natural log transformation is used to make the distribution more normal.
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Independent Variables
The independent variables of interest are the labor market institutions of the state
in which a firm resides. Three state-level labor market measures are used for each year:
(1) the minimum wages, (2) union densities, and (3) and an index that reflects how

burdensome the unemployment tax systems are for firms. I obtained minimum wage data
for

u.s. states from the u.s. Department of Labor (2010).

I then calculated the

difference between the state minimum wage and the federal minimum wage. I obtained
union densities values from the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census Bureau (2010). Union densities are based on
union coverage, not union membership. This provides a better measure of what
percentages of workers receive the benefits of unionization, regardless of whether they
are union members. I obtained unemployment tax data from the Tax Foundation, which
provides an index that scores how costly the unemployment tax is on businesses for each
state (Padgitt, 2009). The score takes into account the range of the possible tax rates as
well as how the taxes are allocated to firms. High scores represent states with
unemployment taxes that are low and that do not overly penalize employers for laying off
workers. States with high values on this index have unemployment insurance
"premiums" or taxes that are less costly to firms than states with low values.
Control Variables
The industry in which a firm competes will determine how fast a firm grows as
well as its need for labor (Farinas & Moreno, 2000; Hall, 1987). Service firms, which
include restaurants and retailers, rely on large amounts of cheap, unskilled labor more
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likely to be earning the minimum wage (Card, 1992; Kim & Taylor, 1995). To control
for the firm's industry, I created a series of dummy variables to represent the NAICS
code for the firm's industry using the first digit of the NAICS code. The omitted NAICS
code is industry 4 (retail trade, wholesale trade, and transportation and warehousing) I
used a measure for competitive advantage taken from the following question in the KFS
survey: "Businesses often have to compete with other businesses. A competitive
advantage is something unique or distinctive a business provides that gives it an
advantage compared to competitors. In calendar year _ _, did name of business have a
competitive advantage over its competitors?" The dummy variable representing
competitive advantage is coded as follows: 1 = competitive advantage; 0 = no
competitive advantage.
High state unemployment rates may also influence a firm's level of employment
because high unemployment may signifY poor economic conditions that may make it
unprofitable to hire and maintain a high number of employees. Thus, I controlled for
state-level unemployment rates using the state-level unemployment rate obtained from
the U.S. Department of Labor for the years 2004-2008.
Analysis
I hypothesize that state-level labor market factors will influence the employment
level in new firms located in those states. The firms in the sample are clustered in states;
thus, state-level factors may influence how quickly firms grow. This creates a problem
for regular OLS regression because the firm observations are not independent and errors
are likely to be correlated among firms within the same state (Raudenbush & Bryk,
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2002). Furthennore, these data are longitudinal; data collected over time from the same
finns are likely to be correlated as well (Bliese, 20(9). Thus, the repeated observations
are nested within finns, and finns are nested within state. Thus, to perfonn these
analyses, random coefficient multilevel (RCM) growth modeling is used (Bliese &
Ployhart, 2002; Holcomb, Combs, Sinnon, & Sexton, 2010). I perfonn the analysis in
SAS using the PROC GLIMMIX procedure.
There are several advantages to using RCM growth modeling over other
approaches of dealing with nested data. This allows finn-level control variables to be
added to the model (Luke, 2004), such as the finn's line of business or presence of a
competitive advantage. Although finn-level attributes could be aggregated for each state,
aggregation can be problematic (Luke, 2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). When
aggregation is used, much of the variability for the dependent variable is lost, leading to
the relationships between variables possibly to be substantially over- or under-estimated.
Several previous studies in the management literature have used RCM to test both levels
and time (Holcomb, Combs, Sinnon, & Sexton, 2010; Short, Ketchen Jr, Bennett, & du
Toit, 2006). Short et al. (2006) examined how industry- and finn-level factors influence
finn perfonnance over time. Likewise, Holcomb et al. (2010) used RCM to examine
how industry factors and growth strategies affect the perfonnance of post-I PO finns. The
model that I propose similarly contains three levels: within-finns (repeated measures over
time), between-finns within-states, and between-states.
To test the hypotheses, I follow a model-building process similar to that
recommended by Bliese & Ployhart (2002). This first involves running an unconditional
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(null) model in which the variability in the dependent variable is partitioned to the
different levels (time, firm, and state). Once the variance is partitioned among the levels,
interclass correlations (ICCs) can be calculated to determine if the higher levels (firms
and states) have a meaningful level of variability. The second step involves determining
the fixed function for time. I test a linear, quadratk, and cubic trend to see what trend
best describes employee growth in the new firms for the sampled period. The third step
involves determining the variability in growth parameters; in other words, determining
which of the growth parameters selected in step two should have random coefficients.
Fourth, different error structures are compared, and the one that has the least amount of
model misfit is selected. This is an important step because longitudinal data may have
error structures that are correlated and heterogeneous. Finally, the independent variables
of interest are added, and the analysis is performed so that the hypothesized relationships
can be tested.
To allow for the comparison of model fit among models, full information
maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) is used to estimate the fixed and random effects
(O'Connell & McCoach, 2007). All dichotomous variables are uncentered while the
continuous variables are grand-mean centered.
The need for using RCM modeling and how many distinct levels are needed in the
analysis can be assessed by calculating intraclass correlations (ICCs). Intraclass
correlations are calculated to see how variance in the dependent variable can be explained
by the different levels of analysis in the proposed multilevel model. I first run an
unconditional (null) model in which the variability in the dependent variable is
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partitioned to the different levels. The intraclass correlations can be seen in Table 3.2.
The intraclass correlations show how the variability in the dependent variable is
explained by the three proposed levels: states, firm within states, and time points within
firms. For states, it is around 0%. This indicates that substantially none of the variance
in firm employment is due to state differences. The intraclass correlation for firms is
.7067 indicating that 70.67 % of the variance in number of employees is at the firm level.
The remaining 24.83% of the variance is within firms across time. The intraclass
correlation for firms is substantial enough that failure to account for this clustering could
inflate the standard errors of the parameter estimates (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998),
indicating that random coefficient multilevel modeling is an appropriate analysis
technique in this circumstance. However, because there is no variability among states
with regard to firm employment, I do not model this level in the multi-level model. Thus,
a model is used consisting of only two-levels: (1) firms and (2) time.
Table 3.2 Intraclass Correlations

Covariance Parameter
Among States
Among Firms within States
With Firms Over Time
Total

Estimate
.0000
.7067
.2483
.9550

Percentage of Total
Variance
0%
74%
26%

The next step is to determine the fixed function for time (Bliese & Ployhart,
2002). In RCM growth modeling, there a number of possible growth trajectories that the
dependent variable can take. Using theory and examining the data can help determine the
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proper growth trajectory that should be modeled. Common growth trajectories include
linear, quadratic, and cubic. Linear trends are the simplest type of growth trajectory and
involve growth that follows a straight line over time. The slope of the growth trajectory
is constant over time. Modeling this type of growth involves only including a linear
"wave" term in the level-l model. A quadratic growth trend is one in which the slope
(rate of growth) changes over time, leveling off and then becoming negative (Singer &
Willett,2003). Modeling quadratic growth trends require including both a linear term as
well as the linear term squared. A cubic growth trend is a higher- order growth trend that
has two stationary points, such as a peak and a trough (Singer & Willett, 2003). I
examine the growth trajectory of the firm employment variable by the use of significance
tests. The average growth trajectory for all firms included in the KFS survey can be seen
in Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1: Average Firm Employment by Wave
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Follow-Up 3

Follow-Up 4

Visually, the growth trend appears to be approximately quadratic. I run the model
as a linear, quadratic and cubic growth models. The results can be seen in Table 3.3. In
the linear model, the linear term coefficient is .0891 is significantly different from zero (p
< .0001). In the quadratic model, both the coefficient for the linear term is .2767 and

significantly different from zero (p < .0001). The coefficient for the squared term is.0509 is also significantly different from zero (p < .0001). In the cubic model, the linear
term (.3912;p < .0001) squared term (-.1352;p < .0001) and cubed term (.0144;p <

.0001) are significantly different from zero. Also, the cubic model has the lowest AIC
(18,201) and BIC (18,242) ofthe three models. This indicates the cubic model offers the
best fit. Thus, I model employment growth as a eubic growth curve.
Table 3.3: Growth Trends

Intercept
Linear
Quadratic
Cubic
Fit Statistics
-2 Log
Likelihood
Generalized
Chi-Square
Gen. ChiSquare/ DF
AIC
BIC

Linear Model
Coefficient p-value
.5433
<.0001
<.0001
.0891

Quadratic Model
Coefficient p-value
<.0001
.4733
<.0001
.2767
<.0001
-.0509

Cubic Model
Coefficient p-value
.4615
<.0001
.3912
<.0001
-.1353
<.0001
<.0001
.01442

18583.13

18219.75

18187.14

1575.41

1466.57

1458.27

.17

.15

.15

18593.13
18622.58

18231.75
18267.10

18201.14
18242.37

In addition to determining what growth tn~ectories should be included in the
model, there is also the decision to which growth terms should be allowed random
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coefficients. The linear, quadratic, and cubed terms are allowed to vary randomly by
firm. However, the random effects of the quadratic and cubic term did not substantially
improve fit. However, the fit is improved when the linear term was allowed to vary by
firm, and hence it is allowed to vary by firm in the model.
The next step is to determine the error structure of the model. With longitudinal
data, errors are likely to be correlated, and if this is not accounted for, significance test
may be inaccurate (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). I ran models with two different types of
error structures: autoregressive and unstructured. The results can be seen Table 3.4.
Comparing the autoregressive model to the previous model, which did not have
the error structure modeled, the autoregressive model actually has worse fit. The ChiSquare increased from 1,458 to 1,534, the AIC from 18,201 to 20,371, and BIC from
18,242 to 20,426. Thus, the autoregressive model does not appear to be an improvement
to not modeling the error structure. The unstructured model did have superior fit
compared to the previous model without a modeled error structure. While the Chi-Square
increased from 1,458 to 1,481, the AIC decreased from 18,201 to 18,183 and BIC
decreased from 18,242 to 18,230. Thus, the unstructured error model is used.
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Table 3.4: Error Structures
Autoregressive Model
Cov. Parameter Estimate
Variance
AR(I) Residual
Residuai

.2870
.0794
.1621

UN(1,I)
U1-.J(2,1)
UN(2,2)
Rt:sidual

.2870
.0794
.1621

.6043
.0206
.0312
.1565

SE
.0198
.0044
.0019
.0033

Fit Statistics

Fit Statistics
-2 Log
Likelihood
Generalized
Chi-Square
Gen. ChiSquare/ DF
AIC
AICC
BIC

Unstructured Model
Cov. Parameter
Estimate

SE

20370.81
1533.60
.16
20384.81
20384.82
20426.04

-2 Log Likelihood
Generalized ChiSquare
Gen. Chi-Square/
DF
AIC
AICC
BIC

18166.70
1481.08
.16
18182.70
18182.71
18229.82

The final step is examining the hypothesized relationships. Originally, I planned
to build a three-level model consisting of levels for time, firms, and states. However,
because there was not a substantial amount of variance accounted for by the, it was
dropped in favor a of a two-level model. Below, equations 1-3 display the equations
associated with this model.
(1)

LNEMPLOYEESti = 1tOi + 1tliWA YEti + 11:2W A VE2ti + 1t3 W A VE3ti +
1t4MINWAGEti + 1tsUNEMPLOYMENTRATEti + 1t6GDPPCti +

LNEmployeesti represents the natural log of the number of employees in time t for
firm i. 1tOi represents the initial employment level of firm i (the employment level of firm
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i in year 0). 7tli represents the slope coefficient for variable WA YEti. which is the slope
of the change trajectory for firm i, holding all else constant. The variable WAVE is
coded 0 for 2004, 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006, 3 for 2007 and 4 for 2008. The term WA VE2ti
is the wave term squared and WAVE 3ti is the linear term cubed, which together with the
WA YEti term models the cubic growth in employment among the new firms in the
sample.
Also included in equation 1 are the state-level variables that vary across time.
These include the minimum wage, union density, unemployment insurance index, gross
domestic product per capita, and unemployment rate.
There are two level-two equations, one for the intercept term (7ro;) and one for the
slope term for the linear growth term (7rli) of the Ievel-1 equation.
(2)

7tOi =

~OOk

+rOi

In equation 2,

~oo

represents the mean initial level of employment for firms. rOi

represents how firm i deviates from this mean. This equation contains no predictors
because the initial level of employment is not of interest. However, this value is allowed
to vary for each firm because firms will have different starting levels of employment.

In equation 3,

~1O

represents the mean annual employment growth, holding all

else constant. This equation contains the firm-level variables that may predict a firm's
employment growth, such as competitive advantage and industry dummy variables, and
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their corresponding slope values. These variables should be constant throughout time,
thus are specified as time invariant using the value from time

o.

Results
The descriptive statistics for all variables are displayed in Table 3.5. The
correlations between these variables are displayed in Table 3.6.

Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
LN(Number of
Employees)
Industry 11
Industry 21-23
Industry 31-33
Industry 42-49
Industry 71
Industry 81
Competitive Advantage
Unemployment Rate
GDP Per Capita
Union Density
Unemployment
Insurance Burden
Minimum Wage
(Difference)

N

Mean

9,326

.6907

Standard
Deviation
.9904

9,326
9,326
9,326
9,326
9,326
9,326
9,326
250
250
250
250

.0167
.1488
.2824
.3073
.0727
.1720
.6471
4.798
35,806
12.624
4.998

.1283
.3559
.4502
.4614
.2597
.3774
.4779
1.126
6,400
5.544
.8961

250

.4359

.6805
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Table 3.6: Correlations

Variable

I

4

3

2

5

7

6

S

9

10

II

13

12

(I) LN(Employees)

I

(2) Industry II

-0.02

I

(3) Industry21-23

0.00

-0.06'"

(4) Industry31-33

0.13'"

-O.OS'"

-0.26'"

I

(5) Industry 42-49

-0.05'"

-O.OS'"

-O.2S'"

-0.42'"

I

(6) Industry71

0.09'"

-0.04'"

-0.12'"

-.OIS'"

-0.19'"

I

(7) IndustrySI

-0.15'"

-0.06'"

-.019'"

-.0.29'"

-0.30'"

-0.13'"

I

(S) Competitive Advantage

0.07'"

O.oz

-0.10'"

0.05'"

0.03"

0.04'"

-0.04'"

I

(9) Unemployment Rate

-0.07'"

-0.06'"

0.00

0.05'"

-0.04'"

-0.02

o.oz

-0.02

I

(l0) GOP Per Capita

0.00

-0.02

-0.02

0.04'"

-0.02

0.03"

-0.03"

-0.02

-0.09'"

I

(II) Union Density

-0.06'"

-0.02

-0.01

0.04'"

-0.04'"

0.01

0.01

-0.03'

0.30'"

0.49'"

I

(12) Unemployment
Insurance Burden
(13) Minimum Wage

0.03"

-0.02

0.02

-0.01

0.02'

-0.01

-0.02

0.00

-0.16'"

-0.34'"

-0.51'"

I

.0.00

-0.02

-0.03"

0.04'"

-0.02

0.01

0.00

-0.03'

0.14'"

0.51'"

0.49'"

-0.22'"

I

Significance Level:

* .05 ** .01

***.001

00

.-

.-

I

Next, I perform an analysis on two models: (1) control model containing only
control variables, (2) and a model examining the hypothesized state-level effects.
The results for the control model are displayed in Table 3.7, and the results for the full
model are in Table 3.8.
Table 3.7: Control Model

Variable
Intercept
Linear Trend
Quad Trend
Cubic Trend
Unemployment
Rate
GDP Per Capita
Competitive
Advantage
Industry 1
Industry 2
Industry 3
Industry 7
Industry 8
Fit Indices
P. Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
AIC
BIC

Coefficient
.4686
.3937
-.1442
.01658
-.01684

SE
.01781
.02568
.01578
.00283
.01209

DF
2630
6684
6684
6696
6684

I-value
26.31
15.33
-9.14
5.87
-1.39

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
.1635

-.000001
-.00780

-.000003
.01092

6684
6684

-.58
-.71

.5611
.4750

-.03869
.02102
.04081
-.00856
-.03828

.04025
.01648
.01355
.02150
.01563

6684
6684
6684
6684
6684

-.96
1.28
3.01
-.40
-2.45

.3365
.2021
.0026
.6905
.0143

17924.29
1467.67
17956.28
18050.29

119

Table 3.8: Full Model
Variable
Intercept
Linear
Quad
Cubic
Unemployment
Rate
GDP Per Capita
Competitive
Advantage
Industry 1
Industry 2
Industry 3
Industry 7
Industry 8
Minimum Wage
Union Density
Unemployment
Insurance Burden
Fit Indices
P. Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
AIC
BIC

Coefficient
.4969
.3906
-.1409
.01581
-.00850

SE
.01792
.02576
.01610
.00291
.01278

DF
2629
6682
6682
6682
6682

t-value
26.21
15.16
-8.75
5.43
-.66

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
.5061

.000002
-.00761

.000004
.01092

6682
6682

.57
-.70

.5676
.4857

-.03857
.02095
.04076
-.00833
-.03852
-.00841
-.00558
.00216

.04027
.01648
.01355
.02151
.01564
.01580
.003258
.02197

6682
6682
6682
6682
6682
6682
6682
6682

-.96
1.27
3.01
-.39
-2.46
-.53
-1.71
.10

.3382
.2039
.0026
.6986
.0138
.5943
.0869
.9216

17920.11
1467.51
17958.11
18069.75

In addition to the linear, quadratic and cubic trend variables, the control model
includes industry dummy control variables, as wdl as controls for the unemployment
rate, GDP per capita, and competitive advantage.
In the full model in Table 3.8, the results for the hypothesized relationships can be
seen. In hypothesis 1, a negative relationship is hypothesized between minimum wages
and firm employment growth; however this hypothesis is not supported (-.0084;p =
.5943). In hypothesis 2, a positive relationship is predicted between union density and
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employment growth. A marginally significant relationship is found, but in the opposite
direction as hypothesized (-.0056;p =.0869). The final hypothesis predicted that an
unemployment insurance system that is costly and that penalizes firms for worker layoffs
will lead to less employment growth. However, a significant relationship is not observed

(.0022;p = .9216).
Table 3.9: Results Summary
Hypothesized Relationship
HI

H2

H3

New firms operating in states with higher minimum wages
will have lower employment growth than new firms
operating in states with lower minimum wages.
New firms operating in states with higher union densities
will have higher employment growth than new firms
operating in states with lower union densities.
New firms operating in states with unemployment taxes
that are high and that penalize firms for worker layoffs will
have lower employment growth than new firms operating
in states with unemployment taxes that are low and that do
not penalized firms for worker layoffs.

Results
Not supported

Not supported

Not supported

3.5. DISCUSSION
The hypothesis between minimum wages and firm employment did not receive
support. There are several reasons why a relationship was not observed. First, there has
been some research indicating that this relationship is not negative (Card and Krueger
(1994) and there are some theoretically reasons proposed in the literature to why this
might be (Brown & Crossman, 2000; Kennan, 1995; Zavodny, 1998). Secondly, the
sample consisted of new firms. One of the justifications of this study is that minimum
wages may have different effects of new and small firms than incumbent and large firms.
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Perhaps, as suggested in some of the literature, small firms (which most of the new firms
in the sample are) have the ability to adapt to changes in minimum wages in a more
flexible manner than larger firms. Research suggest that they might be able to do this by
hiring workers "off the books" and paying them a wage below the legal minimum wage
(Arrowsmith et ai., 2003), or cutting other benefits or vacation time (Brown & Crossman,
2000).
The relationship between union density in states and new firm employment
growth was negative and marginally significant, while a positive relationship was
hypothesized. This is not particularly surprising however, as a theoretical case can be
made for either direction. For example, much research has shown that unionization is
associated with high employee wages (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983;
Stewart, 1990) and lower firm profitability (Voos and Mishel (1986; Hirsch, 1991;
Menezes-Filho, 1997). Perhaps when new firms are in areas of high unionization, they
are not immune from threats of unionization, especially as they grow larger. New firms
may have to pay a higher wage when unioinizationzation is high . They may have to do
this because their workers have become unionized, or to keep their workers from
unionizing (Freeman, 1984). Also new firms in regions of high unionization may to pay
a high wage in order to attract high-quality employees away from unionized jobs. Also,
strong unionization may reflect other pro-labor institutions that raise the cost of hiring
additional workers.
The unemployment insurance burden had a non-significant effect on employment
growth, even though a negative relationship was hypothesized. This may be due to the
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fact that paying unemployment insurance premiums may ultimately be a small burden for
new firms, and therefore may not have a noticeable effect on a firm's hiring behavior.
Also, while certain aspects of unemployment insurance- such as how firing an employee
influences the firm's premiums may deter a firm from hiring, it may also deter a firm
from firing. The measure of the unemployment insurance burden is higher in states in
which when a firm terminates an employee, they are charged a high unemployment
insurance premium (Padgitt, 2009). Since such a penalty may deter both hiring and
firing, there may ultimately be little net effect on firm employment growth.

3.6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several limitations to this analysis. First of all there is the possibility of
alternative explanations accounting for the observed relationships. There are a large
number of variables that vary by geographic regions and states that might be the
underlying driver of employment growth. While some control variables are used in the
analysis, many possible confounding variables may not be easily measured. Thus, they
cannot be controlled for since they cannot be added as independent variables into the
analysis.
Also, sample heterogeneity may have affected the results as well. A number of
industries were excluded in which minimum wagl~s, unionization, and the unemployment
insurance burden should have little or no impact on hiring and firing decisions. These
include firms in the real estate and leasing, finance and insurance, information,
management of companies and enterprises, professional scientific and technical services,
and health care and social assistance, and educational services industries. However, the
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sample may still include firms that are not particularly sensitive to minimum wages,
unionization, or the unemployment insurance burden. Narrowing the sample to industries
most affected by these labor market variables might lead to different results. For
example, examining the effects of minimum wages only using food service firms would
have made a much narrower sample, and perhaps a negative relationship would have
been found. While the sample could have been made narrower, doing so has the
undesirable effect of reducing our sample size, giving the analysis less power. Since any
effect is likely to be small, having adequate power is essential. Furthermore, any finding
of such a narrow sample is only valid for firms similar to those in the sample. Finding an
effect in a very narrow sample may not be of particular importance.
Like many longitudinal studies, sample attrition is a problem in this study. In the
baseline year, there were 2,662 firms in the sample, but this was reduced to 1,391 by the
fourth follow-up wave. If this attrition is not random this could be problematic. It is
reasonable to suspect that firms dropping out of the sample were disproportionally poor
performers. The results may have been different had these firms been included in the
analysis.
The data also suffer from the fact that we only observe firms that actually came
into existence. The variables examined may reduce the likelihood of an entrepreneur
starting a business to begin with. However, since the data do not include nascent
entrepreneurs, this issue cannot be addressed.
I examined how labor market institutions influence employment growth in new
firms. Most of the research on entrepreneurship and institutions has focused on how they
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influence the prevalence of self-employment well as the births and deaths of firms.
Little research has examined the impact that institutions have on firm growth, and this
would be a fruitful are for future research. Formal institutions such as taxation, property
rights, and sound money may influence the performance of the venture, such as how fast
it grows.

3.7. CONCLUSION
New firms in the United States operate in labor markets with different
characteristics; in particular they can differ dramatically in their labor market institutions.
In this essay I examined the influence of state-level labor market factors, such as the level
of unionization, minimum wage rates, and the structure of unemployment insurance, on
employment in new firms. I made use of data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a
longitudinal survey of new firms to test how labor market institutions affect employment
growth in new firms. Unionization is found to have a negative effect on firm employee
growth. I found no relationship between both minimum wages and the unemployment
insurance burden and employee growth in new firms.
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF TAXES AND REGULATIONS ON NEW FIRM
BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN STATE BORDER COUNTIES

4.1. INTRODUCTION
Gartner (1988) and Vesper (1982) define entrepreneurship as the creation of a
new organization. In addition to individual attributes of entrepreneurs, many
environmental factors influence if, where, and what type of entrepreneurial activity
occurs (Baumol, 1990; Shane, 2003). Many environmental factors influence the rate of
new firm entry and exit in an economy. The size of the local market is a strong predictor
of regional new firm formation (Davids son, Lindmark, & Olofsson, 1994). Exploiting
opportunities requires that firms have certain levels of human capital and knowledge
(Audretsch, Lehmann, & Warning, 2005; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998). A close
proximity to universities and their associated knowledge spillovers increases firm birth
rates (Audretsch et aI., 2005; Kirchhoff, Newbert" Hasan, & Armington, 2007). Labor
markets with high levels of college graduates, income growth, and population growth
also have high rates of new firm formation (Armington & Acs, 2002). Institutions, or the
rules of the game in an economy, playa role in predicting firm births and deaths as well.
Individuals are more likely to start new firms in areas in which taxes are low (Kreft &
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Sobel, 2005; Papke, 1991) and economic freedom is high (Campbell & Rogers, 2007;
Sobel, 2008).
Although informative, the existing research on how environments influence the
births and deaths of firms has several limitations. Although some research focuses on
how institutions influence firm births and deaths (Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Ovaska &
Sobel, 2005; Sobel et aI., 2007), to what degree these effects vary by industry is
unknown. Certain types of firms, such as laundromats and retail outlets, provide services
in which production and consumption occur simultaneously. Thus, they need to be
located near the relevant customer base and may not have much choice in determining
where to locate. However, many types of manufacturing firms have wide latitude in
where to locate, and therefore, institutions may have a different impact on the births and
deaths of these types of firms. Furthermore, a limitation of the current research is that
although institutions have been found to influence: firm births in U.S. states (Campbell &
Rogers, 2007; Kreft & Sobel, 2005), U.S. states are heterogeneous with regards to
demographics, human capital, and culture. Thus, these results may be due to
confounding factors, some of which cannot be easily observed and measured.
This essay examines the following research question: Do taxes and regulations
influence the birth and death rates of service and manufacturing firms in an economy?
Counties located on state borders are used so that confounding variables such as culture
and demographics can be controlled for. Measure:s used to predict firm births and deaths
include taxation levels, government size, unionization, and minimum wages. In addition,
I examine separately if the birth rates of manufacturing and services firms are influenced
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differently by the level of taxation. Policy makers have become increasingly concerned
with encouraging entrepreneurship (Holtz-Eakin & Rosen, 2004; Peterson, 1988). This
essay should give policy makers some more refim:d ideas about how regulatory factors
and taxation levels can influence new firm births and deaths.
This essay is structured as follows. First, I examine what factors influencing an
individual's choice to enter and exit self-employment. Then, I develop hypotheses
concerning how government size, taxation level, lmionization, and minimum wages
influence the birth and death of firms. Next, I test these hypotheses using firm birth and
death data from the EBD (establishment births and deaths) tabulations. These tabulations
consist of data on establishment births and deaths for each county in the U.S. by industry
code from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). I merge these data with institutional
measures at both the state- and county-level from the Economic Freedom of North
America index and the U.S. Census of Governments. I test these hypotheses using a
matching technique that matches contiguous counties located on state borders.
4.2. OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE
Firm Deaths (Exit)
Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo's (1997) model explains the decision to exit
self-employment. In their model, the threshold level of performance is compared to the
actual expected economic performance of the business to determine whether to continue
the venture. The threshold level of performance is the minimum level of performance
needed for a self-employed person to continue operating the firm and remaining self-
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employed (Gimeno et ai., 1997). The threshold level of performance is a function ofthe
opportunity cost associated with other forms of employment, the cost of switching
occupations (from self-employment to the new oc,;;upation), and the difference in psychic
income between continuing self-employment and alternative sources of employment.
When the expected economic performance of a venture is higher than the threshold level
of performance, an individual will continue to be self-employed. When the expected
economic performance falls below the threshold level of performance, the firm is
abandoned, and the individual leaves self-employment for alternative employment.
Following Gimeno et ai., (1997), an individual will discontinue the business when
the expected utility of operating the entrepreneurial venture (UE) is less than the utility of
alternative employment (UA) minus the associated cost of switching from selfemployment of alternative employment (SC EA):
(1)

The UE is determined by the expected economic performance of the venture (EP E)
plus the psychic income that the individual obtains from operating the venture (PIE)' EPE
is a function ofthe entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human
capital specific to the current firm (X2). PIE is a fUnction of a number of individual
characteristics

(~).

(2)
The expected utility of alternative employment (U A) is determined by the
expected economic performance of alternative employment (EPA) plus the psychic
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income that the individual obtains from alternativ(: employment (PIA)' EPA is a function
of the entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human capital specific to
alternative employment (X3). PIA is a function of a number of individual characteristics
(Xs).

U A= EPA (Xl, X 3) + PIA (Xs)

(3)

Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) yields: (4)

Thus, an entrepreneur will close a firm when the expected utility gained from
operating the venture becomes less than the expected utility of alternative employment
minus the cost of switching from entreprneuership to alternative employment. The
expected utility the entrepreneur recieves from the venture is a derived from both the
economic performance ofthe venture as well as the psyhic income of operaing the
venture. Likewise, the expected utility of alternative employment is due to both the
economic performance and psychic income of alternative employment.
Firm Births (Entry)

Although the model developed by Gimeno et al. (1997) is used to predict whether
a self-employed individual will switch to an alternative form of employment, it can be
modified to predict if an individual who is currently engaged in alternative employment
will switch into self-employment. Mathematically, an individual will discontinue wage
employment and start a venture when the utility of alternative employment (U A) is less
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than the utility of self-employment (U E) minus the cost of switching from alternative
employment to self-employment (SC AE ):

(5)
UA and UE are the same as above and SC AE is the switching cost from alternative
to self-employment. This switching cost can include the cost of education and training
needed to start a business, as well as the cost of buying assets for the new business.
Often such costs may be sunk and not recoverable. For example, the cost of taking a
course on how to write a business plan is a cost that might be incurred by someone
switching from alternative employment to self-employment.
Equation 8 displays the combined equation:

(6)
The expected performance of the venture CEPE), the expected performance of
alternative employment (EPA), and switching costs (both SCEA and SCAE) are likely to be
influenced by taxation levels, government size, and labor market regulations.

4.3. TAXES, REGULATIONS, AND FIRM BIRTHS AND DEATHS
North (1990) argues that a country or region accumulating factors of production
has less influence on economic growth than the incentive structure or institutional
environment (Henrekson, 2007). Institutions set the "rules of the game" in an economy,
determining incentives, reducing uncertainty, and influencing transaction costs (North,
1987). Institutions are often classified as formal or informal, with formal institutions
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being the rules that are developed by human beings, such as constitutions and statutory
law (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Conversely, informal institutions include norms,
customs, traditions, and religion (Williamson, 2000). Baumol (1990) applies institutional
theory to the field of entrepreneurship, stating that formal institutions influence how
entrepreneurs allocate their time and resources between productive, unproductive, and
destructive activities. Productive entrepreneurship, according to Baumol & Caves (1993)
is "any activity that contributes directly or indirectly to net output of the economy or to
the capacity to produce additional output" (p. 30). Activities such as engaging in
frivolous lawsuits, avoiding taxes, and lobbying have been described as unproductive
forms of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Foss & Foss, 2002; Sauka & Welter, 2007).
In the United States, the federalist system of government gives individual states a
wide range of powers as specified in the U.S. constitution (US Const. amend. X),
although there are a few powers that are explicitly prohibited (US Const. Art 1, sec 10).
While institutions are often examined at the country level (Bj0mskov and Foss, 2007;
Nystrom, 2008) formal institutions and factors influenced by institutions (such as
unionization levels) often vary at lower levels of analysis, such as states (Karabegovic et
aI., 2005). This can be seen in the state differences in taxation levels, business
regulations, total government spending, allocation of state funds, minimum wages, etc. I
will specifically discuss how state difference in the level of taxation, government size,
unionization, and minimum wages may influence the birth and death rate of businesses.
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Taxation

The impact of high taxes on entrepreneurship has been strongly debated.
Governments often levy a number of taxes against individuals and firms, and those taxes
may influence the behavior of the individuals and firms. These include sales taxes,
personal income taxes, business incomes taxes, inheritance and gift taxes, and user fees.

Income Taxes
Income taxes represent a substantial portion of all taxes paid by those operating a
business. Business profits are often taxed at personal income tax rates (Carroll et aI.,
2001), reducing the expected returns from self-employment when taxes are high. This
may discourage entry into self-employment, espec:ially among high-income individuals
when the tax system is highly progressive 7 (Gentry & Hubbard, 2005).
In addition to reducing incentives, high levels of taxation may discourage entry
into self-employment by limiting the amount of self-funded assets available to
prospective entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may suifer from liquidity constraints, meaning
a lack of capital sometimes keep them from starting or expanding their business even in
the presence of profitable opportunities (Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994; Johansson, 2000; Lindh
& Ohlsson, 1996). If those contemplating entering self-employment have difficulty

obtaining financing from third parties, they may have to rely on their own limited funds.
High taxes, especially those on income, may redUl:;e the funds available to individuals
wanting to start a business (FoIster, 2002).
A progressive tax rate is one in which the tax rate becomes higher as the taxable base (often income)
becomes higher. Thus, when an income tax is progressive, those with high incomes are subject to higher
tax rates than those with lower incomes.
7
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Although high taxes may discourage entry into self-employment due to lower
incentives and liquidity constraints, it has been suggested that high income taxes actually
may encourage entry into self-employment for several reasons. The self-employed are
typically allowed to deduct any business expenses when computing business income
taxes, allowing some of their income to be sheltered from taxes (Lang, NohrbaB, & Stahl,
1997; Schuetze, 2000). Wage earners have a more difficult time deducting job expenses
relative to the self-employed because their deductions are subject to more limitations
(Internal Revenue Service, 2010). When taxes ar(: high, the business expense deduction
may serve to encourage those with risky business ideas to start a new firm. Even if failure
of the business does occur, those who are self-employed do not bear the full cost of the
failure (Bruce & Schuetze, 2004; Domar & Musgrave, 1944) because some ofthe costs
are recovered through the tax deduction.
High tax rates may encourage individuals to enter self-employment if they can
more easily avoid paying all of the legally required taxes when they are self-employed
(Bruce & Schuetze, 2004). Firms in the U.S. are required to report the annual income
earned by their employees to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). However, selfemployed individuals have no third party reporting their income to the IRS (Schuetze,
2002). Furthermore, if a business conducts mainly cash transactions, the IRS may have a
difficult time identifying and proving tax evasion. In addition to underreporting income,
those who are self-employed may benefit by reporting personal expenses as business
expenses so that they can deduct them from their income for tax purposes (Bruce &
Gurley-Calvez, 2008). Thus, although high taxes are likely to lower the expected return
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to self-employment, they may lower the expected returns to alternative employment even
more. This may make entering self-employment the utility-maximizing choice.
Some studies have shown a positive relationship between income tax rates 8 and
rates of self-employment and entry into self-employment. See Table 4.1 for a summary
of these studies. Schuetze (2000) found a positive relationship between the average
income tax rates and self-employment rates in the U.S. and Canada. Parker (1996) uses
co-integration analysis to test the long-run relationship between self-employment and its
determinants and found a positive relationship between marginal income tax rates and
self-employment. Long (1982) found that increasing the marginal income tax rate 10% is
associated with a 6.4% increase in the self-employment ratio in metropolitan areas.
Robson and Wren (1999) examined the relationship between both marginal and average
tax rates and their impact on self-employment. While higher marginal income tax rates
are associated with lower levels of self-employment, higher average income tax rates are
associated with higher levels of self-employment. However, Gentry and Hubbard (2003)
found that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 lowered the probability that
those in upper-middle income households would become entrepreneurs by up to 20%.
This act raised the top marginal income tax rate from 36% to 39.6% (Auerbach &
Feenberg, 2000). For a comprehensive review of empirical findings concerning the
relationship between income taxes and self-employment, see Bruce and Schuetze (2004).
These studies make use of various measures of taxation, including average income tax rates, marginal
income tax rates, marginal effective income tax rates, and overall tax burdens. The average income tax
rate is the total amount of tax that an individual pays divided by their total income. The marginal income
tax rate is the tax rate that an individual pays on their highest dollar of income. The effective marginal
income tax rate is the marginal tax rate paid on the highest dollar of income, controlling for any decrease in
transfer payments that the additional dollar of income causes. Measures of overall tax burdens, such as
those from the Economic Freedom of North America index, combine several measures of taxation to
develop a proxy of the overall tax burden.
8
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Table 4.1: Studies on Taxes and Firm Entry/Entrepreneurship

Findings

Study
Wasylenko
(1980)

Negative relationship between property taxes and firm location in
the manufacturing and wholl~sale industries in the Milwaukee
metropolitan area.

Long (1982)

Positive relationship between marginal income tax rate and selfemployment rate in SMSAs.

Bartik (1985)

Negative relationship betwel~n overall tax burden and new
business activity in u.s. states.

Papke (1991)

Negative relationship between marginal tax rate and firm births in
the publications, communication, and apparel industries in the
U.S.

Parker (1996)

Positive relationship between marginal tax rates and selfemployment rates in the United Kingdom.

Robson & Wren
(1999)

Negative relationship betwe,en marginal tax rates and selfemployment; positive relationship between average tax rates and
self-employment in 15 OECD countries.

Schuetze (2000)

Positive relationship between average income tax rate and selfemployment rates in U.S. & Canada.

Gentry &
Hubbard (2000)

Negative relationship between top marginal tax rate and
probability of upper-income individuals becoming self-employed
in the U.S.

Kreft & Sobel
(2005)

Negative relationship between overall tax burden and sole
proprietor growth rate in U.S. states.

McMullen,
Bagby, & Palich
(2008)

Negative relationship between overall tax burden and necessitymotivated self-employment rates in GEM countries.
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Overall Tax Burden
Although high income taxes may reduce the expected returns to self-employment,
they may also reduce the returns to alternative employment even more. However, other
forms of taxation do not typically allow special deductions for the self-employed and
may even be more burdensome. For example, property taxes are levied on real estate and
other assets, which often are owned by the self-employed for use in operating their
business. However, those in alternative forms of e:mployment may not have these assets
(or at least not to the same extent), resulting in lower property taxes. Thus, relative to
income tax rates, the overall tax burden in an economy may have a larger effect on the
decision to become self-employed.
A number of studies found a negative relationship between taxation levels and the
entry of new firms when using measures of taxation other than the income tax rate.
Papke (1991) examined how state and local taxes influence the number of firm births
using U.S. Census data. Five industries were examined: women's outerwear, household
furniture, book printing, communication equipment, and electronic components.
Although results varied by industry, a high marginal effective tax rate in a state was
generally associated with fewer firm births in that state. Kreft and Sobel (2005) examine
how institutions impact the sole proprietor growth rate from 1996 to 2000 in U.S. states,
using the measure of overall tax burden from the Economic Freedom of North America
(EFNA) index. They found a negative relationship between overall tax burdens and sole
proprietor growth rates. Wasylenko (1980) examined how property taxes impact firm
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relocation. In manufacturing and wholesale trade tirms, low property taxes are
significant in determining firm relocation. Howev1er, the relationship is not significant for
firms in the construction, retail trade, finance, and service industries. Bartik (1985a)
examined how existing firms make decisions concerning where to locate a new
manufacturing plant. High taxes were negatively associated with new business activity.
Thus, high overall tax burdens are likely to make the returns of self-employment
lower than that returns of alternative employment. High taxes will deter individuals from
switching into self-employment.
H1: There is a negative relationship between the matched overall tax burden
and the matched firm birth rate.
Taxation and Firm Deaths
When taxes are high, firms will retain a smaller percentage of their pre-tax profits.
When profits are low, they are more likely to fall below the threshold level of
performance required by firm owner(s) to keep th~: firm operating (Gimeno et aI., 1997).
As a result, firm closure becomes more likely. High taxes also may lead to firm closure
by lowering the amount of capital that the firm has for operations and investment. When
taxes are high, firms are likely less profitable, giving them less money to invest in
operating and expanding the business (FoIster, 2002). These reasons suggest that high
levels of taxation may lead to high firm death rates.
However, there are other reasons that high levels of taxation may be associated
with lower rates of firm deaths. The self-employed typically are allowed to deduct any
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business expenses on their tax return, allowing some of their income to be sheltered from
taxes (Lang et aI., 1997; Schuetze, 2000). If income taxes are high, then the ability to
deduct expenses becomes more valuable, leading to greater self-employment. Another
reason why higher tax rates may discourage firm closure is that individuals can more
easily avoid paying all of the legally required taxes when they own a business (Bruce &
Schuetze, 2004). Although high taxes will decrease the expected return to selfemployment, they may decrease the expected return from alternative forms of
employment even more. Thus, high taxes actually may lead to fewer firm deaths.
As discussed previously, a high level of taxation may serve as a barrier to entry to
self-employment as well. Because high taxes are likely to deter entry, existing firms may
face fewer competitors when taxes are high. A lack of competition allows firms currently
operating to charge higher prices for the goods and services that they offer. This allows
them to be more profitable. As this occurs, few self-employed individuals will close their
businesses. Conversely, low levels of taxation may lead to more individuals entering
self-employment (Aidis et aI., 2009; Kreft & Sobel, 2005). If this occurs, existing firms
face more competition. As more firms compete for resources and customers, more firms
are likely to fail (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1993).

H2: There is a negative relationship between the matched overall tax burden
and the matched firm death rate.
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Government Size

Governments are needed to provide certain goods and services in an economy.
Public goods, such as defense, police protection, roads, court systems, and basic research,
would likely be underinvested in without government action and funding (Comes &
Sandler, 1996; Nelson, 1959). When governments fail to provide these goods,
entrepreneurship is likely to falter (Audretsch et ai., 2005; Kirchhoff et ai., 2007; Kreft &
Sobel, 2005). However, much debate exists about the impact that governments have on
economic growth and entrepreneurship when the government goes beyond these basic
functions and moves into providing private goods and redistributing wealth. Large
governments typically provide extensive social safety nets and income redistribution,
which may influence the attractiveness of entering into self-employment.

Social Safety Nets
Large governments often provide significant social safety nets to their citizens.
Generous old-age pensions, medical care, disability payments, and unemployment
insurance are some of the types of programs that large governments may provide to their
citizens (Henrekson, 2005). Although much of the variation in entitlement programs is at
the national level, significant variation exists among states in the level of benefits offered
(Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004b; Howard, 1999). For example, programs such as
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)9 are partially funded by the states with
substantial differences in funding and benefit levels (McKinnish, 2007). In one sense,
extensive social safety nets may serve to limit exposure to risk and, therefore, encourage
9

TANF was formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
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additional risk-taking (Sinn, 1995, 1996). Starting a new firm possibly may be the kind
of risky action that these safety nets stimulate.
However, these safety nets generally offer limited protection against business
failure. This is because most social programs are providing assistance to low-income
individuals with children and those who are unemployed (Henrekson, 2005). They
generally do not provide protection for the costs that an entrepreneur may incur when
their business fails. Furthermore, when states provide generous social safety nets, the
state's safety net provides an incentive for individuals not to enter self-employment, and
the returns to self-employment must be sufficiently high relative to the benefits provided
by government programs (Henrekson, 2005). Thus, extensive social safety nets may
provide another alternative to self-employment: unemployment.
As social safety nets become more comprehensive, individuals may be less likely
to enter self-employment if they can earn an adequate return by exploiting the safety net.
Individuals often enjoy free time (Hornberger & Knauth, 1993) and thus obtain a high
degree of psychic income from being unemployed. Even if individuals earn substantially
less from exploiting the social safety net than from self-employment, they may still
obtain more utility from exploiting the social safety net due to the high psychic income
that unemployment offers. Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2000) found a negative
relationship between the generosity of the social safety net, measured by the replacement
ratio lO , and the level of entrepreneurship in OEeD countries.

\0 The replacement ratio refers to the ratio of benefits received from not working (such as welfare payments
and unemployment insurance payouts) and the amount ofinl~ome received from working (Nickell, 1979).
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Rent-Seeking Opportunities
Large governments generally are involved in more aspects of the economy,
increasing opportunities for rent-seeking (Goel & Nelson, 1998; Scully, 1991). Rentseeking refers to the resource-wasting activities involved in competing for artificially
contrived wealth transfers (Tollison, 1982). An individual or firm may engage in rentseeking by lobbying for regulations that thwart competition, by bribing public officials
for monopoly rights, or by instigating frivolous litigation (Krueger, 1974; Murphy,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993). Rent-seeking activities are an alternative to self-employment;
thus, as rent-seeking opportunities increase, the return of alternative employment
increases. Fewer individuals will engage in entrepreneurial activities as more individuals
are drawn into rent-seeking (Scully, 1991).
Furthermore, when a substantial amount of rent-seeking activities takes place,
productive entrepreneurs are likely to be preyed upon. As an increasing number of
individuals engage in rent-seeking activities and abandon productive entrepreneurship,
those currently self-employed may be forced out of the market as their businesses are
preyed upon by an increasing number of rent-seekers (Baland & Francois, 2000; Murphy
et aI., 1993) and as returns to productive entrepreneurship fall (Acemoglu, 1995). Rentseekers may crowd out productive entrepreneurs in several ways, such as through
frivolous lawsuits, wealth transfers, or lobbying fi)r the passage of restrictive regulations
that hurt competitor firms.
Thus, a large number of rent-seeking opportunities are likely to occur when
governments grow leading to fewer individuals switching into self-employment. This is
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because: (1) rent-seeking opportunities provide a profitable alternative to selfemployment and (2) a high level of rent-seeking may lower the expected performance of
self-employment, especially for owners of new fimas.
H3: There is a negative relationship between the matched state government

size and the matched firm birth rate.
Government Size and Firm Deaths
The size of the government may influence the decision of those currently selfemployed to exit or to remain self-employed. As governments grow larger, rent-seeking
activities become more attractive (Goel & Nelson, 1998). Rent-seeking activities are
often directed at businesses, which may lower the expected returns to self-employment
for some individuals. For example, rent-seekers may engage in pursuing frivolous
litigation against medical doctors, causing some of them to exit self-employment and
seek alternative employment. Even when rent-seekers are not successful in winning their
case and making doctors pay damages, they may leave medical doctors with substantial
legal fees (Dippolito et aI., 2008).
However, operating businesses may also btmefit from the large number of rentseeking opportunities that are likely to arise as governments become large. Existing
firms may take advantage of these rent-seeking activities as a way to protect and expand
their business (Krueger, 1974). Existing firms may have the necessary funding and
associations needed to lobby effectively and to obtain favors from legislators and
government leaders that new, less-organized entrants are likely to lack. Firms often
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engage in rent-seeking by lobbying for regulations that protect existing incumbent firms
at the expense of new firms or potential startups (Oal Bo, 2006; Hardy, 2006; Stigler,
1971). During the development of the trucking industry, for example, some states limited
the weight of trucks specifically on routes that competed with railroads. The shorter the
average railroad haul distance, the lower the weight limit that some states allowed for
freight trucks ll (Stigler, 1971). These regulations favored incumbent railroad firms over
new entrants in the trucking industry.
It is likely that rent-seeking opportunities that large governments provide are

more likely to be exploited by existing firms, increasing their financial performance.
Thus, when governments are large, fewer individuals will exit self-employment for
alternative forms of employment.

H4: There is a negative relationship between the matched state government
size and the matched firm death rate.
Minimum Wages and Firm Births
High minimum wages increase labor costs for firms that require high amounts of
low-skilled labor. In some cases, firms may be able to minimize the effects of minimum
wages through increasing prices to increase revenue (Aaronson, 2001) or by hiring
employees "off the books" so that they can pay a lower wage (Arrowsmith et aI., 2003).
However, when firms are in a competitive industry, they may not be able to raise prices.
Also hiring employees "off the books" is illegal and typically not appealing to workers,
lIGenerally, trucks competed more with railroads on routes of relatively short distances. Railroads had
more of an advantage over trucks on longer routes. Thus, it was thought that the longer the average
railroad haul in a state, the less that railroads would lobby against trucking (Stigler, 1971).
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thus making it difficult to do. Some studies suggest that firms respond to high minimum
wages by hiring fewer employees (Baker et aI., 1999; Brown et aI., 1982; Neumark &
Wascher, 2000).
High minimum wages and are likely to inerease the labor cost of firms. This will
make the expected returns of self-employment lower than they would be otherwise.
Many new firms plan to hire employees fairly early in their life (Human & Matthews,
2004). Thus, labor costs are likely considered when an individual is deciding whether to
start a new firm. When a firm is first started, employees must be paid immediately even
though the revenue those employees generate may not be realized until further in the
future. This may be particularly burdensome for new firms because they are liquidityconstrained (Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994; Johansson, 2000) and often operate in competitive
industries that have low profit margins (Jones et aI., 2004; Ram et aI., 2007).
Additionally, new firms are typically small, and small firms often pay their employees
relatively low wages (Brown & Medoff, 1989; Idson & Feaster, 1990; Morissette, 1993;
Winter-Ebmer,2001). Because small and new firms are likely to pay a larger percentage
of their workers low wages, high minimum wages that increase the labor cost of lowwage workers may have a disproportionate impaet on these types of firms.

H5: There is a negative relationship between the matched minimum wage
and the matched firm birth rate.
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Unionization and Firm Births
High union densities in a region may be due to the types of industries in the
region, to the culture (Singh, 2001), and to the laws that protect and encourage
unionization (Moore, 1998). When union densities in a region are high, firms are more
likely to be unionized. Unionized workers tend to get paid more than non-unionized
workers (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983; Stewart, 1990), making it more
costly for unionized firms to operate. Several empirical studies support the idea that
unionization can lead to decreased firm profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Menezes-Filho, 1997;
Voos & Mishel, 1986). New firms typically are not unionized however. Although
unionization may generally lead to higher wages and lower profitability for most
businesses, firms that are new and small are unlikely to be unionized even in a highly
unionized region. Therefore, they may actually have an advantage over existing firms,
since they will be able to obtain labor at a lower eost. Acs and Audretsch (1989) found
that industries with high levels of unionization had higher levels of new firm entry than
those with lower levels of unionization. Thus, high levels of unionization in a region
may increase the returns of self-employment for owners of new firms entering the
market.

H6: There is a positive relationship between the matched union density and
the match firm birth rate.
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Minimum Wages and Firm Deaths
High minimum wages increase the labor costs of existing firms (Gregg, 2000). If
the minimum wage rises above the marginal revenue that the employee(s) generate, then
firm employment levels are likely to fall (Leonard, 2000). In addition to lowering firm
employment levels, high minimum wages may even cause some firms to go out of
business if they lower the expected performance of the firm below the threshold level.
However, high minimum wages may also serve as an entry barrier (Kreft & Sobel, 2005).
If high minimum wages deter new firms from

entl~ring

the market, competition will be

limited. A lack of competition may allow existing firms to have more flexibility in
setting prices, which may partially compensate for the higher labor cost. This will likely
improve the economic performance of existing films, leading to fewer self-employed
individuals switching to alternative employment. Furthermore, many existing firms have
been operating for some time, giving them a steady cash flow that can be used to pay for
high labor costs if necessary, Waltman, McBride & Camhout, (1998) found that high
minimum wages are associated with lower business failure rates.

H7: There is a negative relationship between the matched minimum wage
and the matched firm death rate.
Unionization and Firm Deaths
Unionized workers typically earn more money than equivalent non-unionized
employees (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983; Stewart, 1990), making it more
expensive for unionized firms to operate. Unionization has been associated with lower
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firm profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Menezes-Filho, 1997; Voos & Mishel, 1986). Although
a high level of unionization in a state may negatively affect the profitability of firms
(since they are more likely to be unionized), it is less likely to affect the profitability of
new firms, which are unlikely to be unionized. High levels of unionization likely
encourage new firm entry, and new firms that enkr the market will tend to have lower
labor cost than existing firms (Acs & Audretsch, 1989). Thus, existing firms, at least
those that are unionized, will be at a competitive disadvantage compared to newer firms.
New firms will have the ability to still earn an adequate return while charging lower
prices than existing unionized firms, decreasing the profitability of existing unionized
firms. When returns to a business become low, owner(s) are more likely to discontinue
operations because returns from the business may fall below the owner(s) opportunity
costs (Gimeno, et aI., 1997). Thus, high levels of unionization are likely to lead to a high
rate of existing firms going out of business.
H8: There is a positive relationship between matched union density and the
matched firm death rate.
Nature of the Opportunity and Firm Births
The impact that institutions have on firm entry is likely to vary depending on the
nature of the opportunity, such as whether it involves performing a service or
manufacturing a product. Services are unique from products in that the offering is
intangible and that production and consumption often occur simultaneously (Carman &
Langeard, 1980; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Gohmann et aI., 2008; Parasuraman, Zeithaml,
& Berry, 1985; Regan, 1963). Starting a firm that offers a service is likely to be much
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more location dependent than starting a firm to manufacture a product (Bowen & Jones,
1986). Manufacturing firms are able to build their product in one location and sell their
product in a different location (Keesing, 1983), while service firms often cannot.
Taxation

Individuals starting firms involved in manufacturing can start their firm in a
location in which the institutional environment is most favorable, such as an environment
with a relatively low tax burden (Bartik, 1985). However, service firms often do not have
this luxury, as the geographical range in which the firm can be started is limited. For
example, a prospective entrepreneur may discover that there is strong demand for pizzas
but few pizzerias in Salisbury Massachusetts, while there is weak demand but many
pizzerias nearby in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. New Hampshire may have a much
lower tax burden, but the entrepreneur does not have the option of opening his or her
pizzeria in Portsmouth unless he or she is willing to accept having few customers and/or
charging a low price. However, a prospective entrepreneur who discovers that there is
strong demand for a special type of surfboard among costal inhabitants could locate their
manufacturing operations in a state with a low overall tax burden, such as South Dakota,
and then transport the finished products to coastal areas where there is customer demand
for them.
H9: A high matched overall tax burden will have a stronger negative impact
on the matched birth rate of manufacturing firms than service firms.
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4.4. METHODS AND RESULTS
Sample

The data used to test these hypotheses come from a set of custom tabulations from
the U.S Census Bureau's Company Division. Known as the EBD (establishment births
and deaths), these tabulations contain data on establishment births and deaths for each
county in the U.S. from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). More specifically, they
contain for each county in the U.S., the total single-unit, multi-unit, and total
establishment firm births and deaths. I only use only data from 1992, 1997, and 2002
because of limited data availability of the independent variables.
In the EBD data, firm births and deaths are collected by industry and contain the
firm's North American Industry Code System (NAICS) codes reported to five digits. An
establishment is considered "born" in a year in which it first reports payroll. Conversely,
an establishment death occurs when no payroll was reported in the current year but was
reported sometime in the previous year. The U.S. Census Bureau defines an
establishment as "a single physical location at which business is conducted or services or
industrial operations are performed" (Plummer & Headd, 2008: p. 8). The birth of a
single-unit establishment represents the birth of a new venture; whereas, a multi-unit
establishment birth represents the geographic expansion of an already existing firm
(Plummer & Headd, 2008). I only examine firm births and deaths from single-unit
establishments.
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Measures

Dependent Variables
I perform the analysis with both matched firm births and firm deaths of singleestablishment firms. Although the EBD tabulations contain data on both single- and
multi-unit establishments, the single-unit births and deaths are a better measure of
entrepreneurship and not merely firm expansion. The ratio of firm births and deaths to
the county's population are used as the dependent variables, representing the firm birth
rate and the firm death rate for each county respec:tively. Therefore, county birth and
death rates
Birth rate: (total county firm birthst/county populationt)
Death rate: (total county firm deaths t Icounty populationt)
These rates are then matched to the rates of contiguous counties by dividing them
by the average rate found in the contiguous counties (this is discussed in the "county
matching technique" section).

Independent Variables
Measures of several state-level variables come from the Fraser Institute's
Economic Freedom of North American (EFNA) index (Karabegovic et aI., 2005). These
measures have been used as measures of institutions in several previous studies
(Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Gohmann et aI., 2008; Kreft & Sobel, 2005; Sobel, 2008)
and are available for all needed years. Developed by the Fraser Institute, EFNA index
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rates economic freedom for states/provinces in the: U.S. and Canada. This index includes
of three components: (1) size of government, (2) takings and discriminatory taxation, and
(3) labor market freedom. Each of these components is consists of several individual
measures, which can be seen in Figure 4.2. The labor market freedom is disaggregated
into two of its measures: minimum wages as a percentage of GDP and union densities.
All measures are transformed into a score ranging from 1-10, with 10 being consistent
with high levels of economic freedom (and 1 associated with low levels). For example,
states with a small government size have a score close to ten on that measure. The same
is true with taxation level (takings and discriminatory taxation) as well as unionization
and minimum wages.
To make the results easier to interpret, I reverse code these four variables by
subtracting them from ten. This makes previously large values small and previously
small values large. For example after the reverse coding, a high score on the size of
government measure means that the state has a relatively large government, while a low
score means it is relatively small.
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Table 4.2: Economic Freedom of North America Index Components
Components
1. Size of
Government

2. Takings and
Discriminatory
Taxation

3. Labor Market
Freedom

Measures
lA: General Consumption Expenditures by Government as
a Percentage of GDP
IB: Transfers and Subsidies as a Percentage ofGDP
1C: Social Security Payments as a Percentage of GDP
2A: Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
2B: Top Marginal Income Tax Rate and the Threshold at
Which it Applies
2C: Indirect Tax Revenue as a Percentage ofGDP
2D: Sales Tax Collected as a Percentage of GDP
3A: Minimum Wage Legislation
3B: Government Employment as a Percentage of Total State
EmQloyment
3C: Union Density

Control Variables
Although the matching technique naturally controls for many confounding
variables, I control for several county level variables: population density, county tax
burden, median income and lagged birth and death rates.
The urbanization of the county is likely to have an effect on the level of
entrepreneurship as well. Urban environments may offer more opportunities for
entrepreneurship because they have access to larger markets and to suppliers leading to
increased firm birth rates (Guesnier, 1994; Keebl(~ & Walker, 1994). In rural
communities, agriculture may dominate the economy instead. Urbanization is measured
by population density, which is calculated by taking the county's population divided by
its area in square miles.
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In addition to state-level taxes, local-level taxes are likely to influence the
location choice as well. Counties and cities often have their own tax rates, especially
property tax rates. Therefore, high births of new firms in a border county could be due to
favorable property taxes in the county compared to the neighboring county, not due to
state-level factors. Thus, I also must control for the burden of taxes at the county-level.
To do this, I use data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Census of Governments. The
Census of Governments is taken every 5 years, and data are used from 1992, 1997 and
2002. The Census of Governments collects data from county governments, and data are
collected on both expenditures and sources ofrev,enue (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009b). For
each county, data are available for the various sources of county revenue, such as income
tax and property tax receipts.
I combine the Census of Governments revenue data with Census data on the
population in each county (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011b) and the median income in each
county (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011a). From this data, an estimate of the tax burden per
capita for the county is calculated as follows:
County Tax Burden = County Tax Per Capita/Median income.

Median income is controlled for as well, since the wealth of an area is often a
significant predictor of entrepreneurship levels (Parker and Robson, 2004; Noorderhaven
and Thurik, Wennekers, and van Stel, 2004).

Finally, I control for lagged birth and death rates. For the analysis with the
matched birth rate as the dependent variable, I control for matched lagged death rates.
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Likewise, for the dependent variable matched firm deaths, I included a lagged matched
birth rate. The lags are three year lags.

County Matching Technique
I match counties with counties that are contiguous with one another and that lie
across a state border. These counties will have access to similar customers, sources of
human capital (Porter, 2000; Rauch, 1991), as well as a similar culture and climate
(Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a). Thus, this method is a good way to control for factors,
even those that are unobservable and immeasurable, that may vary based on location.
This makes it more likely that any observed relationship between the state-level variables
and firm births or deaths is not due to confounding factors. For these reasons, matching
techniques have been used in a number of studies in the economics literature (Bronars &
Lott, 1998; Card, 1992; Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2007; Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a, b;
Holmes, 1998).
The data on contiguous counties come from the 1991 Contiguous County file
from the U.S. Census. This file contains data on contiguous counties for every county in
the U.S. (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1991). The file
contains each pair of counties that are contiguous to one another, as well as a code that
represents in what way the two counties are contiguous. In this essay, I consider counties
contiguous if they meet any ofthe following three conditions: (1) they share a border, (2)
they lie across a body of water but are connected by a bridge of ferry, or (3) they share a
comer. I eliminate county pairs in which both counties are in the same state, only leaving
pairs of contiguous counties that are on different sides of a state border. Counties vary
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drastically by their area. San Bernardino County, California, is 20,052 square miles in
size (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009a), larger than nine U.S. states, all which contain multiple
counties. The state of Maryland is only 9,774 square miles in size, yet contains 24
individual counties and equivalents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009c). Typically, counties in
the Western U.S. are far larger than counties in the Eastern U.S. Therefore, any border
effect is likely to be less pronounced in large counties, which may stretch far from the
border (Holmes, 1998). However, the county size: that is "too large" has not been well
defined in the literature. Holmes (1998) handles this issue by ignoring states located in
the western U.S. which are likely to have larger counties. Others have simply performed
the analysis using all available counties, such as Holcombe and Lacombe (2004a, b). To
account for this issue, the main analysis is performed by eliminating counties that have a
land area of over 1,200 square miles. Eliminating these extremely large counties leaves
952 counties.
Because data from the Census of Governments are only available for 1992, 1997,
and 2002, I construct three panels that coincide with these years. However, the variables
are not used in their raw form; they are matched with those of bordering counties. I
perform the analysis similarly to that of Holcombe and Lacombe (Holcombe & Lacombe,
2004a, b). For example, I construct the dependent variable, matched firm birth rate, by
taking the new firm birth rate in counties located on state borders and dividing that rate
by the average birth rate of the counties that are (:ontiguous to it but that are located in
another state. Often, a county shares a border with at least two counties in the
neighboring state, thus the average birth rates of these counties must be calculated and
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used in the denominator of the matched birth rate formula. The formula can be written
as:

(1)

MBRi is the matched birth rate for county;/. BRi is the birth rate of new firms in

border county i, and BRj represents the birth rates of new firms in the contiguous counties
on the other side of the state border (but all within the same state). n represents the
number of contiguous counties on the other side of the state border. MBRi, the matched
birth rate for county i, is obtained by taking the birth rate of new firms in county i and
dividing this value by the average birth rate of contiguous counties that are on the other
side of the state border. For example, let us say that county i is in state Yand county i
borders countiesji andj2, which are located in state Z. Given that the firm birth rate in
county i =.06, county j i =.08 and county j 2 =.10, then the matched birth rate for county i
would be = (.06/((112)/(.08+.10)) = (.06/.09) = .667. The matched birth rate represents
the county's new firm birth rate as a percentage of the average new firm birth rate of
contiguous counties across the state border.
Counties that share borders with counties in two different states are included in
the analysis twice so that the variables associated with both states can be examined
separately. This leads to a small increase in the sample size from 952 tol101. In
addition to performing this matching for total new firm births in counties,
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I also perform the analysis separately for both the birth rate of manufacturing
firms and the birth rate of service firms in order to test hypothesis 9.

(2)
Formula 2 is used to test the hypotheses predicting firm deaths. Formula 2 is
identical to formula 1, except that it represents death rates. MDRi is the matched death
rate for county i. DRi is the death rate of new fimls in border county i, and DRj
represents the death rates of new firms in the contiguous counties on the other side of the
state border (all within the same state). n represents the number of contiguous counties
on the other side of the state border. MDRi, the matched death rate for county i, is
obtained by taking the death rate of firms in county i and dividing this value by the

average death rate of contiguous counties that are on the other side of the state border.
All independent variables, including control variables, are matched in the same manner.

Statistical Technique
I predict county-level firm birth and death rates using both county- and state-level
predictors. The matching of border counties creates a unique nesting problem: counties
located on a state border are likely to have similar birth and death rate to other counties in
the state because firms in those counties will have similar tax rates and regulations. For
example, a county located along the Kentucky border with Indiana (such as Jefferson
County) is likely to have more similar firm birth and death rates with another Kentucky
counties along the Indiana border (such as Oldham County) than a county located on the
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Kentucky-Tennessee border (such as Wayne County). Thus, the border counties on a
particular state line are nested within a border area. Border areas are counties within a
state that share a common border with a certain adjacent states. There are 174 border
areas in the sample with an average of 4.99 counties in each with a standard deviation of
3.54.
Additionally, border regions are themselvt~s nested within states. The state of
Kentucky, for example, shares borders with Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia,
Virginia, Tennessee, and Missouri. If a state has favorable institutions conductive to the
creation of new firms, that state is likely to have high relative new firm birth rates in all
border areas. Therefore, the model is developed as a three-level model. An example of
this can be seen in Figure 4.2, which shows an example of Jefferson County, Kentucky.
Jefferson County is nested within the Kentucky-Indiana border area, which itself is
nested within the state of Kentucky. There are 45 states included in the sample.
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Figure 4.1: Nested Data Example: Jeffersonville County Kentucky

State (level 3): Kentucky
Indell.endent Variables: None

Border Area (level 2): Kentucky Counties on
Kentucky-Indiana Border
Independent Variables: Matched State Taxation Burden,
Matched State Government Size, Matched State Minimum

~

County (Ievell): Jefferson County
Independent Variables: Controls
Dependent Variables: Matched County Firm
Birth and Death Rates
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I perform multilevel modeling using the hne procedure in R to test the proposed
hypotheses and to account for the multilevel structure of the data. With this type of
analysis, higher-level independent variables can be used to predict county-level outcomes
and different intercepts can be fitted for each border area as well as each state. To test
the developed hypotheses, I follow a model-building process like that recommended by
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). This first involves running an unconditional (null) model
in which the variability in the dependent variable is partitioned into the different levels
(i.e., county, border area, state). Once the varianc,e is partitioned among the levels,
interclass correlations (lCCs) can be calculated to determine if the higher levels (border
area and state) have a meaningful level of variability. To allow for the comparison of
model fit among models, full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) is used
to estimate fixed and random effects (O'Connell & McCoach, 2007).
The county-level equation is the level-l equation because counties are the lowest
level of analysis. The level-l (county-level) equation is displayed below:

(1)

Yijk = 1tOjk + 1t 1PopulationDensitYi + 1t2CountyTaxBurdeni + 1t3MedianIncomei +
1t4LaggedRatei + eijk
In equation (1), Yijk is the matched birth rate (or death rate) for county i. 1tOjk

represents the matched intercept term for border area}. Yijk is predicted by county-level
measures of population density, county tax burden, median income, and lagged rate (birth
or death). In this analysis, I allow the intercept term, 1tOjk, to vary based upon the border
area in which the county is located. However, tht: slope coefficients for the level-l
equation are not allowed to vary based upon the county. Thus, this simplifies the model,
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leaving only one level-2 equation which uses matc:hed state-level variables (which are
unique to each border area) to predict the intercept term, 1tOjk.
(2)

1tOjk=POOk + POljSizeofGovernmentj + P02jTaxBurdenj + p03jUnionizationj+
p04jMinimumW agej + rOjk
Equation 2 shows how 1tOjk is determined. POOk represents the intercept term,

which I allow to vary by state. This is the mean matched birth (or death) rate for the state
that the border lies in, all else held constant. 1tOjk is predicted by the matched size of
government, tax burden, unionization, and minimum wages.
POOk = 'YOOO + !lOOk

(3)

As represented in equation 3, POOk is allowed to vary based upon the state. Thus,
'YOOO

represents the mean birth (or death) rate for each state, while !lOOk represents the

variation of border area k from the state mean.

Results
The descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis and their
correlation are displayed in Table 4.3. Note that these variables are in the form of
matched rates.
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Table 4.3: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
I
1.00
0.57***
(2) Death Rate Ratio
(3) Lagged Birth Rate Ratio 0.56***
(4) Lagged Death Rate Ratio 0.53***
0.15***
(5) County Tax Burden
(6) Government Size
0.02
(7) Tax Burden
-0.08***
0.24***
(8) Median Income
(9) Minimum Wage
0.03
(10) Population Density
0.13***
0.11***
(11) Unionization

Variable

4

5

1.00
0.52***
0.14***
O,ol
0.02
-0.05** -0.06***
0.19*** 0.25***
0.06***
0.03
0.12*** 0.13***
-0.12*** -0.12***

1.00
0.14***
0.01
-0.02
0.15***
0.03*
0.09***
-0.09***

1.00
-0.14***
-0.09***
0.21 ***
-0.16***
0.14***
0.14***

1.00
0.66*** 1.00
-0.13*** -0.1 ***
0.84*** 0.55***
O,ol
-0.02
-0.22*** 0.00

1.00
-0.14*** 1.00
0.07*** -0.04*
1.00
-0.12*** -0.17*** O,ol

1.0454
0.4062

1.0405
0.4151

1.1703
0.8835

1.06573 1.0224
0.4163 0.2062

1.0180
0.1991

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

(I) Birth Rate Ratio

Mean
Standard Deviaton

1.0526
0.4595
-_.-

1.00
0.56***
0.5***
0.14***

1.0510
0.4412

Significance Level: * .05 ** .01

***.001

1.0614
0.3599

1.8613
4.1885

M

\0

......

1.00
1.1413
0.6517

The need for using RCM modeling can be partially assessed by calculating
intraclass correlations (ICCs). Intraclass correlations are calculated to see how variance
in the dependent variable can be explained by the different levels of analysis in the
proposed multilevel model. I first ran an unconditional (null) model in which the
variability in the dependent variable is partitioned to the different levels (county, border
area, and states). The intra-class correlations for both of the dependent variables can be
seen in Table 4.4. The intra-class correlations show how the variability in the dependent
variables is explained by the three proposed levels: counties, border areas, and states.
Table 4.4: Random Effects and Intraclass Correlations

State
Border Group
County
Total

Birth Rate
Variance
0.0078
0.0326
0.1773
0.2177

Percentage
3.59%
14.97%
81.43%

Death Rate
Variance
0.004
0.0194
0.1453
0.1688

Percentage
2.36%
11.52%
86.12%

For the birth rates, about 3.59% of the variation is due to state differences, while
14.97% is due to differences between border areas. For the death rates, 2.36% of the
variation is attributes to state differences, 11.52% is due to differences between border
areas. When observations are clustered in higher level units, the standard errors can be
inflated, and Type I errors are more likely to occur (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). Only a
small percentage of the variance in birth and death rates are at the state level (3.59% and
2.36%). However, Roberts (2007) found that "group dependence may still exist
depending on the nature of the covariates introduced into the model" (p. 15) when an
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intraclass correlation is close to zero. Thus, I kept the random state-level intercepts in the
model despite the relatively small percentage of variation attributed to states.
Next, I estimated a control model for both the matched birth and death rate
differences as dependent variables. These can be seen in Tables 4.5 and Table 4.6.
Then I estimated a full model which contains both the control and hypothesized models.
The results can be seen in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8.
Table 4.5: Control Model: Matched Birth Rate
Variable
Intercept
County Tax Burden
Median Income
Death Rate Lagged
Population Density
Year 1997
Year 2002
AIC
BIC

SE
.0434
.10090
.10380
.0164
.0017
.0153
.0153

Coefficient
.0669
.0451
.4173
.4719
.0080
-.0058
.0041
2730.1
2790.9
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t-value
1.54
5.03
10.99
28.72
4.60
-.38
.27

p-value
.1299
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
.7045
.7872

Observations
Border Areas
States

3249
174
45

Table 4.6: Control Model: Matched Death Rate
Variable
Intercept
County Tax Burden
Median Income
Birth Rate Lagged
Pop_ulation Density
Year 1997
Year 2002
AIC
BIC

SE
.0357
.0076
.10338
.10141
.0015
.0139
.0139

Coefficient
.4196
.0298
.0952
.4624
0053
-.0054
-.0069
1993.2
2054.1

t-value
11.76
3.91
2.81
32.69
3.50
-.39
-.50

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
.0049
<.0001
.0005
.6985
.6186

Observations
Border Areas
States

3249
174
45

Table 4.7: Full Model: Ma.tched Birth Rate
Variable
Intercept
County Tax Burden
Median Income
Death Rate Lagged
Population Density
Year 1997
Year 2002
Government Size
Taxation Level
Union Density
Minimum Wage
AIC
BIC

SE
. 0728
. 0090
,,0380
. 0164
.0017
.0154
.0154
.0526
.0657
.0157
.0512

Coefficient
.2806
.0472
.4057
.4725
.0078
-.0070
-.0054
.0460
-.2680
-.0254
.0483
2716.3
2801.5
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t-value
3.85
5.27
10.66
28.76
4.54
-.45
.35
.88
-4.08
-1.62
.94

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
.6491
.7257
.3814
<.0001
.1045
.3453

Observations
Border Areas
States

3249
174
45

Table 4.8: Full Model: Matched Death Rate
Variable
Intercept
County Tax Burden
Median Income
Birth Rate Lagged
Population Density
Year 1997
Year 2002
Government Size
Taxation Burden
Union Density
Minimum Wage
AIC
BIC

SE

Coefficient
.4829
.0337
.0861
.4580
.0052
-.0045
-.0061
-.0179
-.0343
-.0368
.0399

,,0578
,,0077
,0341
,0142
,0015
.,0139
.,0139
,0392
,0498
,0122
,0389

1989.4
2074.6

t-value
8.36
4.39
2.52
32.14
3.47
-.33
-.44
-.457
-.69
-3.03
1.02

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
.0116
<.0001
.0005
.7447
.6601
.6476
.4911
.0025
.3057

Observations
Border Areas
States

3249
174
45

The hypotheses can be examined using the results in the full models for matched
birth and death rates. The matched overall tax burden is hypothesized to have a negative
effect on both matched firm birth and death rates. I find a negative relationship between
matched taxation level and matched firm birth rates (-.2680;p < ,0001) supporting
hypothesis 1. No relationship is found between matched overall tax burden and firm
death rates (-.0343;p = .4911), Thus, no support is found for hypothesis 2. Matched
government size is hypothesized to have a negative impact on both matched firm birth
and death rates. Matched government size was not a statistically significant predictor of
either matched firm birth rates (.0460;p = ,3814) or death rates (-.0179;p = ,6476).
Thus, neither hypothesis 3 or 4 was supported.
Hypothesis 5 predicts a negative relationship between matched minimum wages
and matched new firm birth rates. There is no support found for this hypothesis (.0483; p
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= .3453). Hypothesis 6 predicts a positive relationship between matched union densities
and matched new firm births, but this hypothesis is not supported (-.0254; P = .1045).
Hypothesis 7 predicts a negative relationship between matched minimum wages and
matched firm death rates. This relationship is not found to be significant .0399; p =
.3057). Hypothesis 8 predicts a positive relationship between matched union densities

and matched firm death rates. However, a statistieally significant negative relationship is
found (-.0368; p = .0025) instead.

Service verse manufacturing
Hypothesis 9 predicts that matched overall tax burden will have a stronger
negative impact on the matched birth rates of manufacturing firms than service firms.
While I expect the overall relationship to be negative, it should be significantly stronger
for matched manufacturing firm births than matched service births. I test this hypothesis
using an interaction term. I first copy each observation, creating a dataset with 6,606
observations. I create a new variable ("matched sector birth rate") that represents either
the service or manufacturing birth rate for each county. Each of the original observations
now are in the dataset twice and have two different values for sector births, one
representing the matched service firm birth rate and the other representing matched
manufacturing firm birth rate. A dummy variable ("manufacturing") is added that equals
1 if sector birth rate variable represents the matched manufacturing birth rate and equals
zero if sector birth rate represents the matched service birth rate. I construct an
interaction term by multiplying the taxation burden variable by the dummy variable
"manufacturing." Based on hypothesis 9, I would expect the interaction to have a
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negative coefficient. This would indicate that for manufacturing firms, the relationship
between the matched overall tax burden and matched firm births is stronger (more
strongly negative) than for service firms.
For years 1992 and 1997, industries are categorized by SIC codes. Industries with
two digit SIC codes of 40-49 (transportation, communication, electric gas, and sanitary
services), 50-51 (wholesale trade), 52-59 (retail trade), 60-67 (finance, insurance, and real
estate), and 70-89 (services) are considered service firms. For year 2002, industries are
labeled with NAICS codes. Firms associated with two digit NAICS codes of 42
(wholesale trade), 44-45 (retail trade), 48-49 (transportation and warehousing), 51
(information), 52 (finance and insurance), 53 (real estate and rental leasing), 54
(professional, scientific, and technical services), 55 (management of companies and
enterprises), 56 (administrative and support and waste management and remediation
services), 61 (education services), 62 (health care and social assistance), 71 (arts,
entertainment, and recreation), 72 (accommodation and food services), and 81(other
services) are considered service firms.
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Table 4.9: Interaction Model: Sector Firm Birth Rate
Parameter
Intercept
County Tax Burden
Median Income
Death Rate Lagged
Population Density
Year 1997
Year 2002
Government Size
Taxation Burden
Union Density
Minimum Wage
Manufacturing
Manufacturing*Taxation
Burden
AIC
BIC
Observations (level-I)

SE
.1977
.0249
.1041
.0475
.0047
.0435
.0441
.1170
.17'01
.0368
.1161
.1802
.1726

Coefficient
.9476
-.0125
-.2491
.4694
-.0141
-.0374
.3887
.0074
-.2685
-.0390
.1040
.1040
.3571

t-value
4.79
-.50
-2.39
9.89
-3.01
-.86
8.82
.06
-1.58
-1.06
.90
.58
2.07

p-value
<.0001
.6159
.0167
<.0001
.0027
.3893
<.0001
.9457
.1146
.2881
.3706
.5638
.0386

21574.57
21682.08
5935

The results can be seen in Table 4.9. The coefficient on the interaction term
Manufacturing*Taxation Burden was statistically significant (3.571;p = .0386).
However, it is in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Thus, hypothesis 9 is not
supported.
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Table 4.10: Results Summary
Hypothesized Relationship
HI
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9

There is a negative relationship between the matched overall
tax burden and the matched firm birth rate.
There is a negative relationship between the matched overall
tax burden and the matched firm death rate.
There is a negative relationship between the matched state
government size and the matched firm birth rate.
There is a negative relationship between the matched state
government size and the matched firm death rate.
There is a negative relationship between the matched
minimum wage and the matched firm birth rate.
There is a positive relationship between the matched union
density and the match firm birth rate.
There is a negative relationship between the matched
minimum wage and the matched firm death rate.
There is a positive relationship between matched union
density and the matched firm death rate.
A high matched overall tax burden will have a stronger
negative impact on the matched birth rate of manufacturing
firms than service firms.

Results
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

4.5. DISCUSSION
Although several of the hypotheses are not supported, the findings are
informative. Several explanations exist for why government size, minimum wages, and
unionization may account little for regional variations in firm births and deaths.
I hypothesized that small state government size should be associated with higher
firm birth rates and higher firm death rates. Howe:ver, no significant relationships were
found. Perhaps large state governments are better able to provide certain public goods,
such as roads, police protection, court systems, and basic research, while states with
smaller governments may underinvest in these public goods. If these types of services
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are beneficial to startups, this may explain why government size does not predict firm
birth or death rates.
I hypothesized that high levels of unionization would be positively related to the
matched firm birth rate and the matched firm death rate. However, a negative
relationship is found between the matched union density and the matched firm death rate.
It seems strange that this relationship is observed, since unionization if often found to

exert a negative financial impact on businesses. Unionized workers typically earn more
money than equivalent non-unionized employees (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr,
1983; Stewart, 1990) and having a unionized workforce has been associated with lower
firm profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Menezes-Filho, 1997; Voos & Mishel, 1986). However,
for smaller firms in areas that are highly unionized, the wage rates for their non-union
workers may be lower making their labor costs lower than areas with higher unionization
rates. Although no significant relationship was found between matched minimum wages
and either matched birth or death rates, this finding may be due to the fact that
differences in minimum wages are relatively modest between states. Furthermore, high
minimum wages are likely to only deter certain types of startups- those that rely on
relatively cheap, unskilled labor. While high minimum wages may deter an entrepreneur
from starting an ice cream shop, they will be unlikely to deter an entrepreneur from
starting up a biotechnology firm.
A failure to find support for some of the hypotheses may be due to prospective
entrepreneurs not "shopping around" much for an area which provides the optimal
climate in which to do business. Perhaps, entrepreneurs just start their business in the
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county and state in which they reside. Even if it is advantageous for an entrepreneur to
start their business in a nearby state, many entrepreneurs may not be aware of any
advantage in doing so. Or alternatively, it may be that entrepreneurs do have a good
understanding of such differences, but choose their location based upon other factors. As
mentioned before, if there is demand for hot pizza in Salisbury Massachusetts, but not in
Portsmouth New Hampshire, it does not make sense for an entrepreneur to start a pizzeria
in New Hampshire regardless of other advantages. Entrepreneurs have to consider a
number of factors when determining the location of a business such as market size
(Davidsson, Lindmark, & 01ofsson, 1994) and aCI~ess to human capital and knowledge
(Audretsch, Lehmann, & Warning, 2005; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998). Although the
matching technique should eliminate many confounding variables, it certainly cannot
eliminate all of them. Finally, there is a cost to starting a business in a location other
than the one in which the entrepreneur resides, even a nearby one. Crossing the state
border to start a business may entail commuting or incurring relocation costs.

4.6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are severa11imitations to this study. The matching technique used in this
study has the advantage of 1imiting- although not eliminating the threat of confounding
variables. Counties that sit on state borders are likely to be similar to those on the other
side of the state border in culture, human capital, natural resources, and access to
customers and suppliers. Thus, any relationship between the differences in taxes and
regulations and differences between firm births and deaths is more likely to be a causal
one. However, matching counties on different sides of state borders is not a perfect
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control, since taxation and regulatory differences may not be the only characteristic that
differs on different sides of state borders. This technique has minimized, but not
eliminated threats to internal validity.
Another limitation of this study is the difficulty controlling for county and citylevel differences in taxation and regulation. These jurisdictions are often empowered to
regulate business, and often do. For example, New York City has recently banned
restaurants from serving food with trans-fats, whHe restaurants in cities in neighboring
New Jersey do not face these regulations as of yet (Wilner & Olshan, 2008). Thus, city
level regulations may have an impact on differences in firm births and deaths in this
border area, confounding any relationship found between counties on differing sides of
the state border. Also, I do not examine the differ,ences in how governments actually
spend their money. What governments spend their money on may be more important
than how much they actually spend. Government spending focused on income
redistribution may deter the birth of new firms, while government spending on education
has been observed to have the opposite effect (Stansel, Gohmann, & Hobbs, 2008).
This study is also limited by the fact they there is no differentiating of births and
deaths of productive firms and those that are unproductive or destructive. Baumol (1990)
argues that the institutional environment has a profound impact on the type of
entrepreneurship displayed in an economy. Just because there are births of new firms,
this does not mean that such firms are productive and ultimately contribute to economic
growth. In fact, many entrepreneurial ventures including certain lobbying firms, likely
do not have a positive impact on economic growth. Likewise, interpretation of death
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rates may be problematic as well. Although the failure of a firm is painful for those
owning the business, failure is often necessary and a natural part of economic
development. Schumpeter (1942) argues that new entrants introduce "new
combinations" or innovations that often lead to the decline and possibly death of existing
firms. Thus, it is difficult to discern the overall economic impact of a high level of firm
deaths.
Examining how taxes and regulations influence different industries is a fruitful
area for future research. In this essay, I do not evaluate births and deaths by industry,
other than a broad breakdown between service and manufacturing firms. It may be that
taxes, government sizes, unionization, and minimum wages influence firm births and
deaths, but only within certain industries. The establishment births and death data used in
this study contains the number of firm births and deaths in each county by five digit
industry codes. Thus, the potential to examine very specific industries exist with the
data. However, the difficulty with doing this is that many smaller counties would have to
be excluded from such an analysis, since they may contain very few births and deaths in
certain industries (or perhaps none at all). However, such an analysis could be done with
counties with larger populations, such as those in metropolitan areas.

4.7. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I hypothesized that small government size, low taxation levels, high
levels of unionization and low minimum wages will be associated with relatively high
new firm birth and death rates. I found support for a negative relationship between
overall tax burden and the birth rate of new firms. However, unionization, minimum
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wages and government size did not influence the birth and death rates of firms in the
manner hypothesized. Likewise, I did not find support for the hypothesis that high
taxation levels would deter the birth of manufacturing firms more than service firms.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the influence of formal
institutions on the behavior of entrepreneurs. Institutions set the "rules of the game" in
an economy, determining incentives, reducing uncertainty, and influencing transaction
costs (North, 1987). The rules of the gamine influence the activities of all "players" in an
economy, and entrepreneurs are no exception. Institutions influence the level
(McMullen, Bagby, & Palich, 2008; Ovaska & Sobel, 2005) and type of entrepreneurship
in an economy (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008). In this dissertation, I build on this research
by examining how institutions influence the behavior of entrepreneurs in three different
contexts. I will briefly summarize the findings from each of these separate essays.
The first essay "The Influence of Institutions on the Likelihood of SelfEmployment: A Multilevel Analysis" I examined the relationship between institutions at
the country-level and how those institutions are related to the likelihood that individuals
in that country will be self-employed. Country-level institution measures used in the
analysis include taxation levels, the strength of property rights, soundness of money,
trade freedom, and the level of business regulation. Two measures of country-level
formal institutions are used: The Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney,
Lawson, Sobel, & Leeson, 2007) and the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage
Foundation, 2005). These country-level measures are paired with individual-level data
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on self-employment from the Global Entreprenemship Monitor (Reynolds et aI., 2005).
The GEM survey is a cross-country data collection project that surveys individuals about
their engagement (or lack of engagement) in entrepreneurship (Reynolds, Bygrave,
Autio, Cox, & Hay, 2004). I use data from 2001-2006, and my sample includes data
from 472,363 individuals and 55 unique countries. The country-level measures of
institutions as well as individual-level control variables are used to predict whether
individuals are self-employed.
With both the Economic Freedom of the World and the Index of Economic
Freedom measures, I find that sound money in a country is positively associated with the
likelihood of an individual being self-employed. Likewise, a positive relationship was
found between property rights and trade freedom and the likelihood that an individual
would be self-employed with the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) measure.
However, this was not found with measmes from the Index of Economic Freedom.
Measures oftaxationlgovernrnent size and the level of business regulation did not predict
the likelihood of being self-employed in the hypothesized direction. While fom
interactions were hypothesized, no significant relationships were found.
In the second essay "Labor Market Institutions and New Firm Employment
Growth," I examined how state-level labor market factors such as minimum wages, union
density, and unemployment insurance premiums influence employment growth in new
firms. Given that new firms are often are resomce-constrained and have less access to
capital than more established firms (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,
& Rosen, 1994), new firms must conserve capital during their formative years. Thus, I
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hypothesized that high minimum wages and unemployment insurance programs that were
costly and penalized firms for firing workers would keep firms from growing their level
of employment. Given that labor unions are often going to make labor more costly for
larger, incumbent firms, I also hypothesized that high union densities would be associated
with higher employment growth in new firms.
I obtained firm-level data from Kauffman Firm Survey (DesRoches, Robb, &
Mulcahy, 2009), which contains data on several thousand new firms across five waves
from years 2004-2008. The sample includes 2,662 observations in the baseline wave,
2,107 observations in the first follow up wave, 1,802 observations in the second follow
up wave, 1,553 observations in the third follow up wave, and 1,391 in the fourth follow
up wave. These data were matched with state-level data minimum wage, unemployment
tax, and unionization data.
None ofthese variables was found to have the hypothesized effect. Minimum
wages and the unemployment insurance structure did not predict the level of employment
in new firms. While state union density did have a marginally significant effect, the
relationship is negative, while a positive relationship was hypothesized.
In the third essay "The Impact of Taxes and Regulations on New Firm Births and
Deaths in State Border Counties" I examined how state-level measures of government
size, tax burdens, unionization levels, and minimum wages influence the birth and death
rates of new firms in counties located on state borders. Data on firm births and deaths by
industry were obtained from a custom tabulation from the U.S. Census Bureau's
Company Division. These tabulations contain data on establishment births and deaths for
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each county in the United States from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). These data
were merged with measures of government size, tax burdens, union densities, and
minimum wages from the Economic Freedom of North America index (Karabegovic,
McMahon, & Mitchell, 2005). In the analysis, I examined counties on state borders,
matching and these counties with counties on the other side of the state border. I
matched counties with counties that are contiguous with one another and that lie across a
state border. I used data from the years 1992, 1997, and 2002. The variables were not
used in their raw form; they were matched with those of bordering counties in a similar
manner as Holcombe and Lacombe (Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a, b).
I found support for a negative relationship between overall tax burden and the
birth rate of new firms. However, unionization, minimum wages and government size
did not influence the birth and death rates of firms in the manner hypothesized. I did not
find support for the hypothesis that high taxation levels would deter the birth of
manufacturing firms more than service firms.
Future Research Possibilities
There are several avenues of future research regarding the influence of formal
institutions on entrepreneurship. In Chapter 3 (Essay 2) I examined how labor market
institutions influence employment growth in new firms. However, little research has
examined the impact that institutions have on firm growth; instead it has focused on how
institutions influence the prevalence of self-employment as well as the births and deaths
of firms (Bjomskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008). Future research should
further examine the link between institutions and firm growth. For example, business
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regulations may limit firm growth by making operating a business more expensive.
Alternatively, they may allow existing firms to grow more rapidly ifthey serve as an
effective barrier to entry.
The relationship between institutions and firm growth becomes even more
interesting when we consider that entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident (Busenitz &
Barney, 1997). This may lead to poor decision making on the part of entrepreneurs
(Hayward, Shepherd & Griffin, 2006). Since entn:preneurs are overconfident, they may
not accurately weigh the negative effect that certalln institutional environments may have
on their business. For example, an overconfident entrepreneur may start a business even
when business regulation is substantial, because he or she may vastly underestimate the
time and resources required to overcome regulatory hurdles. Likewise, an overconfident
entrepreneur may overestimate the amount of tax deductions he or she will be able to
claim, thus underestimating the tax burden they will endure. This may be addressed by
testing interaction effects between cognitive variables such as overconfidence, and
institutional measures, such as the level of business regulation, taxation and property
rights. However, this would require a large individual-level survey across multiple
countries that include measures of cognitive biases (such as overconfidence) which are
not contained in surveys such as the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey. Another
approach may be to perform a conjoint experimenlt in which entrepreneurs are asked if
they would start a given business given certain institutional variables. These may include
tax rates, regulatory burdens, risk of property expropriation, etc. Choi and Shepherd
(2004) used a conjoint analysis in order to show how customer demand, the development
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of enabling technologies, capability of the management team, and stakeholder support
influence an entrepreneur's decision to begin opportunity exploitation. A similar
experiment could be conducted to examine how different institutional environments
influence the exploitation decision of entrepreneurs. Interactions could be tested between
institutional and individual-level variables. Whilt: such an approach has limitations, it
would not require collecting individual-level surv,ey data from multiple countries.
One limitation of much of the research regarding the relationship between
institutions and entrepreneurship has implicitly assumed that entrepreneurship is a
desirable activity. While researchers are often careful to make positive statements
instead of normative ones, the large amount of research that uses entrepreneurship or the
level of entrepreneurship as the dependent variable shows the attention that has been
given to entrepreneurship. This attention suggests that entrepreneurship is often viewed
as something that is socially desirable. Entrepreneurship has been linked to economic
outcomes like job creation and economic growth (Carree, van Stel, Hafer, 2011, Thurik,
& Wennekers, 2002; FoIster, 2000). However, Baumol (1990) recognized that not all

entrepreneurship is socially productive; some entrepreneurship is unproductive and even
destructive. One problem is that it is difficult to determine what entrepreneurship is
productive, unproductive, and destructive. Sobel (2008) attempts to do this by using
measures such as firm births and patenting activity to represent productive
entrepreneurship. He uses the number of lobbying firms and the quality of the state's
liability system as measures of unproductive entn::preneurship. However, using firm
births (and even patenting activity) as a measure of productive entrepreneurship may be
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problematic, since they are crude proxies for productive entrepreneurship. Examining
how institutions influence unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship may be useful
as well. Besides the number of lobbying firms

us~:d

by Sobel (2008), another possible

measure of unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship may be the percentage of
individuals engaging in drug dealing or property crimes. Developing better ways to
examine the influence of institutions on both productive and unproductive
entrepreneurship remains a fruitful area for research.
In Chapter 4 (Essay 3) I matched counties that are contiguous with one another
and that lie across a state border. This method is a good way to control for factors, even
those that are unobservable and immeasurable, that may vary based on location. Any
observed relationship is less likely to be due confounding factors. Due to this advantage,
matching techniques have been used in a number of studies (Bronars & Lott, 1998; Card,
1992; Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2007; Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a, b; Holmes, 1998).
This kind of matching technique can be applied to examine the impact of a number of
state-level institutions and policies. One specific example would be examining how taxes
and regulations influence the births and deaths offilrms in different industries. The
establishment births and death data used in this study contains the number of firm births
and deaths in each county by five digit industry codes making such an analysis possible.
Taxation, property rights, and business regulation are likely to have different effects on
the birth and death of firms depending on the industry in which they operate in.
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